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Starting from the concept of the Matthew effect and inspired by the work of Robert 
Merton, this dissertation explores the intended as well as unintended consequences of 
family policy measures in the social investment state. Two overarching research questions 
are addressed in an empirical and comparative way: 1) Who benefits from government 
investment in current family policy measures?; and 2) What are the consequences of 
government investment in family policy? The results suggest that governments have good 
reasons to care about the social distribution of the benefits of family policy measures. It 
cannot be assumed that families from different social and economic backgrounds will 
react in a homogeneous way to the options and opportunities shaped by family policies. 
The analyses show that inequality prevails in the use of ‘new’ family policy measures 
such as childcare services and parental leave schemes: the middle and higher-incomes 
benefit more from government investment for these measures than low-income families. 
This is likely to counteract the social investment objective of mitigating inequalities in 
early life. The Matthew effect in family policy is not set in stone, however, and is related 
to policy design. In order for the social investment strategy to be effective, due account 
should be taken of internal consistency of policies and of labour market participation, 
and social spending should be increased. Notwithstanding the current policy focus on 
childcare and parental leave, ‘old’ family policy measures such as child benefits have 
a direct and important impact on inequality in early childhood. A focus on income 
protection should be an indispensable part of any successful investment strategy.
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
The poor stay poor,  
the rich get rich.  
That’s how it goes,  
Everybody knows. 
 - Leonard Cohen (‘Everybody Knows’) 
 
Leonard Cohen’s lyrics express a commonly shared intuition about how 
social reality works: the rich seem to get richer, while the poor appear to 
stay poor. It is a phenomenon known as a Matthew effect, a term 
coined by the great sociologist Robert K. Merton (1968a) in a reference 
to a verse in the Gospel of Matthew: “For unto every one that hath shall be 
given, and he shall have abundance: but from him that hath not shall be taken away 
even that which he hath” (Matthew 25:29, King James translation). 
In his 1968 Science article, Merton argues that the prevailing reward 
and communication system in science gives far more credit to well-
known scientists, Nobel Prize laureates in particular, than to relatively 
unknown scientists for comparable contributions. Moreover, he 
describes this phenomenon as a self-reinforcing process that 
accumulates over time. Simply put: even though their contributions to 
the field may be similar, famous scientist tend to become even more 
famous relative to their less famous peers. This allows them to obtain 
more resources, amplifying their chances of acquiring even greater fame. 
Initial advantage begets further advantage, a positive feedback loop 
benefiting those who are already advantaged (Rigney 2010). This 
process of “cumulative advantage” is not limited to scientific endeavour, 
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but can be observed in a variety of social situations and institutional 
contexts: “[it] is a general mechanism for inequality across any temporal process (..) 
in which a favorable relative position becomes a resource that produces further relative 
gains” (DiPrete and Eirich 2006). Processes in which the rich get richer 
(irrespective of whether the riches are expressed in terms of money, 
fame, influence, career opportunities, or indeed any other valued 
resource) have been identified in sports, literature, music, art, business, 
education, the fiscal system, politics et cetera. Hence the familiar ring to 
the truism that the rich will get richer while the poor will stay poor.  
In each of the aforementioned fields, the underlying social 
mechanism of the process at hand is similar, irrespective of whether we 
are talking about the often-cited paper that subsequently attracts even 
more citations or about the marginally more talented young ice hockey 
player who becomes a superstar thanks to better guidance and coaching 
(Gladwell 2008); those in a position of initial advantage enjoy 
disproportionate rewards compared to their less advantaged peers (Gal 
1998). The initial advantage, moreover, is often a matter of luck, or 
‘randomness’, such as being endowed with a talent at sports or, more 
generally, being in the right place at the right time (McNamee and Miller 
2004). In fact, many of the inequalities and disadvantages we encounter 
find their origin in the accident (or lottery) of birth. Various crucial 
factors are more or less predetermined: not only genetic endowments, 
cognitive abilities and talents, but also parental educational attainment, 
socio-economic background of the family, the quality of the house in 
which one lives, and the neighbourhood in which one grows up. 
Sociological research has demonstrated forcefully how the family in 
which one is born reproduces social advantage or disadvantage, through 
economic (Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992) as well as cultural channels 
(Bourdieu 1996). It is well documented that children growing up in 
poverty face inferior life chances (Duncan et al. 1998; Hackman, Farah 
and Meaney 2010), as they start out with a disadvantage they are 
generally unable to overcome. Indeed, poor children exhibit low levels 
of social mobility and often become poor parents themselves (Corak 
2006). Or, as Daniel Rigney argues, “would any rational and informed person 
seriously argue that the son or daughter of a billionaire and the son or daughter of a 
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migrant farm worker share anything even remotely approaching an equal opportunity 
to acquire material wealth?” (Rigney, 2010: 8). 
To return to the example of ice hockey: being born with a talent for 
the game is obviously a matter of luck (insofar as one aspires to 
becoming an ice hockey player, that is). But the lottery of birth also 
works in more surprising ways. In the 1980s, the Canadian psychologist 
Roger Barnsley noticed1 that a disproportionate share of major league 
ice hockey players were born in the first months of the year (Barnsley, 
Thompson and Bamsley 1985). The age grouping in youth hockey 
leagues is determined by ‘hockey years’ (between January 1 and 
December 31), which means that players in the ‘same’ age group may be 
as much as a year apart. The older players are generally bigger and 
stronger than their younger counterparts in the same group. As the best 
players tend to be picked by better, more competitive teams, the older 
players enjoy an advantage for no other reason than the random event 
of having been born in the early months of the year. Barnsley called this 
the “relative age effect”, but it is in fact a perfect example of a Matthew 
effect whereby an initial advantage begets further advantage. As a matter 
of fact, the relative age effect has been observed in numerous other 
competitive sports, including baseball, football, rugby, and soccer 
(Musch and Grondin 2001). Despite it being discovered more than 
thirty years ago, the effect persists to this date (Nolan and Howell 2010).  
Many people would deem the relative age effect to be unfair, and 
probably rightly so. However, it also hints at an important positive 
aspect: clearly this Matthew effect is not an iron law of nature but a 
social construct, implying that it should be rectifiable by changing the 
rules of the game. One could, for instance, adapt the organizational 
structure of youth leagues to countervail the relative age effect. Hence, 
the process of cumulative advantage, the Matthew effect, is not 
inevitable. This observation constitutes the first premise of this 
dissertation. 
                                                 
1  According to Malcom Gladwell, who reports on the story in his book Outliers, 
it was in fact Barnsley’s wife who first noticed the month-of-birth bias. 
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1.1 TALES OF THE (UN)EXPECTED 
Social policy is one of the domains in which a Matthew effect has been 
demonstrated. Herman Deleeck was among the first to investigate who 
actually benefits from government expenditures on social policy 
measures. Based on data from the 1970s, Deleeck, Huybrechs and 
Cantillon (1983) found that Belgium’s universal child benefit system, 
designed to compensate all families for the costs of child rearing, 
actually disproportionally benefited middle and higher-income families. 
Children were entitled to child benefits up to age 18, unless they 
continued to study in which case eligibility was extended to age 25. The 
Matthew effect occurred because 1) the number of eligible children 
increased with income; and 2) children from high-income families were 
overrepresented in higher education. Child benefits had a reversed 
redistributive effect (from low to higher incomes): as these child 
benefits were part of the social insurance system, childless families at the 
lower end of the income distribution in fact contributed to child benefit 
payments to families with children at the higher end.  
Belgian policymakers had of course never intended to implement a 
child benefit system that benefited the rich; the occurrence of the 
Matthew effect was an unintended consequence of the interplay 
between the rules of the game (a policy design effect) and the social 
structure of families with children (a compositional effect). Deleeck, 
Huybrechs and Cantillon (1983) showed that similar mechanisms were 
at play in social housing, pensions, healthcare, cultural participation, and 
education. Julian Le Grand sketched a similar picture of welfare-service 
use in the United Kingdom: the better-off were found to make 
disproportionate use of public and social services such as education, 
housing, healthcare, social care, and transportation (Le Grand 1982). 
Similar research efforts have since been carried out in various 
industrialized countries, identifying Matthew effects in a diverse range 
of social policy fields, including education, healthcare, infant mortality, 
career longevity, early-childhood intervention, social security, housing, 
and childcare (Bakermans-Kranenburg, van IJzendoorn and Bradley 
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2005; Deleeck, van den Bosch and de Lathouwer 1992; Dzakpasu et al. 
2000; Gal 1998; Ghysels and Van Lancker 2010; Gouyette and Pestieau 
1999; Petersen et al. 2011; Storms 1995; Walberg and Tsai 1983). 
In a classic essay, Robert Merton (1936) pointed out that 
unintended consequences are an integral part of purposive action and 
deemed it a ‘fundamental process’ that calls for a “systematic and objective 
study of the elements involved in the development of unintended consequences” 
(Merton 1936). Without mentioning the phenomenon of the Matthew 
effect, Anthony Giddens in turn emphasized the role of unintended 
consequences of policy action in that they “promote social reproduction across 
long periods of time” (Giddens 1984). In this dissertation, I characterize the 
Matthew effect as an unintended consequence of purposive policy action. This 
characterization has two properties. First, it clarifies that the term 
Matthew effect as used throughout this work, refers to a consequence 
of policy action rather than to a consequence of individual human 
behaviour. Second, it emphasizes that the Matthew effect is an unintended 
consequence, as opposed to the intended objective(s) of a particular 
policy measure. Applied to the previously mentioned example of child 
benefits: the objective of child benefits is to compensate all families with 
eligible children (at least partly) for the cost of child rearing, whereas the 
Matthew effect is an unintended consequence, a side-effect, of this 
purposive policy action. 
It does not follow from the definition that a Matthew effect is 
necessarily dysfunctional or undesirable. The intended objectives of 
policy action are - by definition - wanted, desirable, by the actor 
implementing the policy measures, notwithstanding the fact that the 
policy objective might be undesirable to an outside observer (e.g. 
Merton 1936). The unintended consequence, however, may be 
functional or dysfunctional, desirable or undesirable. Let me clarify this 
with another example. In The Paradox of Redistribution, Walter Korpi and 
Joakim Palme conclude for eleven developed countries, on the basis of 
data from the mid-1980s, that “the more we target benefits at the poor only [..], 
the less likely we are to reduce poverty and inequality” (Korpi and Palme 1998). 
To substantiate this rather counter-intuitive claim, Korpi and Palme 
invoked a political economy argument: targeting social spending at the 
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poor (and not at middle and higher-income groups) marshals less 
popular support for redistribution, which feeds back into lower levels of 
social spending. This in turn leads to lower levels of redistribution and 
poverty reduction. However, it is also the case that the middle and 
higher-income groups typically benefit more from universally-oriented 
social insurance programmes than the poor do (Goodin and Le Grand 
1987).  
As a side note: the matter has recently attracted renewed scholarly 
attention. In contrast to Korpi and Palme, the most recent empirical 
studies for OECD and EU economies tend to find that the paradox of 
redistribution has ceased to exist: targeting is no longer associated with 
lower levels of redistribution and poverty reduction (Kenworthy 2011; 
Marx, Salanauskaite and Verbist 2013). I will discuss these recent 
findings in more detail in chapter 4. The bottom line of the argument, 
however, is that if universal social insurance schemes are more effective 
in reducing poverty than selective poverty programmes because they 
garner broad popular support, then the Matthew effect is a functional 
element of effective poverty reduction even if is not the policymakers’ 
intention to make the rich richer. Hence, the Matthew effect is an 
unintended yet not necessarily undesirable by-product of deliberate 
policy action. That is the second premise of this dissertation. 
1.2 THROUGH THE LOOKING-GLASS, OR: VIEWING SOCIAL 
POLICY THROUGH MATTHEW’S LENS 
In the sequel2 to Alice in Wonderland, Alice wonders what the world 
would look like on the other side of a looking-glass. After some 
pondering, she eventually steps through the mirror and discovers a 
strange, adventurous world where nothing is what it seems, and where 
actions have rather unintended consequences. In this dissertation, I, too, 
intend to step through the looking-glass to observe social reality from a 
                                                 
2  Through the Looking-Glass, and What Alice Found There, by Lewis Carroll. 
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different perspective. The main purpose is to approach the notion of a 
Matthew effect as an analytical device to evaluate the outcomes of 
contemporary family policies. I will, in short, look at the outcomes of 
family policy through Matthew’s lens. 
Viewing family policy through Matthew’s lens forces one to go 
beyond the mean impact of policy measures and to take into account 
the social distribution of policy outcomes (Heckman, Smith and 
Clements 1997). Consider the example of the Finnish home-care 
allowance (HCA). Basically, an HCA or cash-for-care benefit is an 
allowance that enables (one of the) parents to stay at home and take care 
of the children themselves instead of outsourcing care to public or 
private childcare services. The result of a political compromise, the 
HCA was introduced alongside legal entitlement to a municipal 
childcare slot for under-threes in 1984 and 1985, and gradually 
implemented thereafter (Repo 2010). The compromise was the result of 
a fierce political and ideological debate between the left and the right. 
The political left emphasized the importance of providing incentives for 
women’s labour market participation by encouraging childcare-service 
use, while the right advocated parents’ freedom to choose between 
different childcare arrangements (Bergman 2004; Sipilä and Korpinen 
1998). The impact of the implementation of the HCA was well 
anticipated. The political right stressed that it would reduce demand for 
childcare and consequently reduce public expenditure, as cash-for-care 
was deemed a cheaper option (Hiilamo and Kangas 2009). Although the 
‘freedom of choice’ rhetoric was framed as being neutral vis-à-vis care 
arrangement preferences, the left argued it would in fact encourage 
traditional family arrangements, with mothers becoming homemakers 
rather than participating in the labour market. As it turned out, these 
predictions were right on the mark. It has since been demonstrated that 
the HCA initiated a move to ‘refamilization’ (Lister 2009; Mahon 2002): 
the majority of young children in Finland are now cared for at home, 
and more than 90% of HCA recipients are mothers (Ellingsæter 2012). 
In terms of user statistics, the policy was a huge success: “By 1990 when 
the law was fully effective, child home care allowances had clearly gone ahead of 
municipal day care as the most popular day care solution for children under three” 
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(Sipilä and Korpinen 1998). As a corollary, maternal employment rates 
are now much lower than in other Nordic countries (Kosonen 2013; 
OECD 2012a). Note that I have stressed supra that intended objectives 
of policy actions are wanted, desired by those advocating or 
implementing the measure, but may be undesirable to other 
stakeholders or observers. Although anticipated, the aforementioned 
consequences were clearly undesirable to the political left. 
The general, mean, impact of the HCA is only half the story, 
though, for its impact on families with young children is socially 
stratified. Among those who receive the benefits, mothers on low 
incomes, with low levels of education, and from a migrant background 
are overrepresented (Ellingsæter 2012). In viewing the outcomes of the 
HCA through Matthew’s lens and taking due account of its social 
distribution, we must distinguish between its direct and indirect impacts. 
First, the majority of recipients of an HCA are to be found in the lower 
end of the income distribution; hence the direct unintended 
consequence is that the lower-income group benefits more than the 
middle and higher-income groups. Prima facie this means that there is no 
evidence of a Matthew effect, or rather, the evidence points at a 
‘reverse’ Matthew effect. Second, as the group overrepresented among 
HCA beneficiaries enjoys fewer opportunities in the labour market, the 
benefit of staying at home increases their opportunity cost to seek paid 
employment. These mothers risk becoming further detached from the 
labour market. This may in turn result in a negative feedback loop, 
further widening the social gap between, on the one hand, a group of 
high-educated, higher-income mothers whose children are enrolled in 
childcare and who are active in the labour market, and, on the other, a 
group of lower-educated, lower-income mothers staying at home and 
providing care for their children. Hence, the indirect unintended 
consequence of the HCA is that it increases class and ethnic inequalities 
(Ferrarini and Duvander 2010; Meagher and Szebehely 2012); the 
Matthew effect emerges as a second-order effect. 
In his 1949 Social Theory and Social Structure, Robert Merton 
differentiates between manifest and latent functions or dysfunctions. To 
Merton, functions are “observed consequences which make for the 
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adaptation or adjustment of a given system” (Merton 1968b), and he 
refers explicitly to functional analysis as a method for evaluating a social 
system. Manifest functions of policy action are intended and recognized, 
while latent functions are neither intended nor recognized (see also 
Ruijer 2012). Applied to the case of the Finnish HCA, lower demand 
for childcare and increased gender inequality are manifest functions, 
while the social stratification of outcomes is a latent function. Hence, 
Matthew’s lens can be applied as an analytical tool for revealing and 
analysing the unintended and unrecognized consequences of deliberate 
policy action. That is the third premise underlying this dissertation. 
1.3 FAMILY POLICY: WHY SHOULD WE CARE ABOUT ITS 
SOCIAL DISTRIBUTION?  
The Leitmotiv of this dissertation is an analysis of the outcomes of three 
family policy measures (childcare services, parental leave schemes, and 
child benefits) from a macro-sociological and functional perspective. A 
functional analysis in the Mertonian sense entails a different way of 
looking at the consequences of social policy. In particular, the outcomes 
of these three measures will be viewed through the lens of Matthew, by 
which I mean that the social distribution of policy outcomes will be 
taken into account. But why should we care about this?  
Social policy, and family policy a forteriori, shapes the range of 
options and opportunities open to its intended beneficiaries and affects 
the living conditions of families (Ferrarini 2006). Julian Le Grand rightly 
notes that “policy-makers fashion policies on the assumption that those affected by 
the policies will behave in certain ways and they will do so because they have certain 
motivations” (Le Grand 1997). One cannot assume, however, that citizens 
will react to policies in a homogeneous way, or as predicted by 
policymakers. Family policy impacts on the intersection between 
motherhood, family and employment, yet without taking into account 
the heterogeneity in terms of preferences, opportunities and constraints 
in relation to decisions about care and employment, one can neither 
understand nor evaluate the outcomes of these policies accurately 
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(Mandel 2012). Mothers continue to bear a disproportionate share of 
the burden of child-rearing (Budig and England 2001; Uunk, Kalmijn 
and Muffels 2005), yet lower and higher -educated mothers tend to 
make different choices with regards to the combination of (paid) work 
and care. After childbirth, low-skilled mothers often withdraw 
(temporarily or permanently) from the labour market in order to 
provide childcare, whereas higher-skilled mothers tend to ‘outsource’ 
childcare and remain active in the labour market. Indeed, it has been 
meticulously documented how the increase in female labour market 
participation observed over the past decade has been a socially stratified 
process, with low-skilled women participating to a much smaller extent 
than their higher-educated counterparts (Cantillon et al. 2001; Evertsson 
et al. 2009; Konietzka and Kreyenfeld 2010). Moreover, due to the 
phenomenon of educational homogamy, dual earnership has also been 
adopted in an uneven way in modern societies exacerbating the labour 
market disadvantage and the welfare gap between low-skilled and high-
skilled families. Mothers are however not only constrained by the 
structure of the labour market; cultural factors, social norms and 
personal preferences are also at play (Pfau-Effinger 2004). For example, 
maternal employment is lower in countries where more traditional 
norms concerning motherhood prevail (Thévenon and Gauthier 2011). 
This also holds at the individual level: lower-educated mothers and low-
income families tend to hold more traditional views on gender roles and 
on what it means to be a ‘good mother’, and they report a lower 
commitment to paid work (Fortin 2005; Steiber and Haas 2012). In 
contrast, when it comes to the employment-care nexus, higher-income 
and higher-skilled families are less likely to have a traditional 
breadwinner arrangement. Although some scholars (notably Hakim 
2000) advocate the primacy of relatively fixed personal preferences and 
‘lifestyle choices’ for explaining stratified outcomes with regards to 
employment and care, most sociological research stresses that 
opportunities, norms and preferences are interrelated, and it has been 
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demonstrated that opportunities tend to shape the context in which 
preferences are formed (Crompton and Lyonette 2010; McCrae 2003; 
Steiber and Haas 2009)3. In sum, not only do policies shape the options 
open to its intended beneficiaries, but the manner in which these 
individuals and families respond tends to be related to the social context 
in which they live. 
If the opportunity structure (labour market opportunities, 
preferences, and social norms) with regards to employment and care 
differs vastly across individuals and families from different social 
backgrounds, then focusing exclusively on the mean impact of policy 
measures can obviously be very misleading. Surprisingly, though, the 
opportunity structure for different social groups in analysing the impact 
of social policy has been rather neglected in the recent scholarly 
literature. Few studies have considered the heterogeneous impact of 
social policy on families and individuals from different social 
backgrounds. In one such example, Budig and Hodges (2010) 
investigate differences in the so-called motherhood penalty, i.e. the 
difference between women with and without children, in terms of 
earnings for women across the income distribution. Keck and Saraceno 
(2013), for their part, consider the motherhood penalty in employment 
for mothers with a varying educational attainment. Similarly, Mandel 
(2012) studies the impact of social policy on gender wage inequality for 
high and low educated men and women. Rense Nieuwenhuis (2014), 
finally, asks how the impact of reconciliation policies on women’s 
employment differ for lower-educated and higher-educated women. All 
of these studies have illuminated class-related differences in the impact 
of social and family policies.  
 
  
                                                 
3  In the sociological literature, revealed preferences, as measured in surveys for 
example, are almost invariably regarded as being exogenous to care and 
employment decisions. The ‘fixed preferences’ assumption has been 
convincingly challenged by psychologists (Tversky and Kahneman 1981). 
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Starting from the three aforementioned premises, the first 
central research question in this dissertation is: Who benefits 
from government investment in family policy? I will investigate the 
social distribution of the outcomes of three measures of family 
policy. This will, in short, reveal whether, how, and which types 
of Matthew effects are present. 
 
Viewing the outcomes of family policy through Matthew’s lens will 
not only reveal its socially stratified impact (if present), but it might also 
shed light on its latent functions and dysfunctions. This enables one to 
investigate the effectiveness of government expenditures for these 
measures (Gouyette and Pestieau 1999). The mere assumption that each 
type of social expenditure serves a particular objective (or particular 
objectives) does not imply that the anticipated goal is effectively 
reached. For evaluating the outcomes of family policy, it is necessary to 
include in the analytical framework not only the heterogeneous impact 
of these measures but also the policy design.  
Returning to the case of Belgian child benefits, the observation that 
this scheme benefits higher-income groups more than it does lower-
income groups, while its intended objective is to support all income 
groups equally, merits that one should 1) evaluate the effectiveness of 
government expenditures on child benefits in achieving the intended 
objectives; and 2) if required, adjust the child benefit scheme 
accordingly. As previously mentioned, the interplay between the 
universal design of the policy measure and the opportunity structure of 
its intended beneficiaries generates a Matthew effect. Here, the Matthew 
effect is dysfunctional in terms of achieving the intended policy 
objective; government outlays are not spent effectively. This could be 
offset by for example, introducing greater selectivity into the child 
benefit system (see chapter 4). 
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Hence, the second central research question is: What are the 
consequences of government investment in family policy? Since a 
dysfunctional (or functional) Matthew effect might countervail 
(or reinforce) the intended objectives of policy measures, 
answering this question enables one to evaluate the effectiveness 
of spending on family policy. In doing so, explicit account will 
be taken of the design of family policy measures.  
1.4 A BRIEF AND IDIOSYNCRATIC HISTORY OF SOCIAL 
CHANGE AND FAMILY POLICY DEVELOPMENT 
The theoretical formulations of the Matthew effects presented in the 
previous sections provide a useful analytical tool for understanding and 
evaluating the outcomes of three family policy measures: child benefits, 
parental leave schemes, and childcare services. Family policy in general, 
and these three schemes in particular, have undergone substantial 
change over the past decades in response to ideological motivations, 
new needs and demands, and structural economic and demographic 
pressures. Several theoretical and empirical perspectives on institutional 
and social change have been explored in the literature (e.g. Esping-
Andersen 1990; Hemerijck 2012a; Pierson 2001; Wilensky 1975). What 
follows is a brief description, in comparative perspective, of the 
principal evolutions leading to the implementation of the three family 
policy measures concerned. 
From the immediate post-War period onwards, most of the 
measures taken in the field of family policy were merely income oriented 
and served the purpose of making society share in the monetary cost of 
child upbringing and ensuring children’s well-being. On the basis of a 
diverse set of ideological arguments, European welfare states crafted a 
combination of cash benefits (e.g. child benefits, maternity benefits) and 
fiscal measures (e.g. tax allowances, derived rights) (Ferrarini 2006; 
Gauthier 1999; Kamerman and Kahn 1978; Montanari 2000; Wennemo 
1992). These family support schemes were designed to cope with the 
‘old social risk’ of child-rearing and served no activation purpose 
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whatsoever. During the so-called trentes glorieuses, an era of economic 
growth, prosperity and near-universal coverage of social risks (such as 
unemployment, work incapacity, sickness, and old age), these cash 
benefits and tax measures continued to expand so that by 1985 all 
developed countries had some form of family support in place 
(Wennemo 1992).  
During this period, only the Scandinavian countries began to 
develop large-scale public childcare services. Concern about declining 
birth rates, prompted by Gunnar Myrdal’s Crisis in the Population Question 
(1934), encouraged the Swedish government to institutionalize family 
policy measures in order to reduce the private cost of raising children, 
boost higher birth rates, and generate gainful employment for men and 
women. In 1943, the first state subsidies for childcare services and 
kindergartens were introduced (Hwang and Broberg 1992). From the 
1970s onwards, with a push from the social-democratic party who made 
it a key priority (Bonoli 2013), the expansion of municipal childcare was 
accelerated (see chapter 3 for a detailed account of the Swedish case) 
and parental leave legislation was introduced. Similar developments took 
place in Denmark (Ellingsæter and Gulbrandsen 2007); Finland and 
Norway followed a less expansive but more ambiguous policymaking 
pathway (see the discussion of the HCA supra, see also chapter 5). In 
Eastern European countries, a particular type of parental leave schemes, 
i.e. home-care allowances (supra), was developed from the 1960s 
onwards. Hungary, for instance, introduced such an allowance in 1967 
at a time of labour surplus with the explicit objective of discouraging 
employment for low-skilled women (Kamerman and Kahn 1991). Other 
Eastern European countries implemented similar policies, usually in the 
shape of long leave periods involving rather generous allowances. As 
will be demonstrated in the next section, to this day the Central and 
Eastern European member states of the EU stand out in terms of 
parental leave provisions. In other countries, the focus has remained on 
cash benefits and tax breaks for families with children. In some 
continental countries, notably Belgium, France, the Netherlands but also 
Italy, a universal system of (part-time) preschools for children aged 3 or 
4 years to compulsory school age developed as a part of the education 
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system (Bonoli 2013; Morgan 2009). Its objectives were pedagogical, 
however, and served no purpose of ‘activation’. 
By the 1970s, the industrialized welfare states had reached a 
considerable level of maturity, and yet they had sailed into some very 
choppy waters. This was, after all, period of serious social and economic 
upheaval. Growth was slowing down, unemployment was rising and the 
post-war institutions of the welfare state seemed unable to cope with 
the consequences of a number of evolutions following the economic 
crisis, including the advent of economic globalization and growing 
international competition, demographic changes, the tertiarization of 
employment, changing family relations, the mass entry of women into 
the labour market, and new migratory flows (Bonoli 2005; Morel, Palier 
and Palme 2012; Taylor-Gooby 2004). Designed to cope with traditional 
‘old social risks’, the welfare state had to set out in search of an adequate 
response to a set of unfamiliar new challenges and newly-emerging 
social risks such as being low-skilled (often resulting in a high 
unemployment risk), single parenthood, the problem of combining care 
duties with paid work, the necessity to care for frail relatives and 
insufficient social security coverage (Bonoli 2005; Taylor-Gooby 2011; 
Vandenbroucke and Vleminckx 2011). Although welfare states have, 
prima facie, proven to be remarkably robust over the past four decades 
(Pierson 2011), in qualitative terms there has been an important shift 
away from the traditional welfare settlement, both at a policy level and 
in terms of ideas (Dwyer 2004). Initially incrementally and restricted by 
the laws of path dependency, but more explicitly since the mid-1990s, a 
common focus on employment, social investment and cost containment 
has emerged that is underpinned by European discourse and policy 
(Cox 1998; Hemerijck 2011). 
The so-called post-industrial transition has resulted in often painful 
shifts in the labour market, from industry to services and from low-
skilled to high-skilled jobs (Iversen and Wren 1998; Pierson 2001). This 
has been a momentous change. Since the early 1970s a process of de-
industrialization has taken place and the share of industrial production 
in the creation of national wealth has declined. Conversely, the 
importance of services has grown throughout the post-war period. 
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According to figures from the OECD STAN Indicators Database, 
employment shares of manufacturing industries in the total economy of 
OECD countries have declined substantially since the 1970s (from 
between 25 to 30 per cent to between 10 and 15 per cent by the mid-
2000s), while employment in services has increased rapidly (Wölfl 2005). 
At the same time, job content has changed dramatically: the share of 
routinizing and ‘alienating’ labour stemming from the industrial era (the 
traditional working-class jobs) has declined and generally made way for 
more knowledge-intensive jobs (be they low-end service jobs or high-
end creative jobs) (Goos, Manning and Salomons 2009; Oesch and 
Menés 2011). This evolution implies a shift towards a higher-skilled 
workforce and hence the likelihood of a widening gap between those 
who do and does who do not possess the skills demanded by a 
‘knowledge economy’.  
Consequently, a substantial group of people, often low skilled 
and/or socially vulnerable, has become economically redundant, 
resulting in greater reliance on social benefits and thus higher 
dependency rates (and costs) in social security. Pierre Rosanvallon 
(1995) termed this la nouvelle question sociale – the new social question. To 
the extent that the low skilled become detached from the dominant 
culture in society (as it finds expression in the middle classes), their 
economic exclusion coincides with a far-reaching exclusion from the 
social, political and cultural spheres. This at once sheds light on the 
paradigm shift that has taken place in the social agenda, away from 
protecting people from the perils of the labour market (by means of, 
say, unemployment benefits) towards the notions of ‘social inclusion 
through work’, ‘welfare-to-work’ and ‘investment in human capital’, 
which are now prevalent in European discourse on social protection 
(Dean 2007; Gilbert 2002; Lewis 2009). 
Intertwined with this labour market transition are evolutions such 
the emancipation of women and the changing patterns of family formation. The 
post-war welfare settlement was grounded on gendered assumptions: 
men were primarily responsible for generating the household income, 
while women took care of the children and household chores, a ‘silent 
agreement’ resulting in regular and fulltime male employment and stable 
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families (Lewis 2001; Orloff 2006). This model began to erode, 
however, from the second half of the 1960s onwards, as evidenced by a 
massive influx of women into the labour market, changing patterns of 
family formation and growing divorce rates (Blossfeld 1995; Crompton 
and Lyonette 2006; Lewis 2009). Described by Ann Orloff as a ‘farewell 
to maternalism’ (2006), the policy logic shifted from supporting women 
as mothers and full-time carers to encouraging employment for all, 
reflecting the ideal of a gender-neutral and individualized model in 
which men and women are regarded as both workers and carers 
(Esping-Andersen et al. 2002).  
The consequences for the functioning of the welfare state were far-
reaching. First and foremost, the emancipation of women meant that 
the working population grew quite strongly, which inevitably translated 
into great imbalances in a labour market already in full transition. As a 
result, the socio-economically weak (be they men or women) saw their 
position further deteriorate, while the impact of the growing service 
economy increasingly affected the employment opportunities of low-
skilled individuals. Second, the outsourcing of care work, previously 
performed unpaid by women, suddenly came at a cost. Moreover, as 
women continued to be largely responsible for care work within their 
families, and despite the formal ideal of the individualized worker, this 
resulted in a double – and sometimes excessively burdensome – day’s 
work for both single parents and mothers in dual-income families. 
Third, marital instability led to an increase in one-person households 
and lone-parent families, an evolution that commonly went hand in 
hand with an intensified poverty risk for such vulnerable households 
(Esping-Andersen et al. 2002).  
In sum, men and women alike were now expected to engage in paid 
employment, and family policy had been reoriented to fully support this 
new vision. Denmark and Sweden were well equipped to deal with these 
new needs: dual earnership had been more or less the norm there since 
the 1960s and family policy already incorporated childcare services and 
parental leave schemes, designed to facilitate the work-life balance. 
Other European welfare states were also reorienting their family policy 
measures, expanding childcare service provision and parental leave 
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eligibility, including in countries where the role of the state in family 
matters had traditionally been limited, as in the United Kingdom (Lewis 
2006a). Moreover, the way family policy responses to the new 
challenges were implemented varied across countries depending on the 
normative and institutional frameworks into which they were fitted 
(Mätzke and Ostner 2010). That being said, clearly today both growing 
employment and the reconciliation of family and work are key 
considerations in contemporary family policy, firmly underpinned by 
European discourse and promoted by international organizations such 
as the OECD (Bonoli 2013; Mahon 2006; OECD 2011b). 
1.5 A THREESOME OF FAMILY POLICY IN THE SOCIAL 
INVESTMENT STATE 
Social investment constitutes a set of policies and ideas that emerged in 
the mid-1990s as a response to profound and fundamental changes in 
the labour market and in the demographic structure of societies, and the 
emergence of new social risks and needs (Hemerijck 2014). The core 
idea underlying social investment is that social policy should no longer 
focus on ‘passively’ protecting people against the perils of the market by 
means of cash benefits but rather on preparing or ‘empowering’ people 
with a view to integrating them maximally into the market (Jenson and 
Saint-Martin 2003). Labour market integration is regarded not only as a 
superior way of achieving income protection and social inclusion at the 
individual level, but also as an indispensable feature of ‘productive’ 
social policy systems, as higher employment levels decrease benefit 
dependency and contribute to sound public finances, hence to the 
future sustainability of the welfare state itself. The prime channel to 
achieve this ideal of social inclusion through labour market participation 
is long-term investment in human capital, beginning in early life 
(Hemerijck 2012b). This ought to ensure productivity improvement for 
future generations and bestow upon individuals the necessary skills in 
order for them to be able to grab the opportunities that present 
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themselves in a knowledge economy and, ultimately, to break the 
intergenerational chain of poverty (Esping-Andersen 2002). 
It is safe to say that the social investment framing of problems and 
solutions in the field of social protection is now the accepted view in 
most countries, inside as well as outside the European Union (Cantillon 
and Van Lancker 2012; Jenson 2012; Peng 2011). At the European level, 
the basic principles have been diffused through the 2000 Lisbon Agenda 
and the ensuing EU2020 strategy (Cantillon 2011; Daly 2012; Peña-
Casas 2012). Indeed, in the early 1990s, growing female employment 
and the reconciliation of family and work began to emerge as key 
elements in European discourse on family policy in the wake of some 
profound changes in European welfare states (Lewis 2006b; Mätzke and 
Ostner 2010). 
At EU level, family policy in the social investment state era became 
generally embedded in an employment-dominated logic, and 
accommodating responsibilities at work and at home emerged as an 
important policy issue (Council of the European Union 1992). Although 
gender equality, equal opportunities for men and women and the 
problem of work/family reconciliation were added in 1998 as a separate 
‘pillar’ to the European Employment Strategy (EES) and thus became a 
subject for the soft policymaking approach known as the Open Method 
of Coordination (OMC) (Hardy and Adnett 2002), by 2003 these three 
interrelated principles were de facto subordinated to an all-encompassing 
approach of ‘employment mainstreaming’ under the Lisbon Strategy, 
despite being paid lip services in official EU communication (Jenson 
2008; Lewis 2006b; Rubery et al. 2003). In short, work/family 
reconciliation measures are expected to contribute to increasing female 
employment in conjunction with broader EU labour market measures 
(e.g. active labour market policies, labour market and working-time 
flexibility4, see Fagan and Walthery 2007), and its potential for 
enhancing gender equality and equal opportunities both in the domestic 
                                                 
4  The 1997 Directive on Equal Treatment for Part-timers and the 1993 
Directive on Working Time. 
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sphere and in the market has been watered down and encapsulated 
within the employment objective. Most recently, the notion of early 
investment in human capital has influenced EU discourse on family 
policy. In its 2013 Social Investment Package, the European 
Commission stresses the importance of investing in early childhood 
through high-quality childcare provision in order to break the 
intergenerational chain of poverty and exclusion (European 
Commission 2013a). The objective is to address the problems of youth 
unemployment and early school leaving in order to ensure that all 
children would become ‘productive’ adults. Once again, social inclusion 
objectives appear to be embedded in an employment-dominated policy 
logic. 
Let us now take a closer look at how the three family policy 
measures under scrutiny in this dissertation took shape in European 
countries under the social investment paradigm.  
1.5.1 New family policy measures: childcare and 
parental leave 
The first family policy measure promoted by the EU as a lever for 
removing disincentives to female employment, balancing paid work and 
family duties, and mitigating inequalities in early life is childcare services. 
As noted supra, it is generally considered to be an efficient instrument 
for encouraging mothers to seek paid work, thereby contributing to 
gender equality as well as to investment in young children. Previous 
research has demonstrated a strong relationship between the level of 
formal care services and women’s employment rates in industrialized 
countries (Gornick, Meyers and Ross 1998; Jaumotte 2003; van der 
Lippe and van Dijck 2002). Evidence on the direct, causal impact of 
childcare services on labour supply is less unequivocal, though. Baker, 
Gruber and Milligan (2005) and Lefebvre, Merrigan and Verstraete 
(2009), for example, took the introduction in 1997 of universal, highly-
subsidized childcare in Quebec (but not in other Canadian provinces) as 
an opportunity to estimate the impact on maternal employment; they 
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found substantial labour supply effects among mothers with preschool 
children. Baker et al. (2005), on the other hand, reported that a 
substantial share of the new childcare usage was accounted for by 
working mothers who previously relied on informal care arrangements. 
A similar shift was observed in Norway by Havnes and Mogstad 
(2011a), combined with a more negative impact of childcare on 
maternal employment. They took the opportunity of a 1975 childcare 
reform in Norway to investigate its labour supply effect, and concluded 
that the newly created and highly subsidized childcare scheme crowded 
out informal care arrangements, so that the overall increase in net 
employment was almost negligible. 
In the case of childcare and its integration in the ESS, issuing hard 
law in the form of Directives has failed, and recourse has been sought 
to soft law (Richardt 2004). Starting from the work of the European 
Commission Network on Childcare during the 1980s, a Childcare 
Directive was drafted, though it was never adopted. Nevertheless, 
childcare became an official policy issue with the adoption of the 1992 
Childcare Recommendation, which reflected a discourse on economic 
efficiency and labour market opportunities. A decade later, explicit 
childcare targets, including the objective to provide childcare, by 2010, 
to at least 33% of under-threes and to at least 90% of children between 
ages 3 and mandatory school age were adopted at the 2002 Barcelona 
Summit as part of the Lisbon strategy (Bleijenbergh, Bussemaker and 
De Bruijn 2006; Council of the European Union 2002). Finally, in 2009, 
the European Council drafted a strategic framework for European 
cooperation in the fields of education and training, and adopted the 
strategic objective for 2020 that at least 95% of children between ages 4 
and compulsory primary school age should participate in childcare 
(European Council 2009). 
Whether the soft law of target-setting and the OMC has profoundly 
influenced national childcare strategies is hard, if not impossible, to 
assess. Nonetheless, Figure 1-1 and Figure 1-2 show that considerable 
differences exist between countries and that, hitherto, most fall short of 
the Barcelona targets. Figure 1-1 shows coverage rates for children aged 
0-2 years in a ‘regular week’ in 2011 (the most recent data available); 
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Figure 1-2 shows coverage rates for children aged 3-5 years. Formal 
childcare encompasses centre-based services, day-care centres, 
professional child minders, and preschool education. 
 
Figure 1-1 The use of formal childcare across European countries, children 
aged 0-2 years, 2011, % 
 
Source: own calculations on EU-SILC 2011 (EU-SILC 2010 for Ireland). The 
horizontal dashed line represents the Barcelona target of 33% of children under the 
age of 3. Countries included: Slovak Republic (SK), Czech Republic (CZ), Romania 
(RO), Poland (PL), Hungary (HU), Bulgaria (BG), Lithuania (LT), Austria (AT), Latvia 
(LV), Finland (FI), Estonia (EE), Ireland (IE), Cyprus (CY), Greece (GR), United 
Kingdom (UK), Switzerland (CH), Germany (DE), Spain (ES), Malta (MT), Italy (IT), 
SI (Slovenia), Portugal (PT), Belgium (BE), Norway (NO), France (FR), Luxemburg 
(LU), Sweden (SE), Iceland (IS), Netherlands (NL), Denmark (DK). 
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Figure 1-2 The use of formal childcare across European countries, children 
aged 3-5 years, 2011, % 
 
Source: own calculations on EU-SILC 2011 (EU-SILC 2010 for IE). The horizontal 
dashed line represents the Barcelona target of 90% of children between 3 years and 
mandatory school age. Countries included: see note under figure 1.  
 
More than half of all EU member states have surpassed the 
Barcelona target for under-threes, namely Denmark, Netherlands, 
Sweden, Luxembourg, France, Belgium, Portugal, Slovenia, Italy, Malta, 
Spain, Germany, and the United Kingdom. The Netherlands and the 
United Kingdom, however, are somewhat special cases, because the 
majority of use is on a part-time basis (see chapter 5). Non-member 
states Iceland, Norway, and Switzerland have likewise surpassed the 
target. The majority of laggards, i.e. countries that have failed to attain 
the target, are Central and Eastern European member states. They share 
a historical legacy of Communist rule, with high female employment 
rates and extensive day-care provisions for preschool children (Haintrais 
2004). After the collapse of these Communist regimes, the expectation 
was that they would display a trend of refamilization would be observed 
(Szelewa and Polakowski 2008b). Indeed, the low coverage rates suggest 
that young children are now cared for at home in these countries. This 
evolution is also reflected in the availability of long periods of paid leave 
in these countries (infra). The only exception is Slovenia where almost 
half of the children aged 0-2 attend formal childcare on a fulltime basis. 
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Other countries that have failed to reach the Barcelona target are 
Greece, Cyprus, Ireland, Finland, and Austria. The low rate of childcare 
use for under-threes in Finland is related to the success of the existing 
home-care allowance (HCA) in place (supra; also chapter 5). 
The situation is different insofar as coverage rates for children aged 
3-5 years are concerned. Most European countries have systems 
offering pre-school (e.g. kindergartens), with higher coverage rates and 
hence less cross-country variation in these rates (Figure 1-2). Romania is 
the only country where less than half of eligible children are enrolled in 
pre-school, while the majority of countries record usage rates above 
80%. In all, 15 of the EU27 countries have attained the Barcelona 
target, namely: France, Denmark, Italy, Belgium, Netherlands, 
Luxemburg, Slovenia, Germany, Estonia, Cyprus, Portugal, Sweden, 
Spain, and the United Kingdom. Non-member states Norway and 
Switzerland fall short of the mark, whereas in Iceland coverage is almost 
universal and fulltime. 
A second important aspect of the EU’s focus on employment and 
the reconciliation of work and family concerns the implementation of 
leave rules. Take-up of leave and use of childcare services are 
interconnected, as leave entitlements enable parents to interrupt 
employment and to care for their young children at home, thereby 
temporarily reducing the need for external childcare services. 
Nonetheless, parental leave and childcare service provision are both 
activation oriented. Leave rules foster parents’ bond with the labour 
market by maintaining the contractual link between employers and 
employees, even though the latter retreat temporarily from the labour 
market to take care of their children (Ghysels and Van Lancker 2011). 
The employment effect of leave is however more complicated than that 
of childcare provisions, as it depends in part on the length of the leave, 
on the conditions of entitlement, and on the generosity of the allowance 
(Gornick and Hegewisch 2010). Short periods of particularly well-paid 
leave have been shown to be beneficial to female employment: young 
mothers-to-be are encouraged to reinforce their labour market 
attachment by the facts that taking leave will induce only minor income 
loss and that they will subsequently be able to return safely to their jobs 
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(De Henau, Meulders and O’Dorchai 2007; Del Boca et al. 2007). Still, 
if the duration of the retreat out of the labour market is too long, there 
are fewer incentives for young women to start a career prior to 
childbirth, including due to deteriorated career prospects after the leave 
period (Gornick, Meyers and Ross 1997; Morgan and Zippel 2003a; 
Nyberg 2004; see also chapter 6). When the leave allowance is too low 
or even non-existent, there is little incentive to take-up leave, especially 
for members of low-income families who cannot afford to forfeit 
earnings (Fagan and Walthery 2007). Finally, as with childcare services, 
leave is a potentially powerful instrument to promote gender equality in 
both care arrangements and in the labour market5. The OECD makes a 
distinction between four types of leave entitlements: maternity, 
paternity, parental and home-care leave (e.g. the Finnish HCA, supra) 
(OECD 2011b). 
In contrast to the soft targeting in the case of childcare services, the 
EU has influenced national policymaking on leave rules in a direct, 
‘hard’, legislative way by introducing legally binding Directives6 (Moss 
and Deven 2006). Examples are the 1992 Pregnant Workers Directive 
(92/85/EEC), which stipulates that workers who have recently given 
birth or who are breastfeeding should be granted the right to maternity 
leave of at least 14 continuous weeks with either retention of their salary 
or an adequate allowance, and the 1996 Parental Leave Directive 
(96/34/EC), which prescribes a minimum right to three months of 
                                                 
5  When the burden of care is shared between men and women and, 
consequently, leave is taken by both on an equal basis, norms on 
motherhood and fatherhood should be challenged and the gender inequality 
in the labour market should be mitigated. Several countries, under the 
impetus of the EU, have tried to expand fathers’ take-up of leave through the 
introduction of daddy quotas (part of the leave is reserved for men on a take-
it or leave-it basis). However, if no remuneration is stipulated and the 
financial incentive for men (which are often higher earners) to take up leave 
is low, parental leave entitlements might reinforce rather than change 
traditional gender roles. This would be an illustration of the unintended 
consequences of purposive policy action. 
6  This is the result of the power vested onto the social partners by the 1992 
Maastricht Treaty to negotiate agreements that could be translated into 
binding Directives. See Bleijenbergh et al. (2004). 
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parental leave for both men and women7. It was further specified that 
fathers as well as mothers should be individually entitled to leave, 
implying that leave should be non-transferable between partners. 
Despite these minimum standards, however, national policies continue 
to vary considerably, as the conditions and rules, as well as the choice 
between paid or unpaid leave provisions, were left to the discretion of 
the member states. Figure 1-3 highlights the substantial differences 
between European countries. It should be noted that, for the sake of 
simplicity, the figure is restricted to parental and home-care leave. Leave 
rules and conditions are complex insofar as eligibility, financing, 
duration and flexibility are concerned, and it would take us too far to 
compare all such details for this large set of countries. Interested readers 
are therefore referred to the excellent overviews by Ray et al. (2010), 
Jorens and Klosse (2008), and Moss (2013). Here I report on the 
situation as it was in 2008. This is an important caveat, as the 1996 
Directive has since been replaced with the 2010 Parental Leave Directive 
(2010/18/EU) which extends the minimum right to parental leave 
entitlement from 3 to 4 months. The new Directive was to be 
implemented by member states no later than March 2013. 
 
                                                 
7  The United Kingdom did not sign the 1996 agreement and must only meet 
the maternity leave provisions. 
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Figure 1-3 Duration and remuneration of parental leave entitlements in 
European countries, 2008 
 
Source: OECD, 2011. Note: only parental and home care leave, excluding maternity and 
paternity leave. The numbers denote the total length of parental leave in weeks. 
 
Figure 1-3 shows that the length of (paid or unpaid) parental leave 
differs considerably between European countries, ranging from (almost) 
three years in Poland, Germany and France to approximately one year 
in Sweden and Denmark, and to the legal minimum of three months (in 
2008) in Ireland, Belgium, the United Kingdom and Portugal. All 
countries thus have leave schemes that go beyond the minimum 
standards set by the EU Directive. A second issue is whether leave is 
paid or unpaid. In the context of the present study, it should be noted 
that unpaid leave is not attractive to low-paid working families, as they 
are often unable to afford forfeiting income by temporarily retreating 
from the labour market (Ray, Gornick and Schmitt 2010). In 2008, this 
was the case in the United Kingdom, Ireland, Greece and Spain (in the 
Netherlands, loss of income is compensated through a tax credit 
scheme). Twelve countries provide benefits covering the entire leave 
period, namely Poland, France, Finland, Hungary, Slovakia, Estonia, 
Norway, Sweden, Slovenia, Luxembourg, Italy, Belgium and Portugal. 
In Austria and the Czech Republic, the period of income support 
actually exceeds the total leave period, which is an incentive for low-
paid mothers in particular to leave paid employment altogether (OECD 
2011b). In Denmark and Germany, leave allowances are restricted to 
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part of the total period of employment-protected parental leave. 
Particularly in Germany, the difference in duration between paid and 
unpaid leave is substantial: parents can claim a leave allowance for only 
a third of the three-year leave period. As noted supra, most Central and 
Eastern European countries provide long periods of paid leave, with 
Slovenia, again, the exception. 
A third element of cross-country variation in parental leave schemes 
consists in the generosity of leave allowances, as expressed in Figure 1-3 
in full-rate equivalents (FREs). FREs represent the theoretical number 
of weeks during which parents are entitled full wage replacement. For 
example, if Country A has a leave period of 12 weeks and provides full 
wage replacement for the whole period, then its FRE amounts to 12 
weeks. By comparison, Country B, which has the same leave period but 
replaces only 50% of the previously earned wage, has an FRE of only 6 
weeks (0.5*12) (OECD 2011b). Using this method, I am able to assess 
in a straightforward manner the relative generosity of different 
countries’ leave schemes. For countries with a flat rate benefit (Belgium, 
France, Germany, Sweden and the United Kingdom), or countries 
imposing income ceilings (Belgium, Germany, Norway, Spain, Sweden 
and UK), the FRE represents a percentage of the average wage in that 
particular country (Ray et al. 2010). As shown in Figure 1-3, only 
Slovenia provides full wage replacement throughout the leave period. 
Sweden and Denmark are also generous, with full wage replacement 
during approximately half of the leave period, as compared to just a 
third of that period in most other countries. In sum, despite the 
minimum standard for leave entitlements imposed under European 
legislation, cross-country comparison of leave schemes in EU member 
states indicates that great variation persists. 
Although the EU has clearly contributed to the observed shift in 
the dominant policy discourse, it is hard (if not impossible) to determine 
unequivocally how much impact it has had on policies in individual 
member states. As social policymaking remains very much a national 
prerogative under the EU’s subsidiarity principle, ultimately it is up to 
individual member states to decide in which direction family support 
measures should move. Obviously, in spite of EU initiatives to steer 
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national family policies in a certain direction, and notwithstanding that 
all European welfare states have crafted combined child benefit, leave 
entitlement and childcare policies to assist families with children, there 
continue to be obvious differences in terms of the structure, generosity 
and entitlement periods of the schemes concerned (Bradshaw 2006; 
Ferrarini 2006; Montanari 2000). To a large extent, these differences 
stem from past choices (path dependency), and they often reflect 
divergent ideological views on the relationship between family, state and 
market and on the role of women in society (Daly and Lewis 2000; 
O'Connor, Orloff and Shaver 1999). This holds in particular for child 
benefits, as will be discussed in the next section. 
1.5.2 Old family support measures: child benefits 
All European welfare state have child benefit schemes in place, but, as 
in the case of childcare and leave policies, there is considerable variety 
between these systems in terms of their design, structure and generosity. 
The specific design of child benefit schemes in individual countries 
often reflects past objectives and ideological assumptions: they may be 
income or non-income related, they may vary with the age or parity of 
the children, they may be taxable or non-taxable, the funding base may 
be contributory or non-contributory, and they may operate through the 
tax system or involve cash benefits, or both (Immervol, Sutherland and 
de Vos 2001; Kamerman 1980). Ferrarini, Nelson and Höög (2013) 
distinguish between six types of child benefits: universal child benefits, 
employment-based child benefits, income-tested child benefits, child tax 
allowances, child tax credits, and child tax rebates (although the latter 
type is applicable only in exceptional cases). Table 1-1 provides an 
overview of the structure of child benefit systems in European countries 
(as in June 2009). 
 
  
30 
 
Table 1-1 The structure of child benefit systems in European countries, 2009 
 Cash Tax 
 Type Variation 
with number 
of children 
Variation 
with age of 
the child 
Supplements Type 
AT Universal x x x 
Allowance 
/ Credit 
BE Employment x x x 
Allowance 
/ Credit 
BG Income-tested  x   
CZ Income-tested  x x Credit 
DE Universal x   
Allowance 
/ Credit 
DK Universal  x x  
EE Universal    Allowance 
ES Income-tested  x  Allowance 
FI Universal x  x  
FR Universal x x  Credit 
GR Employment x  x 
Allowance 
/ Credit 
HU Universal x    
IE Universal   x  
IS Universal x x x  
IT Income-tested x    
LT Income-tested x x x Allowance 
LU Universal x x   
LV Universal    Allowance 
MT Universal x    
NL Universal x x x  
NO Universal   x  
PL Income-tested x x x Allowance 
PT Income-tested x x  Allowance 
RO Income-tested x x x Allowance 
SE Universal x    
SI Income-tested x  x Allowance 
SK Universal x  x Allowance 
UK Universal x  x Credit 
Source: own composition on the basis of CSB MIPI database (Van Mechelen et al., 
2011) and OECD (2012). Note: ‘supplements’ refers to additional benefits for specific 
types of families (large families, families with disabled child, single parents) or low-
income families.  
 
As regards cash benefits, it is clear from the table that the majority 
of countries have in place a universal child benefit system so that all 
families with children are entitled to (at least) a basic allowance. This is 
the case in Austria, Germany, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, 
Hungary, Ireland, Iceland, Luxemburg, Latvia, Malta, Netherlands, 
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Norway, Sweden, Slovak Republic and the United Kingdom. Benefit 
levels typically depend on the rank and age of the child, and additional 
supplements are granted for disabled children, and to lone-parent 
households, large families and low-income families. In other words, 
child benefit systems generally cover the variable needs of children 
(Immervol, Sutherland and de Vos 2001). In Belgium and Greece,  
working families are entitled to employment-based benefits rather than 
to universal non-income related benefits while non-working families 
usually receive income related benefits.  
The majority of European countries combine cash benefits with tax 
benefits (Van Mechelen and Bradshaw 2013). Tax allowances are 
deducted from taxable income while tax credits are deducted from tax 
liability. Similar to cash benefits, tax benefits may be income-tested and 
they may vary with the age or the rank of the children concerned. 
Germany is the only country with a child benefit systems consisting 
mainly in tax measures: it replaced its universal cash benefit scheme 
with an optional model of tax credits and tax allowances in 1996. 
Families with children are taxed in the most favourable way, which in 
most cases involves tax credits. In other countries, the cash component 
prevails, although fiscal policy has gained in prominence over the past 
decades (Ferrarini et al. 2013). The architecture of child benefit systems 
is discussed in greater detail in chapter 4. 
1.6 OUTLINE OF THE DISSERTATION 
Starting from the three previously outlined premises and the proposed 
theoretical concept of the Matthew effect, this dissertation addresses 
two overarching research questions in an empirical and comparative 
way: 1) Who benefits from government investment in current family 
policy measures?; and 2) What are the consequences of government 
investment in family policy? Inspired by the work of Robert Merton, 
our answer to the first research question sheds light on the presence of 
Matthew effects, while answering the second question enables one to 
evaluate how effectively current family policy measures attain the 
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envisaged objectives. Although the number of countries included in the 
analyses presented in the various chapters of this dissertation differs 
depending on data availability, the main focus is on European welfare 
states (although chapter 6 also presents analyses for the US and 
Australia). 
In Chapter 2, written in collaboration with Joris Ghysels, I set out 
to explore the first substantial research question: who benefits from new 
as well as old family policy measures? First, I explore how spending on 
the three distinct family policy schemes has evolved and consider 
whether family spending has shifted from old to new measures. Second, 
I tackle the question of how expenditures are allocated across different 
households in European societies. This is followed by an in-depth 
distributional analysis of two specific cases: Sweden and Belgium’s 
Flemish region. The case studies of Sweden and Flanders are 
subsequently discussed more in detail in Chapter 3. This chapter, 
likewise co-authored with Joris Ghysels, presents a detailed account of 
childcare services and considers how the interplay between policy 
design, labour market attainment and childcare use is resulting in 
different patterns of social spending. These case studies shed light on 
the specifics of policy design, and provide insight into whether and how 
a particular design might counteract or reinforce the intended objectives 
of said policies. 
The intended and unintended consequences of family policy 
measures are explored in the subsequent chapters. In Chapter 4, the 
focus is on the lower end of the income distribution. Co-written by 
Natascha Van Mechelen, this chapter uses model family data to gauge 
child benefit levels for families on different incomes and investigates the 
relationship between benefit design and effective child poverty 
reduction. This issue is related to the ‘paradox of redistribution’, which 
has been under siege in recent years. In Chapter 5, the focus shifts to 
childcare services. It is hypothesized that the objectives of childcare 
services under the social investment paradigm will not be effectively 
achieved in the presence of a Matthew effect. After discussing the basics 
of the so-called child-centred investment strategy, I investigate the social 
distribution of childcare service use in the EU27 based on EU-SILC 
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data. Furthermore, I explore some tentative explanations for the results 
obtained. Chapter 6, written in collaboration with Joris Ghysels, builds 
on the findings from Chapter 5. Drawing on the comparative social 
policy literature, I explore the determinants of inequality in childcare 
coverage for a broad set of countries. Given the lack of both prior 
theoretical understanding and comparative data, this analysis is 
exploratory in nature and tries to identify which institutional welfare 
state features may be associated with inequality in childcare use. 
Finally, in Chapter 7, I adopt a panel approach to childcare use and 
public investment. Based on various cross-sectional waves of EU-SILC 
data (2006-2010) and spending data derived from the OECD SOCX 
database (2005-2009), I consider trends in spending, childcare use, and 
inequality in childcare use in an attempt to determine whether 
convergence has taken place. Furthermore, I empirically investigate the 
relationship between spending and childcare use as well as between 
spending and inequality in childcare use. A more dynamic account of 
childcare and inequality should provide better insight into how public 
spending impacts on inequality in childcare coverage in the era of social 
investment. I conclude with a discussion of the results obtained, some 
suggestions for further research, and a general assessment of the 
relevance of respectively old and new forms of family policy to the 
future of the social investment strategy. 
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CHAPTER 2 
WHO BENEFITS FROM INVESTMENT 
POLICIES?* 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Family policy is a constituent part of the traditional social policy mix 
that has been subject to profound changes in terms of both scope and 
substance following the emergence of the social investment state. 
Initially in the post-War era, most measures in the field of family policy 
were entirely income-oriented and served the main purpose of making 
society share in the monetary cost of child raising and ensuring 
children’s well-being. Working from diverse ideological foundations, 
European welfare states crafted a combination of cash benefits (e.g., 
child benefits, maternity benefits) and fiscal measures (e.g., tax 
allowances, derived rights) (Ferrarini 2006; Gauthier 1999; Montanari 
2000). The design of such family support measures was geared entirely 
toward coping with the “old” social risk of child-rearing and served no 
activation agenda whatsoever. 
                                                 
*  This chapter has been published as Van Lancker, Wim and Ghysels, Joris 
(2014) “Who benefits from investment policies? The case of family activation 
in European countries” in: Cantillon, Bea and Vandenbroucke, Frank, 
Reconciling work and poverty Reduction: how successful are European welfare states? 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. Some minor adjustments have been made 
for the purpose of this dissertation. We would like to thank Dieter 
Vandelannoote and Willem Adema for their valued help with the data, and 
Frank Vandenbroucke, Bea Cantillon, and the participants of the Gini 
workshop in Antwerp (November 14-15, 2011) and the SOCLIFE Research 
Seminar in Cologne (December 21, 2011) for their comments and 
suggestions. 
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In the past three decades, however, the family policy mix has 
undergone a remarkable transformation. Its traditional pillar of 
“passive” cash measures has been complemented with “activating” 
services and measures, such as early childhood education and care 
(ECEC) services and parental leave schemes, designed to reconcile work 
and family life, to foster female employment, and to promote child 
development, all of which are important pillars of the social investment 
idea (e.g. Bonoli 2005; Esping-Andersen 2008). More generally, under 
the umbrella of European-led initiatives aimed at boosting employment 
rates and enhancing competitiveness and growth, family policy (and 
investment in young children) has come to be seen as a “productive 
factor” and an integral part of employment-centered social policy 
strategies (European Commission 2000; Lewis 2009). It is often 
assumed that this emphasis on activation and the accompanying change 
in discourse has led to a shift in government expenditures from “old” to 
“new” family measures (Cantillon 2011). 
This chapter considers the outcome of government investment in 
the present-day family policy mix, defined as policy measures aimed at 
families with young children (under 6 years old). The focus is on the 
three mainstays of family policy, representing old as well as new forms 
of family support: ECEC (briefly: childcare) services, parental leave 
schemes, and child benefits. The key question addressed is who benefits 
from changing government expenditures on family policy? More specifically, we 
want to unravel (1) whether the assumed shift in government 
expenditures for family policy has actually occurred; and (2) how 
expenditures are allocated over different households in European 
societies. Our research question is fueled by growing concern over the 
distribution of family-oriented benefits under activating policy measures 
(Esping-Andersen 1999; Ghysels and Van Lancker 2011; OECD 2011b; 
Van Lancker and Ghysels 2012). Traditional cash programmes of family 
support (child benefits) redistribute income between households with 
and without children and generally entail elements of vertical 
distribution from high to low incomes in order to ensure children’s well-
being in families with more limited economic resources(Immervol, 
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Sutherland and de Vos 2001; Wennemo 1992). It is, however, much less 
evident which households are the beneficiaries in the case of parental 
leave and childcare services. Considering their underlying employment 
logic, it can be hypothesized that government expenditures for those 
measures will first and foremost benefit families with two earners. 
Given the fact that dual earnership is not equally dispersed among 
income strata, with higher educated women being more often employed 
and living in a dual earner household (Cantillon et al. 2001; Evertsson et 
al. 2009), the implication is that social expenditures for activating family 
support are biased against the lower incomes and that government 
expenditures will flow first and foremost toward dual earner 
households, which have more financial resources at their disposal and 
thus greater opportunities to ensure their children a better future. More 
generally, if policy measures are grafted on an underlying logic of 
(previous) employment, then government investment will favor those 
already better-off. In this respect, it was claimed in a recent European 
Commission review on employment and social developments in Europe 
that “the resources devoted to early childhood education and childcare (ECEC) 
services are seen to benefit the rich more than the poor” (European Commission 
2011b). This phenomenon has been designated a “Matthew effect,” 
after the Gospel of Matthew (see chapter 1). Our analysis aims to 
demonstrate whether the above considerations hold true and, if so, 
whether this Matthew effect may be an unavoidable feature of current 
family policy. 
The next section investigates whether a shift in social expenditures 
has taken place from old to new measures. Subsequently, we study the 
variable use of the aforementioned measures by different income 
groups using European-wide survey data. This is followed by an in-
depth distributional analysis of two specific cases: Sweden and the 
Flanders region of Belgium. We end this chapter with a discussion of 
the results and their implications for social investment policies related to 
families with young children. 
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2.2 PRODUCTIVE FAMILY POLICY IN THE EUROPEAN 
UNION: SCOPE AND EVOLUTION 
Chapter 1 described how social policy became embedded in an 
employment-driven logic and why accommodating responsibilities at 
work and at home became an important policy issue at European Union 
(EU) level since the early 1990s (Council of the European Union 1992; 
Lewis 2006a; Mätzke and Ostner 2010). In a nutshell: Family measures 
are expected to contribute to increasing female employment in 
conjunction with broader EU labour market measures; their potential 
for enhancing gender equality and equal opportunities, both in the 
domestic sphere and in the job market, has been watered down and 
encapsulated within the employment objective. 
In the field of family policy, the EU promoted various measures for 
removing disincentives to female employment and balancing paid work 
and family duties. A first lever is the provision of childcare services. It is 
generally considered an efficient labour market instrument that removes 
barriers to labour market participation by mothers, while at the same 
time contributing to gender equality and investment in young children 
(Lewis, Campbell and Huerta 2008; Vandenbroucke and Vleminckx 
2011). Women still face the main burden of child care, and, without the 
possibility of externalizing care duties (be it through informal or formal 
channels), they are often unable to engage in paid employment. In the 
absence of decent care provisions, women often cut back on their 
working hours or quit the labour force altogether to take care of their 
(pre-school-age) children (Ferrarini, Nelson and Höög 2013; Uunk, 
Kalmijn and Muffels 2005). Indeed, it has been shown that the 
availability of formal care services in particular is a strong determinant 
of female labour supply in industrialized countries (Jaumotte 2003; van 
der Lippe and van Dijck 2002). Child care became an official EU policy 
issue with the adoption of the 1992 Childcare Recommendation, 
followed by the adoption of explicit targets to provide child care by 
2010 to at least 33% of children under 3 years old and to at least 90% of 
children between 3 years old and mandatory school age at the Barcelona 
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Summit in 2002 as part of the Lisbon Strategy. A new benchmark for at 
least 95% of children between 4 years old and mandatory school age to 
participate in child care was set in 2009. At present, child care is seen as 
a means to reach the EU2020 targets for employment, early school 
leaving, and poverty (European Commission 2011a). 
Parental leave is a second important aspect of EU concern for the 
reconciliation of work and family life. Leave entitlements interact with 
childcare services, because they enable parents to interrupt employment 
to care for their children, which reduces the need for external childcare 
services during that period. Nevertheless, parental leave and childcare 
service provision are both activation-oriented. Leave schemes ensure 
parents’ bond with the labour market by maintaining the contractual 
link between employer and employee during the latter’s temporary 
retreat from work (Ghysels and Van Lancker 2011). However, their 
employment effect is harder to assess than that of childcare services, 
because that depends on the length of the leave, the conditions of 
entitlement, and the generosity of the benefit (Gornick and Hegewisch 
2010). Short periods of particularly well-paid leave have been shown to 
be beneficial to female employment rates: Young women are 
encouraged to strengthen their labour market attachment before 
childbirth through the knowledge that they will incur only minor 
income loss during their leave and that they will be able to safely return 
to their jobs subsequently (De Henau, Meulders and O'Dorchai 2007; 
Del Boca et al. 2007). However, longer leave from the labour market 
provides women with fewer incentives to start a career and fewer 
postleave career prospects (Gornick, Meyers and Ross 1997; Morgan 
and Zippel 2003b). The exact tipping point is rather unclear: Jaumotte, 
for instance, found that the impact of parental leave on employment 
becomes negative beyond a duration of 20 weeks, while others assert 
that the optimal leave period may be more than 40 weeks (Jaumotte 
2003; OECD 2011b). If remuneration is too low or even nonexistent, 
there are few incentives for taking leave, especially for low-income 
families who cannot afford to give up earnings (Fagan and Walthery 
2007). Like childcare services, leave is a potentially powerful instrument 
to ensure gender equality in both care arrangements and on the labour 
40 
 
market (see Ray, Gornick and Schmitt 2010for further reading on this 
issue). Generally, four types of leave entitlements are available in 
European welfare states: maternity, paternity, parental, and home-care 
leave (OECD 2011b). In contrast to the soft targeting in the case of 
childcare services, the EU has influenced national policymaking on leave 
rules in a legislative way by introducing legally binding Directives. 
Examples are the 1992 Pregnant Workers Directive (92/85/EEC), 
which stipulated that workers who have recently given birth or who are 
breastfeeding should be granted the right to maternity leave of at least 
14 continuous weeks with continuous receipt of either their salary or an 
adequate allowance, and the 1996 Parental Leave Directive (96/34/EC), 
which stipulated a minimum right to three months of parental leave as 
an individual entitlement for both men and women. In 2010, the 1996 
Directive was revised (2010/18/EU) inter alia extending the period of 
leave to four months. 
A final policy measure we incorporate into our comparative exercise 
is child benefits, which constitute a more traditional pillar of family 
policy. All European welfare states have child benefit schemes, but, as 
with childcare and leave policies, there are considerable differences in 
design, structure, and generosity. Previous research on the history and 
evolution of child benefit systems has shown them to be shaped by 
ideological considerations and gendered views on society and the role of 
men and women as breadwinners and/or homemakers. Hence, they 
may serve different purposes (Gauthier 1999): (1) as a complement to 
household income so that mothers can stay at home and take care of the 
children; (2) to encourage parenthood and increase fertility; or (3) as a 
means of horizontal and/or vertical redistribution in response to a 
concern for the well-being of children. The particular design of the 
system of child benefits in the various countries often reflects such 
historical objectives and ideological motives: They may be income or 
nonincome related, variable with the age or parity of the children, 
taxable or nontaxable, have a contributory or noncontributory financial 
base and operate through the tax system, via cash benefits, or a 
combination of the two (Immervol, Sutherland and de Vos 2001; 
Kamerman 1980). 
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One of the assumptions underlying this chapter is that the 
transition from the traditional welfare state to the social investment state 
has coincided with a shift in expenditures from passive cash benefits to 
activating family support. Ultimately, this is an empirical issue. How 
does the hodgepodge of family policy measures of different origins, 
with divergent ideological foundations and varying modalities translate 
into government expenditures, our main area of interest? Moreover, 
given the above-described shift in the dominant EU policy discourse to 
an emphasis on work/family reconciliation and activation, is there a 
parallel evolution to be observed from old to new family support 
measures? 
Figure 2-1 shows total gross government spending on child 
benefits, parental leave, and child care for 21 EU Member States and 
Norway compiled from the OECD Social Expenditure database 
(SOCX). We also take government spending via the tax system (by 
means of tax credits or tax allowances) into account, which is an often 
overlooked fact in comparative spending exercises (Adema, Fron and 
Ladaique 2011). 
The amounts of spending are made comparable across countries 
and over time by converting them into purchasing power parities (PPPs) 
using the EU27 average as basis. To ensure that differences in spending 
between countries are not driven by demographics, we control for the 
number of children between 0 and 6 years of age for child care and 
parental leave spending, and for the number of children between 0 and 
18 years of age for spending on child benefits. In effect, what is shown 
in Figure 2-1 is the average spending per child on the three mainstays of 
family policy in 2009, while Table 2-1 shows the evolution of average 
spending per child for the three measures between 2001 and 2007 and 
between 2007 and 2009. 
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Figure 2-1 Average net government spending on child benefits, parental leave, 
and childcare, per child in €PPP, 2009 
 
Source: own calculations on OECD SOCX database and Adema et al. (2011). No 
information available for Bulgaria, Romania, Latvia, and Lithuania. Note: childcare 
includes spending on day-care services, pre-primary (ISCED0) education and, if 
applicable, tax credits for childcare. Leave includes maternity as well as paternity and 
parental leave. Child benefits include benefits in cash and benefits working through the 
tax system. 
 
Although diversity is without doubt the main feature of a cross-
country comparison of spending on family policy, certain patterns 
emerge. In the Southern welfare states, spending on family policy is 
comparatively low and heavily concentrated on child care (nurseries for 
3–6-year-olds in particular). The highest overall spending is observed in 
the Continental and Nordic countries. In the former, child benefits are 
relatively more important (with Luxemburg as emblematic example), 
while in the latter the focus is on productive family policy (childcare 
services and parental leave). This mirrors choices made in the past. 
The Anglo-Saxon countries differ from each other. While spending 
in Ireland is comparatively low and focused on child benefits, the UK 
spends above average, emphasizing childcare services. Although the 
former Socialist economies share a history of extensive day-care 
provisions for pre-school-age children combined with generous and 
extensive leave schemes, today only the latter is clearly reflected in the 
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expenditure data. Czech Republic, Slovenia, Estonia, and Hungary only 
devote a minor share of family policy expenditures to childcare services, 
although they have retained their focus on leave entitlements and 
display a rather high average level of spending per child. Poland finds 
itself at the bottom of the league table with total spending at 
Mediterranean level. 
 
Table 2-1 Change in government spending on three family support measures 
per child in €PPP, 2000-2007-2009, European countries. 
 Child benefits Leave schemes Childcare services 
 Δ01-07 Δ07-09 Δ01-07 Δ07-09 Δ01-07 Δ07-09 
Spain +313% -2% +105% +31% +40% +8% 
Portugal +35% +36% +120% +25% +45% +11% 
Italy +15% -1% +52% +4% +20% -1% 
Greece +43% 25% +52% +53% +2% -5% 
       
Czech R. -29% -50% +196% -16% +41% +10% 
Poland +245% -10% +43% +27% +139% +17% 
Slovenia +18% +6% +27% +34% +15% -10% 
Slovak R. +113% +11% +56% +9% +47% 10% 
Hungary +68% +3% +81% +8% +49% 0 
       
Ireland +103% +9% +176% +17% +83% +6% 
UK +88% +12% +507% -16% +56% -9% 
       
Estonia +50% +3% +170% +54% +226% +2% 
       
Denmark +12% +3% +44% +5% +21% +3% 
Finland +11% -1% +122% +8% +36% +9% 
Sweden +16% -6% +54% -1% +71% +2% 
Norway -3% -8% +19% +3% +124% +16% 
       
Germany +82% +4% +46% +11% +58% +20% 
Belgium +21% +2% +26% +3% +28% 0 
France +13% +4% -9% -1% +22% 0 
Luxemburg +32% +33% +39% +9% +48% +7% 
Austria +36% +7% -49% +7% +48% +28% 
Netherlands +28% +21% +192% +17% +133% +26% 
       
Mean +37% +9% +61% +8% +50% +7% 
Source: Own calculations on OECD SOCX and Adema et al. (2011). 
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Finally, the data shed light on the question of whether government 
spending on new family policy measures, that is, employment-related 
policy, increased during the Lisbon period. Table 2-1 shows changes in 
government spending per child in €PPP for the period 2001–2007–
2009. It is immediately clear that, generally, spending on all three measures 
increased in the pre-crisis period (2001–2007). Only Czech Republic 
(−29%) and Norway (−3%) have seen a decline in spending on child 
benefits, and spending on leave declined in France (−9%), Luxembourg 
(−5%) and Austria (−49%). All other countries report increasing 
budgets for child benefits, leave schemes, and childcare services. Eight 
countries have more than doubled their budget for leave (Spain, 
Portugal, Czech Republic, Ireland, the United Kingdom, Estonia, 
Finland, and the Netherlands); four countries their budget for child 
benefits (Spain, Poland, Slovak Republic, and Ireland); and four 
countries their budget for child care (Poland, Estonia, Norway, and the 
Netherlands). 
For the sake of clarity, we do not discuss the evolution of 
government spending in every particular country. Yet we may conclude 
from the data that the assumed shift in government expenditures for 
family policy has not occurred: Although spending on new family 
measures has increased, the same holds (although to a somewhat lesser 
extent) for spending on old measures. In other words, spending on 
leave and child care has not led to a crowding out of spending on child 
benefits. 
Recent OECD data allow some preliminary light to be shed on the 
evolution of spending in the first years of the crisis. In several countries, 
spending on child benefits came to a halt or even decreased (Czech 
Republic, Poland, Sweden, and Norway) while in others spending did 
increase but at a slower pace than in the pre-crisis period (exceptions: 
Portugal, Luxemburg, and the Netherlands). A similar picture arises for 
spending on leave schemes (cuts in Czech Republic, the United 
Kingdom) and childcare services (cuts in Greece, Slovenia, and the 
United Kingdom). Generally speaking, the data show that spending on 
family policy slowed in the period 2007–2009. 
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2.3 THE FAMILY POLICY TRIAD: EXPLORING THE 
DISTRIBUTION OF ITS USE 
In the previous section we clarified total spending, its recent evolution, 
and policy background. Yet this chapter is not just about spending on 
family policy, but also about its distribution among families with 
children. This section explores the social distribution of the use of 
existing family policy schemes as a first step in determining who 
benefits from public investment in these areas. Later on, we will 
complete the picture by coupling usage with government spending. It 
will be argued below that the interaction of use and government funding 
is complicated by the modus operandi of the various policy measures. 
Therefore, the detailed analysis of the social distribution of public 
spending on family policy will be limited to two countries. The Europe-
wide comparison of family policy measure usage in this section thus 
concludes the European part of our analysis. 
2.3.1 Child Benefits 
In order to gain insight into the social distribution of child cash benefits 
in Europe, and hence grasp the relative generosity of child benefits 
toward different income groups, use is made of the “model families 
matrix method,” which allows cross-country comparisons for different 
“model family” types at different earnings levels. Figure 2-2 compares a 
low-income family (single earner, working at minimum wage) with an 
average-income family (dual-earner couple, both working at average 
wage) and a couple living on social assistance. For the sake of 
comparability, amounts have been converted into €PPPs, so that the 
cross-country assessment takes due account of price differences. 
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Figure 2-2 Child cash benefit levels for families on social assistance and low 
income families compared to average income families, European countries, 
€PPP, 2009 
 
Source: CSB MIPI data (Van Mechelen et al. 2011). Couples with two children (7 and 
14yrs old). If the bar is not shown, the family type does not receive any cash benefit 
(see Spain, Italy, Greece, Czech Republic and Poland). 
 
In 11 of 26 countries under study, the child benefit package takes 
account of the higher needs in low-income families, while in others 
child benefits are provided on a universal basis (at least for the model 
families under consideration). Only in Greece and Estonia are child cash 
benefits biased against the lowest incomes, while in Italy the benefit 
system is biased against the non-employed. The high overall level of 
generosity in the Continental and Liberal welfare states illustrates once 
again its importance in these countries, as reflected in Figure 2-1. The 
Baltic and Southern European countries have the lowest levels (except 
Italy, with its system of employment-related yet generous benefits for 
low incomes), while the Central and Eastern European countries display 
considerable variation. All in all, child benefits are in most countries not 
linked directly with employment and are awarded on a universal basis. 
Additionally, several countries have made room for “targeting within 
universalism” (Skocpol 1991): degrees of selectivity offering additional 
resources to low-income families within a universal framework. Hence, 
government investment in these measures can be expected to be either 
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distributionally neutral or allocated more than proportionally toward 
low-income families (assuming complete take-up). 
2.3.2 Childcare Services 
To gauge the social stratification of the use of childcare services in 
European countries, the households in our sample (households with a 
youngest child under the age of 6 years) were divided into five income 
groups (quintiles). The average outcome is compared with results for 
the highest and lowest income groups in Figure 2-3 and Figure 2-4, 
respectively, for the youngest children and for pre-school-age children. 
Overall, the pattern of care use is socially stratified: In almost all 
countries, the higher-income households (represented by triangles in the 
figures) make far more use of formal care services than the lower-
income households (diamonds in the figures). Obviously, these findings 
should be interpreted in conjunction with the labour market 
participation of mothers in the different social groups. This is certainly 
the case in Belgium, for example, where mothers living in low-income 
households are more likely to be inactive than mothers in higher income 
brackets, and this pattern is reflected in the social distribution of formal 
care use (chapter 3). Nevertheless, the magnitude of the inequality in 
Belgium is striking: In spite of the high average use of child care for the 
youngest children in general, around 60% of the households in the 
highest income quintile make use of formal care services compared to 
only 25% of the households in the lowest income quintile. Countries 
with similar unevenly distributed care use patterns are France, the 
United Kingdom, Ireland, the Netherlands, Luxemburg, and Spain. 
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Figure 2-3 The social distribution of childcare use for children aged 0-2 by 
income group, SILC 2009, European countries 
 
Source: own calculations on EU-SILC 2009. 
 
Figure 2-4 The social distribution of childcare use for children aged 3-5 by 
income group, SILC 2009, European countries 
 
Source: own calculations on EU-SILC 2009. 
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Furthermore, all countries with low rates of childcare use display a 
very unequal distribution among households (with Latvia as the only 
exception). In contrast, Denmark and Sweden succeed in providing 
extensive care services while almost equalizing the social distribution of 
opportunities, which to an extent reflects the inclusive childcare policies 
pursued in these two countries, although it is also related to their high 
female employment rates. Indeed, the employment gap between high- 
and low-skilled mothers is much smaller in Sweden (Evertsson et al. 
2009) than, say, Belgium (Cantillon et al. 2001). Be that as it may, the 
Danish and Swedish pattern of childcare use is reminiscent of basic 
arithmetic: Equal (universal) access for all social groups must be ensured 
in order to reach high overall levels of formal care use, which is an 
important lesson in the light of the European ambitions laid down in 
the Barcelona targets. 
In many countries, the pattern for the 3-to-5-year-old age group 
runs parallel to that for the youngest, though at higher average levels of 
use. In most countries, children between ages 3 years and 5 years are 
served by the school system. Often this entails a shift from the policy 
sphere of social welfare to education, which commonly results in a clear 
break in the usage pattern. In Spain and Italy, for example, childcare 
services are used by about 40% of the youngest (an intermediate 
position within the EU), whereas kindergarten is attended by almost all 
children aged 3 years to 5 years (making them top-ranking countries 
within the EU). As a corollary, the uneven social distribution of child 
care for the youngest is not found among the older group of children. 
The same gap-closing pattern is found in the Continental welfare states 
(Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg, and Netherlands) and—
albeit to a lesser extent—in Ireland and the UK. Interestingly, however, 
gap closing is not general, even though an expansion of use is. The 
graphs illustrate that social inequality among children aged 3 years to 5 
years is larger than among the youngest in the Slovak republic, Latvia, 
and Estonia. 
All in all, the above shows that social inequality in childcare use is 
the norm rather than the exception in European countries. Moreover, 
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we are reminded of a basic lesson: An equal distribution is hard to 
achieve without high levels of service use. 
2.3.3 Parental Leave Entitlements 
The empirical data for parental leave entitlements are drawn from the 
2005 ad hoc module of the EU Labour Force Survey (EU-LFS). This 
module offers uniquely comparable information on the use of parental 
leave, but as a source it also has some drawbacks. First, no income data 
is available in the publicly available version of the EU-LFS. Therefore, 
we limit our distribution analysis to educational groups instead of 
income groups. Second, to ensure that data were available for all 
countries, the sample had to be widened to working women with a child 
under the age of 15 years. Still, a table for a sample of families with 
children under the age of 3 years for a selection of countries (excluding 
Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Finland, and France) does confirm the 
results. 
 
Figure 2-5 The educational distribution of remunerated parental leave among 
families with a working mother and at least one child under the age of 15, 
European countries, 2005 
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Source: own calculations on EU-LFS 2005. Cells with fewer than fifty observations are 
not shown, resulting in the omission from the table of Luxembourg as well as the 
group of low-skilled mothers for several countries.  
Selection: women having a job at the moment of the interview and living together with 
at least one own or partner’s child younger than 15. 
Note: Paid parental leave refers to all types of remunerated parental leave schemes, 
including both full-time and part-time leave and leave taken by either one or both 
parents during the last twelve months. Bulgaria and Ireland are not included, because 
there was no paid parental leave scheme in place in these countries in 2005. Other 
countries lacking a paid parental leave scheme, such as the UK and Spain, are included 
because a number of respondents reported some kind of remuneration (e.g. specific 
regulations in the public sector, following a collective agreement or with a particular 
employer). 
 
The distributional picture shown in Figure 2-5 is quite 
homogeneous, despite the considerable differences in generosity of 
parental leave schemes. All significant divergences between educational 
groups point in the same direction: Households with a low-educated 
mother use parental leave opportunities to a smaller extent than other 
households do. As in the analysis of childcare services, a second 
observation applies: Some countries do not exhibit an unequal 
distribution at all. In Spain, Poland, and the UK, the reason for this 
outcome is quite obvious: The overall use of parental leave is almost 
zero. In these countries, parental leave is either unpaid (Spain and UK), 
or an income test applies to what is, moreover, a rather low benefit 
(Poland). 
In Austria and Hungary, a relatively high level of take-up is equally 
dispersed among the social strata. Characteristics of the leave system do 
not offer an immediate explanation for the relative attractiveness of 
leave to low-skilled mothers in these countries. Leave is paid at a flat 
rate in Austria, but the payment period can exceed the leave period 
(which is an attractive option for low-income families), while in 
Hungary, for example, it covers 60% of the previous wage for a period 
of more than two years (OECD 2011b). Yet, the specific characteristics 
of the leave entitlements are not the only factor determining take-up. 
Other factors such as the availability of child care, employment 
opportunities for women, and cultural aspects, are equally important 
(Gornick and Hegewisch 2010). 
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Moreover, the equalizing logic we observed in the childcare sector 
is not reproduced in parental leave. None of the countries with high 
take-up rates display an equal distribution across educational groups. 
The difference between high- and low-skilled working mothers is 
statistically significant among the three countries with the highest 
average take-up rates, for example (Sweden, Finland, and Greece). Yet, 
it should be stressed that take-up of parental leave is typically much 
lower than childcare coverage. Hence, the mathematical rule tending 
toward an equal distribution with rising coverage rates does not come 
into play yet. 
It is worth reiterating that Figure 2-5 is limited to working mothers 
only. This demonstrates that even among the selected group of 
employed low-skilled mothers, parental leave is not used to the same 
extent as among the high-skilled (with the exceptions noted above). 
Consequently, inequality in the use of parental leave is not only the 
result of unequal labour force participation but also a consequence of 
inequalities in the effective access to parental leave within the working 
population. Compared with the analysis of the use of childcare services, 
Figure 2-5 also shows that the Nordics do not always achieve equal 
distributions. Although childcare use is hardly skewed against the low-
skilled in Denmark, Norway, and Sweden, the use of parental leave 
clearly is. 
2.4 THE SOCIAL DISTRIBUTION OF FAMILY EXPENDITURES: 
THE CASE OF SWEDEN AND FLANDERS (BELGIUM) 
The above analyses suggest that the more recent work-family 
reconciliation measures (childcare and leave schemes) may have 
distributional effects that countervail the redistributive or 
distributionally neutral design of long-standing income protection 
measures such as child benefits. Yet, the interaction between the 
measures and their resulting overall effect (i.e., the presence of a 
Matthew effect) cannot be ascertained on the basis of the use of those 
measures only. For instance, if one observes that the use of child care is 
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unequally distributed among households with young children in some 
countries but not in others, it does not necessarily follow that 
government expenditures are unequally distributed. The distribution of 
government expenditures on policy measures depends not only on their 
use or take-up, but also on the modus operandi. In the case of child 
care, this includes  inter alia the out-of-pocket costs and the subsidizing 
method of (public or private) childcare services. In the case of parental 
leave, it depends on the benefit levels, be they income-related or not, 
the leave period duration, entitlement conditions, etc. For child benefits, 
due account should be taken of whether the system is universal or 
means-tested, how it incorporates age, rank, and number of children, 
and the extent of targeting. Dysfunctions in any of these aspects can 
induce a Matthew effect, so that detailed data and level of analysis are 
required to gain genuine insight. For this reason, we concentrate on two 
case studies. 
In the following paragraphs, the focus is on Sweden and the Belgian 
region of Flanders, which accounts for approximately 60% of the 
country’s population. The purpose is to arrive at a fine-grained analysis 
of the social distribution of subsidized childcare services, parental leave 
entitlements, and child benefits.8 The descriptive overview above 
indicated that child care and parental leave use is heavily biased against 
the lowest incomes in Belgium, while this is only the case for parental 
leave, not child care, in Sweden. Child benefits are expected to be 
targeted more at the lowest incomes in Belgium, while they are assumed 
to be distributionally neutral in Sweden. In what follows, we investigate 
whether these patterns of entitlement, use, or take-up translate into a 
Matthew effect, in other words, an unequal allocation of government 
investment in these policies. 
  
                                                 
8  The focus is on the Flemish community rather than on Belgium as a whole, 
because family policy has been devolved to the communities. When relevant 
(i.e., in the case of overlapping competences), reference is made to Belgium 
as a whole. 
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2.4.1 Data and Methodology 
The proposed analysis of the social distribution combines administrative 
data on government outlays with detailed data from national surveys 
containing information on usage and parental contributions (for child 
care) and on benefit receipt (for child benefits and parental leave). For 
Flanders, we rely on the 2005 Flemish Families and Care Survey (FFCS), 
while for Sweden we draw on the Level-of-Living Survey (LNU) Wave 
2000 (relating to income for the year 1999), complemented by register 
data on benefits drawn from the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) 
database. All data on government expenditures on relevant policy 
measures are derived from official and administrative sources and 
recalculated to reflect government efforts to reach the group of young 
children (0 to 6 years of age) that the present chapter is concerned with. 
For the sake of clarity and conciseness, the calculation of the amounts 
cited is not shown, but details can be obtained from the authors upon 
simple request. 
One should also refrain from making simple comparisons between 
Sweden and Flanders in so far as the total budget for a particular 
measure is concerned. Differences in volume of the total budget do not 
necessarily reflect genuine differences in policy choices or total 
government investment, but might simply be occasioned by 
compositional differences (population size, number of children). Similar 
to Figure 2-1 and Table 2-1 above, we control for the number of 
children in a particular household to make sure that potential 
differences between income groups do not stem from differences in the 
number of children across these social groups. In effect, the graphs 
presented below show the amount of government investment received 
by an average child in five different income groups. As such, the results 
reflect the joint outcome of use or take-up of a measure (access, 
perceived affordability) and its funding (proportion of public support). 
Hence, if differences are observed between the funding received by an 
average child in different income groups, these may stem from variation 
in both usage and mode of operation (government funding rules, 
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legislation, entitlements), as will be discussed for every policy measure 
separately. 
Finally, it should be noted that the amounts relied upon are based 
on the year 2000 for Sweden and the year 2005 for Flanders, but in 
order to allow comparison, the Swedish amounts have been uprated to 
the year 2005 and converted into €PPPs. Still, although great care is 
taken to maximize comparability, the difference in policy setup does not 
allow very precise comparisons. The focus is rather on the patterns of 
social distribution constituting the central question addressed in this 
contribution: Which income groups benefit from government 
investment in the three mainstays of contemporary family policy? 
2.4.2 Child Benefits 
Let us first consider (cash) child benefits. In Belgium, child benefit 
rights for employees were first introduced in 1930 and the system has 
expanded ever since (Cantillon and Goedemé 2006). Today, the system 
encompasses child benefits (kinderbijslag) and childbirth allowances 
(kraamgeld). Hence, Flemish families with children may claim universal 
child benefits (with supplements according to age and rank of the child), 
additional child benefits for vulnerable families (e.g., single or 
unemployed parents) and one-off allowances at childbirth (or at the 
moment of adoption) from the federal state and municipal authorities. 
In 2005, the total government budget for this combined scheme for 
children aged 0 to 5 years in the region of Flanders amounted to EUR 
686 million, which works out to EUR 1,821 per child per year. 
In Sweden, prior to the 1930s, support measures for families with 
young children consisted mainly of tax subsidies. A universal system of 
child benefits for all parents (barnbidrag) was only introduced in 1948 as 
a flat-rate fee that did not vary according to rank or age of the child. 
This principle has been retained to date. However, the universal benefit 
was complemented in 1982 with an additional benefit for large families 
of three or more children (flerbarnstillägg), the rationale being that full-
time work is hard to maintain for mothers with more than two children. 
As in Flanders, parents are entitled to cash childbirth allowances, but 
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these are provided under the (insurance) scheme of parental leave, 
which will be discussed in the next section. In 2000, the total Swedish 
budget for child benefits for children aged 0 to 5 years amounted to 
EUR 660 million, or roughly EUR 1,135 per child per year. The 
difference in average public investment per child between Sweden and 
Flanders corresponds with the different expenditure structures observed 
in Figure 2-1: Belgium (and thus Flanders) spends most on cash benefits 
and least on parental leave, while in Sweden childcare services and 
parental leave schemes represent a much more substantial item of public 
expenditure than do child benefits. 
All in all, given the design of the Swedish system, government 
spending on child benefits may be expected to be quite evenly 
distributed among the different income groups. In Flanders, on the 
other hand, expenditures are expected to be targeted more at the lowest 
incomes (given the system of supplementary benefits). Figure 2-6Figure  
shows that the public subsidy for an average child in the five income 
groups indeed follows the expected pattern in Sweden, but surprisingly 
not so in Flanders. In reality, the supplementary benefits are highly 
selective and cover only a small proportion of the population. 
Moreover, families in the lowest income quintile tend to have more 
children than other households. Combined, these characteristics explain 
why there is no statistically significant difference between the social 
groups in terms of average child benefit amounts. The same 
mechanisms are at play in Sweden: Although lower income families tend 
to be larger families (and hence should be the main beneficiaries of the 
supplementary benefit for large families), the weight of the benefit is too 
insignificant to show up in the results. In sum, in both Sweden and 
Flanders, children receive on average a more or less equal share of child 
benefit expenditures, regardless of their parents’ financial resources. 
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Figure 2-6 Social distribution of government investment in child benefits 
 
Source: own calculations. 
2.4.3 Parental Leave 
In 1974, Sweden abolished its system of maternity leave and replaced it 
with a system of remunerated parental leave (föräldrapenning). It was the 
first Western democracy to impose a strictly gender-neutral programme 
of this kind (Ferrarini 2006). Since 1989, the leave period has been 360 
days per child, with an income replacement of 80% of previous wage up 
to a certain earnings level, followed by a flat fee during 90 days 
(guaranteed minimum). Eligibility depends on the payment of national 
insurance contributions through employment for a minimum of 240 
consecutive days before childbirth. Those who do not meet this 
requirement are entitled to the guaranteed minimum for the full period. 
The benefit may be taken up by the mother from 60 days prior to 
confinement onward, and by either of the parents up until the child 
reaches the age of eight. Additionally, fathers are entitled to 10 days of 
leave (“daddy days,” pappadagar) under the same income replacement 
rate as parental leave, to be taken up any time during the first 60 days 
after childbirth. 
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
1600
1800
2000
1 2 3 4 5
Y
e
ar
ly
 s
u
b
si
d
y 
fo
r 
an
 a
ve
ra
ge
 c
h
ild
, €
P
P
P
 
equivalised disposable household income 
Sweden Flanders
58 
 
In 1994, a so-called “daddy month” was introduced. This is a period 
of four weeks within the total leave length earmarked for fathers on a 
use-or-lose basis, with the explicit aim of increasing gender-equality in 
childrearing (Duvander, Ferrarini and Thalberg 2006).9 Presently, 60 
days of the leave are reserved for either parent, and the remaining time 
may be divided between the parents as they see fit. The system is very 
flexible: It can be used partially by both parents, allowing both to work 
and be on leave on the same day, and parents can opt to receive only 
part of the benefit even if on full-time leave in order to extend the total 
leave period. In effect, most Swedish children stay at home with a 
parent for approximately a year, regardless of household income or 
labour market status of the parents. Finally, parents are entitled to 60 
days of “temporary parental leave” per child (below 12 years of age) per 
year in case the child or child minder is sick. The latter benefit is not 
included in the analysis. In 2000, total government spending on parental 
insurance and the additional “daddy days” amounted to EUR 1,272 
million, an average of EUR 2,187 per child. 
In Belgium, parental leave (ouderschapsverlof) is a strict 
implementation of the European Directive (supra). Introduced in its 
current form in 1997 by Royal Decree, it entitles each individual parent 
to 12 weeks of parental leave (recently extended to 16 weeks following 
the revision of the Directive). The parental leave benefit consists of a 
flat fee (federal plus Flemish supplement). The strict individualization 
implies that families stand to lose half of their entitlement if the father 
does not participate. However, fathers’ take-up-rate is low. This may be 
due in part to the lack of proportional income replacement, though 
employer reluctance is also believed to be a factor. This system, too, is 
quite flexible: Leave can be taken on a full-time or part-time basis, 
including the option of taking leave at a rate of one day a week. This 
way, the entitlement period of twelve weeks may be proportionally 
extended to a maximum of 60 weeks. Additionally, in 1999, the Belgian 
                                                 
9  For further details on the system of parental insurance and its effects on 
gender equality, see Haas and Rostgaard. (2011). 
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government introduced a generalized system of career breaks 
(loopbaanonderbreking) as an individual right for all workers. Although 
such leave may be taken for any reason,10 it is often associated with 
child-rearing (Clauwaert and Harger 2000). 
The benefits included in the analysis are those for parental leave and 
the related scheme of career breaks (as well as its more recent “time 
credit” variant). Because the career break scheme is not confined to 
parents with young children, only that part of the budget that is assigned 
to parents with young children is taken into account. It should, 
however, be noted that due to data limitations, no distinction is made 
between full-time and part-time leave. In 2005, government spending on 
the various types of parental leave for young children amounted to EUR 
132 million, an average of EUR 351 per child. 
 
Figure 2-7 Social distribution of government investment in parental leave 
 
Source: own calculations. 
 
Figure 2-7 shows that government subsidizing of parental leave in 
Flanders and Sweden is not distributed evenly across social strata. An 
                                                 
10  The Di Rupo I government, however, pledged to reform the system. Here, 
we report on the system as it was in December 2011. 
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average child in the first income quintile receives considerably less in 
leave benefits than a child in the upper quintiles. In Flanders, the 
highest income quintile is the main beneficiary, while in Sweden it is the 
middle-income group. Hence, despite large differences in their policy 
frameworks, both Sweden and Flanders fail to reach children in the 
lowest income group with measures of parental leave. As parental leave 
is directly linked to active participation in the labour market, a Matthew 
effect seems inevitable, regardless of the design of the measure. 
However, as demonstrated in Section 2.3.3 the unequal distribution 
of use is only partially explained by differences in employment. Other 
potential factors are the types of jobs held by parents in the lowest 
income group, which may not be sufficiently stable for them to qualify 
for parental leave and/or (under the Belgian scheme) to convince an 
employer to sanction such leave, and insufficient household resources, 
which may impede use of the scheme. The rather odd observation that, 
under the Swedish system, the main beneficiaries are families in the 
middle quintile rather than the highest quintile may be due to the ceiling 
imposed upon the wage-related benefit level. After all, this may be 
assumed to make the system less attractive to high-earning families, in 
terms of career advancement and wage penalties (Moss 2013). By 
contrast, it allows middle-income mothers and fathers to profit fully 
from the wage-related benefit system. However, the precise causes of 
the socially stratified allocation of government investment in parental 
leave systems have yet to be established. 
2.4.4 Childcare 
From the mid-1970s onwards, childcare services developed quite rapidly 
in both Belgium and Sweden. Childcare in Sweden serves the dual 
purpose of enabling parents to combine paid work with parenthood and 
providing support for the development of children (Skolverket 2000a). 
The latter goal has gained in prominence since the responsibility for 
childcare was transferred in 1996 to the Ministry of Education 
(Skolverket), putting it outside the realm of social welfare. Child care in 
Sweden is organized at the municipal level, but with a national financial 
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framework and curriculum and centrally determined regulations. 
Municipalities are obliged to provide child care to the extent necessary 
for parents to be able to work and study without “unreasonable delay,” 
which usually means within three to four months. The bulk of childcare 
services is provided publicly, although private facilities are becoming 
more widespread. In any case, the latter must meet identical standards 
and they are funded in the same way as the public services. 
In the early 2000s, major reforms were implemented, imposing a 
ceiling on parental fees (maxtaxa). By the year 2003, all municipalities 
had introduced a uniform income-related tariff system as a result of 
which any remaining regional differences in fees were smoothed out 
(Skolverket 2007). Although prior to the reform, municipalities were 
free to set rates, almost all had already implemented an income-related 
tariff system (Brink, Nordblom and Wahlberg 2007). Another important 
aspect of the reform was the introduction of the additional obligation 
for municipalities to provide child care for children whose parents are 
unemployed or on parental leave. In effect, while children under 1 year 
old were almost always cared for at home, due to the system of parental 
leave (supra), about 85% of children yet to start school (aged 1 to 5 
years) participated in public child care. Total government outlays for 
childcare subsidies for the year 2000 amounted to EUR 2,297 million, 
or an average of EUR 3,951 per child per year. 
Unlike in Sweden, child care and education are separate policy areas 
in Flanders. In general, education starts at age 2.5 years, when almost all 
children enter kindergarten up to the age of 6 years. Kindergartens are 
free of charge and entirely state funded, although many are privately 
organized (Vandenbroeck 2006). Child care for children under the age 
of 3 years is a responsibility of the Welfare Department (a competence 
that was devolved to the Belgian regions under the 1980 state reform). 
The monitoring of care for those under the age of 3 years is entrusted 
by decree to the public institution Child and Family (Kind en Gezin, 
K&G hereafter), which sets forward three objectives: reconciling work 
and family life; supporting the development of children; and promoting 
the social inclusion of vulnerable groups. It should be noted that K&G 
does not organize childcare services itself and that, unlike in Sweden, 
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there is no such thing as a statutory childcare entitlement for young 
children. Even though child care is privately organized, a distinction can 
be made between facilities accredited and subsidized by K&G on the 
one hand and facilities registered with and supervised rather than 
subsidized by K&G on the other (see chapter 3). 
Subsidized services receive funding that covers staffing (salaries) 
and operating costs. They must apply centrally determined income-
related fees. Private facilities, by contrast, may set fees freely. Moreover, 
unlike in Sweden, parents can claim tax deductions for their childcare 
expenses, even if their children attend a nonsubsidized service (which 
makes all childcare services de facto indirectly subsidized). 
Flemish parents are each entitled to three months of parental leave 
(supra), which means that most infants enter childcare services before 
their first birthday. Around 1990, about 20% of children under 3 years 
of age (0–2.5) were in child care. This proportion has since increased to 
63% (45% for Belgium as a whole) (Kind en Gezin 2009; Moss 1990). 
In 2005, total government subsidies for childcare services and 
kindergarten amounted to EUR 1,014 million, an average of EUR 2,691 
per child per year. 
As pointed out above, in Sweden, children from different social 
strata are represented quite evenly in subsidized childcare services, while 
in Belgium there is a bias in childcare use against the lowest incomes. 
(See chapter 3 for a further elaboration on the use of child care in both 
cases.) The reason for this inequality lies in factors of supply and 
demand: It is well-established that Flanders suffers from a general 
shortage in childcare supply, despite its high coverage rate, resulting in 
an underrepresentation of the lower income groups. In Sweden, the 
system of guaranteed places ensures equal access. However, as argued in 
section 2.3.2, the different labour market circumstances in the two 
countries obviously play a crucial role here. Yet, previous analyses of the 
FFCS data revealed that 70% of non-working mothers in the lowest 
quintile who are not using child care would prefer to be employed if 
possible (Ghysels and Van Lancker 2010). In other words, there is an 
untapped labour supply among low-income families who are 
disproportionally hit by the current lack of child care slots in Flanders. 
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Following the employment logic of the European discourse on child 
care, the provision and use of child care acts as a precondition for 
labour market attainment of mothers with young children, and the 
unequal use in Flanders warrants concern. 
Figure 2-8 represents public subsidy allocation given the divergent 
usage patterns and substantial systemic differences between Sweden and 
Flanders. 
 
Figure 2-8 Social distribution of government investment for childcare 
 
Source: own calculations. 
 
When analyzing the various components of government funding of 
childcare services in Flanders, it is important to keep in mind the 
underlying compensation mechanisms. The starting point is the net 
government subsidy to childcare providers. Because the tariff system is 
beneficial to lower income groups, subsidies net of parental 
contributions are larger in the lower income groups than in the higher 
income groups. In other words, the tariff system compensates for the 
unequal use of childcare services, to the extent that the direct 
government subsidy is not statistically different between the income 
groups. However, the equalizing effect of the income-related tariff 
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system is undone by the indirect subsidy of the tax reduction scheme, 
which allows parents to deduct part of their childcare outlays from 
income tax. All things considered, then, direct and indirect subsidies for 
child care are beneficial to the upper income groups. In Sweden, 
however, one observes the opposite pattern. Because there is no 
comparable tax deduction scheme, the income-related tariff system 
combined with a more equal usage among income groups results in 
higher average investment per child among the lower income groups. 
However, due account must also be taken of nursery school use in 
Flanders. From age 2.5 years, children are able to enter the school 
system. By age 3 years, attendance is quasiuniversal and by age 4 years 
almost all have become full-time users of the system. Thus, in the age 
group between 3 and 6 years, government funding is divided equally 
among the social groups. Moreover, funding is high relative to funding 
for the youngest children, because attendance approximates to 100% 
and tends to be full-time. Consequently, social inequalities in 
government funding of childcare services in Flanders are confined to 
the youngest age group. A strongly income-sensitive tariff system has 
proven insufficient to counteract this tendency, due to a combination of 
persistent inequalities in use (in consequence of supply and demand 
factors) and a “perverse” system of tax compensations that undoes the 
effects of the tariff system. 
2.4.5 The Total Distribution of Old and New Family 
Measures 
As a final step, the three measures of family support for young children 
are integrated into Figure 2-9, in order to compare the total distribution 
of government investment in the two cases considered. For Flanders, it 
suggests a rather uniform distribution. This follows from the relative 
dominance of two universal measures: child benefits and nursery 
schools. Indeed, the amounts of child benefits and nursery schools are 
clearly much higher than the government funding of pre-school 
childcare services or parental leave (see also Figure 2-8). This should not 
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come as a surprise, given that child benefits reach all children and 
attendance at nursery school is nearly universal, while the latter policy 
measures are selective by design. As shown above, this selectivity 
implies a certain bias. In the lowest fifth of the income hierarchy, 
children benefit significantly less from government funding for pre-
school childcare services and parental leave. In Sweden, the allocation of 
government investment tends to benefit the lower and middle income 
groups most, while children in the highest income quintile receive the 
least. 
 
Figure 2-9 The social distribution of total government investment for family 
policy 
 
Source: own calculations. 
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2.5 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has considered the question of who benefits most from 
government investment in family policy. The starting point was the 
observation that the nature of family policy has changed dramatically 
from passive cash payments (such as child benefits) to more activating 
and employment-related services and measures (such as parental leave 
and child care). Given this, it is often assumed that there has been a 
shift in government expenditure toward the latter type of schemes, the 
main beneficiaries of which are assumed to be the higher income 
categories, which is a so-called “Matthew effect.” Using this insight as a 
conceptual tool, this study looked into the social distribution of three 
measures, namely child benefits, parental leave, and child care, 
representing respectively an old and two new forms of family policy, in 
order to ascertain whether or not the presence of a Matthew effect 
could be confirmed and, if it could, to establish whether it is an 
inevitable feature of employment-related forms of family policy. 
The analysis began with a European overview, which yielded a 
rather unexpected picture: Countries spend increasing proportions of 
their budgets on both old and new forms of family policy. There is no 
clear evidence to be found in the data for the assumption that spending 
on child care and parental leave schemes is crowding out spending on 
child benefits. In the first years of the crisis (between 2007 and 2009), 
however, in many countries the expenditure increase came to a halt. We 
also found that high relative spending on one type of policy may or may 
not be accompanied by generosity in other areas of family policy. What 
is more, spending is not tightly linked either to the social distribution of 
use. As a matter of fact, relatively high degrees of equality in the use or 
take-up of family measures are observed at both high and low 
expenditure levels. 
Our results underscore the importance of policy design in the 
broadest sense; hence the need for careful consideration of the existing 
policy framework and close monitoring of policy implementation. In 
reality, a policy measure may be undone by competing adjacent policies 
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or citizens may choose not to respond to a newly introduced measure, 
undermining its anticipated impact. 
To illustrate the complexity of design and outcome interactions, 
detailed analysis was made of family policies in two different settings, 
namely Sweden and Flanders (Belgium). In a European comparative 
perspective, the two countries report high average spending per child on 
family policy. Moreover, they both have a universal child benefit system 
and rank among the countries with the highest use of childcare services. 
When it comes to parental leave, however, Sweden spends 
proportionally more than Flanders, where leave is comparatively short 
and not very generous. 
At first sight, the overall distributional picture looks favorable for 
both countries: In Flanders, an average child younger than 6 years is 
likely to benefit equally from family policy measures across the income 
distribution and the same is (largely) true for Sweden. However, this 
overall and average picture is deceptive. It is biased by the age brackets 
chosen and stems in large part from the child benefit system. 
Traditionally, child benefits are the mainstay of family policy. In 
Flanders, this is true up to the present day; child benefits represent 37% 
of the amount an average child under the age of 6 years receives 
through the three measures scrutinized here. Consequently, the largely 
uniform and universal nature of the child benefits dampens potential 
disruptions of more selective family policy measures such as parental 
leave and childcare services, which are further discussed below. In 
Sweden, however, child benefits are less important. Here they represent 
19% of the total amount received by an average child under 6 years of 
age. Conversely, the average amount spent by the Swedish government 
on parental leave is much more substantial (36% of the average total), 
and hence its distributional pattern also has a much greater impact on 
the overall distribution than is the case in Flanders. As has been 
demonstrated, neither Flanders nor Sweden achieves a socially uniform 
distribution of either parental leave usage or funding. 
A widely applicable lesson to be learned here is that unequal 
distribution, although a legitimate cause for concern, only becomes 
crucial in the context of policy measures that have a large relative weight 
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in the total policy mix. Hence, if other European countries should opt 
to follow the Swedish route, with large increases in the use of parental 
leave and much greater spending on such measures within the family 
policy mix, they must give due consideration to the design issues 
involved. In Sweden, parental leave is proportional to the previous 
earned income, which is likely to motivate parents to make use of the 
measure. Yet, this design feature also entails a Matthew effect, which, 
under the premise that all children should be treated equally, is 
detrimental to those living in lower-income families. 
However, the case of child care in Sweden demonstrates that, even 
when a large share of government outlays is devoted to a policy 
measure, Matthew effects are not inevitable. The Swedish childcare 
system is beneficial for the lower incomes thanks to its design and the 
universality of its use: Child care slots are guaranteed for every child 
from age 1 year onward and the tariff system is related to disposable 
income. A second lesson to learn here is that policymakers should be 
aware of the internal consistency of their policy initiatives: The Flemish 
regional government aimed for the inclusion of low-income families in 
its implementation of childcare services by designing an income-related 
tariff system, as exists in Sweden. However, the Belgian federal 
government concurrently introduced a measure whereby parents of 
young children who remain in work are compensated for their childcare 
expenses through a tax deduction scheme. The latter undoes the 
income-sensitivity of the tariff system completely. 
A third lesson relates to exogenous factors such as the state of the 
labour market. Even when carefully designed, employment-related 
policies can generate Matthew effects because labour market 
participation is unequally distributed across social strata. Especially 
parental leave, but in many countries also childcare services, are tightly 
linked to parental employment. Without employment, parents may not 
be (or they may perceive themselves not to be) entitled to such newer 
strands of family policy. A generalization of the latter thus requires 
universal parental employment and, hence, accompanying labour market 
policy. 
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A final lesson concerns the age group taken into account. In 
subsequent chapters, the focus is on families with children younger than 
3 years (see chapters 3, 5, 6, and 7). In the present chapter, the scope is 
widened to children under 6 years of age. This makes a considerable 
difference, because age 3 years is when universal childcare schemes (as 
part of the general school system) become applicable in many European 
countries. In other words, the distributional concern is often limited to 
the youngest age group, as the Flemish example indeed shows. For 
children aged 3 to 5 years, Flanders succeeds in equalizing its allocation 
of government investment in child care through its nurseries, which are 
free of charge and used almost universally. Again, this stresses the 
importance of expanding service use across income groups in order to 
avoid Matthew effects and a subsequent bias against the lowest incomes. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE SOCIAL DISTRIBUTION OF 
SUBSIDIZED CHILDCARE IN 
SWEDEN AND FLANDERS* 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
In the last decades, childcare policies emerged in the midst of several 
parallel evolutions in industrialized nations. Increasing female labour 
market participation coincided with shifting gender inequalities and a 
change from the male breadwinner model to a generalization of dual 
earnership, among more broad developments such as a shift to service 
employment (Bonoli 2005; Crompton and Lyonette 2006; Esping-
Andersen 1999). Consequently, the (gendered) problem of 
accommodating responsibilities at work and at home became an 
important policy issue and European welfare states adapted to this ‘new 
social risk’ in mutual interaction with European strategies to further 
increase (female) employment rates. Childcare is a focal point in this 
strategy, as it is generally considered an efficient labour market 
instrument removing disincentives to labour market participation for 
                                                 
*  This chapter has been published as Van Lancker, Wim and Ghysels, Joris 
(2012) “The social distribution of subsidized childcare in Sweden and 
Flanders”, Acta Sociologica, 55, 2: 125-142. Some minor adjustments have been 
made for the purpose of this dissertation. We would like to express our 
gratitude to Magnus Nermo for commenting on a previous draft of this 
chapter and for his much appreciated help with the data, which was made 
available to us by the Swedish Institute for Social Research (SOFI), 
University of Stockholm. We would also like to thank Bea Cantillon, Frank 
Vandenbroucke, Anton Hemerijck, Tommy Ferrarini, Josefine Vanhille and 
two anonymous referees for their valuable comments and suggestions. 
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mothers while at the same time contributing to gender equality and 
investment in young children (Lewis, Campbell and Huerta 2008; 
Vandenbroucke and Vleminckx 2011). After being firmly put on the 
European agenda in 1992 with the adoption of the Childcare 
Recommendation, which reflected a discourse on economic efficiency 
and labour market opportunities, explicit childcare targets to provide 
childcare by 2010 to at least 33% of children under 3 years old were 
adopted at the Barcelona Summit in 2002 (see chapter 1). Generally 
speaking, social policy came to be seen as a productive factor rather 
than solely a device for protecting citizens against the occurrence of 
certain ‘old’ social risks, all this under the umbrella of safeguarding the 
‘European Social Model’ and ensuring competitiveness and growth 
(European Commission 2000; Lewis 2009). 
It has been documented earlier that changes in employment 
behaviour of married women, especially with dependent children, have 
predominantly accounted for rising female employment rates (Blossfeld 
1995). Yet, dual earnership has (to date) been adopted in a socially 
uneven way in most European societies, with higher educated women 
being more often employed and living in a dual earner household 
(Cantillon et al. 2001; Evertsson et al. 2009). By the same token, the 
previous chapter revealed that public childcare provisions are in most 
European countries unevenly distributed among households, with a 
clear bias against low-income families. Taken together, the above 
suggests that the recent expansion of public childcare efforts has not 
eliminated across the board the gender employment gap that derives 
from care responsibilities. Rather it seems that budgetary resources for 
noncash services such as childcare policies end up with the higher 
income brackets and some strata in society have not (yet?) benefitted 
from these policy initiatives. Therefore, genuine concern is warranted 
about the distributional consequences of childcare policies on the one 
hand, and its effectiveness as an instrument to activate all mothers with 
young children into the labour market on the other. Apparently, the 
current childcare systems are not guaranteeing employment to all 
mothers in society and, hence, do not deliver the expected 
generalization of dual earnership. Obviously, the observed employment 
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gap cannot be attributed to policy flaws in the field of childcare only. 
Access to employment has to do with much more than finding 
appropriate care, as we will discuss in the next section. Yet, childcare 
acts as a pre-condition. Without a care solution, parents of young 
children simply cannot engage in employment. Our detailed comparison 
of two countries will shed light on the difference childcare policy can 
make. 
The main focus of this chapter is on current outcomes. Given the 
imperfections of labour markets and policies, we analyse the social 
distribution of subsidized childcare services and wonder: who benefits from 
government subsidies on childcare services? Answering the distributional 
question is more complicated than one would expect: one has to gather 
data on the tariff structure of childcare services, private childcare costs 
(what parents pay themselves, i.e. out-of-pocket parental fees), 
government expenditures (subsidies to childcare providers and tax 
concessions) along with data on households’ use of childcare. In this 
chapter, we present evidence on this question for two countries: Sweden 
and the Belgian region of Flanders. Both countries belong to the 
European forerunners regarding public childcare for young children 
(they have surpassed rather easily the Barcelona targets), display similar 
childcare characteristics and have a long-standing history of childcare 
expansion. As such, our approach can be considered as a weak version 
of John Stuart Mill’s method of difference: if the outcome (the social 
distribution of government investment in childcare) turns out to be 
different in countries with similar coverage rates, it will provide us with 
valuable lessons on the nature, design and implementation of ‘new risk 
policies’ in light of European-led initiatives to increase childcare 
coverage (and thus female labour market participation) throughout 
Europe. 
Before we start, a general limitation of this chapter has to be 
clarified. In contrast to chapter 2, here we are concerned with 
households having a youngest child under 3. Not only is the work-
family conflict most pressing for parents having very young children, we 
also want to compare relatively homogenous groups in both our cases. 
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We will elaborate somewhat further on this restriction in the 
methodological section.  
3.2 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
The rationale behind the promotion of childcare as an instrument to 
increase female employment rates is quite obvious. Women still face the 
main burden of care for the children, and without the possibility to 
externalize care duties (be it through informal or formal channels) they 
simply cannot engage in paid employment. A vast amount of research 
has shown that the level of childcare provisions is the strongest 
determinant of female labour supply in industrialized countries 
(Gornick, Meyers and Ross 1998; Jaumotte 2003; Kreyenfeld and Hank 
2000; van der Lippe and van Dijck 2002). Indeed, in the absence of 
decent care provisions, women often cut back on their working hours 
or quit the labour force to take care of their children, especially when 
the latter are of preschool age. This so-called child effect has been 
observed in all countries and for all women, although not necessarily to 
the same extent (for an overview, see Uunk, Kalmijn and Muffels 2005). 
It has also been established that not the cost of childcare per se, but 
access and availability is of uttermost importance (De Henau, Meulders 
and O’Dorchai 2007). The role of external care in allowing mothers to 
work is often evaluated in tandem with parental leave schemes, which 
foster parents’ bond with the labour market by maintaining the 
contractual link when they retreat temporarily from the labour market to 
take care of their children. Leave rules allow previously employed 
mothers to return to their working place if they are able to ‘outsource’ 
parental care when the child is old enough. 
In sum, the correlation between childcare provisions and female 
(maternal) employment is quite established although it is difficult to 
disentangle the direction of causality in this respect. Moreover, the 
association is not an iron law of nature, as exemplified in Figure 3-1. 
The figure shows employment rates for mothers with a child under 3 
and childcare coverage for children under 3 in industrialized countries. 
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Although the general pattern reflects more or less the expected 
association between childcare coverage and maternal employment (r = 
.63; p < .001), we observe that countries with similar coverage rates can 
display different employment rates (compare for instance Sweden, 
Belgium and Finland). One of the explanations for this result could lie 
in the different distribution of care use within those high-coverage 
countries. Indeed, when a similar childcare supply is distributed in a 
dissimilar way, the argument can be made that the efficiency of childcare 
as a productive social policy instrument depends on the mechanisms 
and the design of the service, i.e. the way government investment in 
childcare is allocated over families with children. 
 
Figure 3-1 Maternal employment rates and childcare coverage, OECD 
countries, 2005 
 
Source: OECD (2007). Note: Employment rate for mothers with a youngest child under 
three (as a percentage of mothers aged 15-64) including those on leave. Childcare 
coverage for children under three. Countries included: Denmark (DK), Sweden (SE), 
Belgium (BE), Finland (FI), New Zealand (NZ), Netherlands (NL), United States 
(US), France (FR), the United Kingdom (UK), Portugal (PT), Canada (CA), Germany 
(DE), Greece (GR), Italy (IT), Austria (AT), Czech Republic (CZ). 
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from family policy, but that this issue is often overlooked when 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
DK SE BE FI NZ NL US FR UK PT CA DE GR IT AT CZ
maternal employment
childcare coverage
76 
 
assessing the impact of family policy on employment and the work-
family balance. Likewise, in an illuminating study on the effect of 
subsidized child care on maternal employment in Norway, Havnes and 
Mogstad report that “the large expansion in subsidized child care had little, if 
any, effect on maternal employment” (2009). The reason for this is quite 
straightforward: the highest demand for childcare expansion came from 
mothers already at work. Hence we iterate our argument: if the social 
distribution of budgetary outlays for childcare benefits first and 
foremost the higher income families (which report more working hours 
and are more often dual earner families, e.g. Cantillon et al. (2001)), 
doubt can be cast on its effectiveness as a labour market instrument to 
increase women’s employment rates. Obviously, the labour market 
integration of mothers does not depend solely on childcare availability 
as other factors are also at play, especially for low-income families: the 
state of the labour market and the unemployment rate, the gendered 
distribution of household work, labour market policies (financial 
incentives, low-wage subsidies) et cetera (Erikson and Nermo 2010; 
Gesthuizen and Scheepers 2010; Gornick, Meyers and Ross 1998). 
However, taking into account that childcare may not be a sufficient 
condition, it certainly is a necessary condition for mother with young 
children to engage in paid work. To be an instrument of labour market 
activation, childcare should thus reach out towards those facing the 
greatest barriers to employment. An analysis of the outcomes of 
government investment in public childcare allows to explore whether 
this is effectively the case. 
This also touches on the issue of (vertical) government 
redistribution. Welfare states have in the past decades, albeit not in an 
equal way, reacted to broader evolutions such as the generalization of 
dual earnership and consequently adapted their policies to 
accommodate the growing need to reconcile work and family. Policies 
addressing new social needs are more service-oriented, as is certainly the 
case with childcare, and concerns about the potential loss of 
redistributive capacity due to a shift from benefits-in-cash to services-in-
kind have been raised earlier on theoretical grounds (Esping-Andersen 
and Myles 2009). This shift from cash to services was however not 
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necessarily a universal evolution. In Sweden, which is often 
characterized as being an epigone of the Scandinavian ‘social service 
model’ (Rauch 2007) and where services as part of the broader social 
policy package were much earlier developed than in other welfare 
regimes, 1.7% of GDP was spent on childcare services in 2007 
according to the OECD Social Expenditure statistics (OECD 2010). 
This is the same proportion of GDP as in the mid-1990s but a modest 
decline of 0.3 percentage points compared to 1990. A contrasting 
evolution took place in Belgium where 0.8% of GDP was spent on 
childcare in 2007, an increase of 0.7 percentage points compared to the 
mid-1990s. Given the stable importance of childcare services in Sweden 
and its growing budget in Belgium, the issue of the redistributive effect 
of services is not a trivial one, especially so in a European context where 
the expansion of childcare services is encouraged. If (scarce) 
government resources spent on childcare services benefit the higher 
incomes, concern is certainly warranted. 
However, measuring the redistributive effect of services is a difficult 
undertaking. Earlier work on the distributional consequences of 
childcare, such as Marical et al. (2008) and Matsaganis and Verbist 
(2009), looked at overall distributional consequences in terms of Gini-
coefficient and poverty outcomes by assigning a monetary value to 
childcare services and treating these as benefits-in-cash. The results 
suggest that services are redistributive albeit less so than cash transfers 
(Esping-Andersen and Myles 2009). Exactly the same conclusion has 
been formulated in Scandinavian research in the eighties and nineties: 
“social services (..) are not as effective in income redistribution as direct transfers” 
(Kröger 1997). This approach thus yields valuable insights, yet falls 
short for our purpose. We are not interested in the income distribution 
in terms of an inequality coefficient, but aim to have a genuine grasp of 
the allocation of government funds among different households in 
society. In order to do so, an analysis using more detailed data is 
indispensable. 
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3.3 A BRIEF SKETCH OF CHILDCARE AND ITS EXPANSION 
Although crèches for children of single mothers existed already in the 
second half of the 19th century, the expansion of childcare as we know it 
in Sweden started from the 1970s onwards to mitigate falling birth rates 
and accommodate the growing demand by parents. In 1963 only 3% of 
all pre-school children (1-5) were in childcare but from the 1970s 
onwards this share tripled to around 30% in 1980. Nowadays, about 
85% of young children participate in public childcare (Bergqvist and 
Nyberg 2002; Ferrarini and Duvander 2010; Skolverket 2010).  
Childcare in Sweden has the twin aim of making it possible for 
parents to combine paid work and parenthood on the one hand and 
supporting the development of children on the other (Skolverket 
2000a). The latter has grown even more important when responsibility 
for childcare was transferred to the Ministry of Education (Skolverket) in 
1996. Childcare has traditionally been provided publicly. Before the 
1990s, there was almost no private provision of childcare, and even now 
private facilities occupy only a minority place in the childcare landscape 
(Ferrarini and Duvander 2010). Nevertheless, private facilities have to 
meet the same standards and are funded the same way as public services 
(Allodi 2007). Children under 1 year are almost always cared for in their 
own home due to the system of parental leave (when a child is born, the 
parents are entitled to 450 days of paid leave). For children yet to start 
school (aged 1-5), three public childcare services can be distinguished: 
Preschool (förskola), family daycare home (familjedaghem) and open 
preschool (öppna förskolan). Preschools are the most widespread form of 
childcare, are open the year round and have varied opening hours to 
correspond as good as possible with parents’ working times. These 
services also have to comply to a national curriculum. Family daycare 
concerns public childcare in the home of childminders. This variety is 
more often used in rural areas or areas lacking access to an adequate 
preschool offer. Finally, open preschools are a form of ‘pedagogical 
playgroups’ for children whose parents are at home during the day. 
Because there is mostly no registration obligation, no regular hours of 
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attendance and the service is mostly free of charge, our analysis is not 
concerned with this form of preschool care. 
Childcare in Sweden is - conform its distinct concept of local self-
government - organized at the municipal level though has a national 
financial framework and curriculum and centrally determined 
regulations. Municipalities are obliged to provide childcare to the extent 
necessary for parents to be able to work and study, without 
‘unreasonable delay’ which means usually within 3-4 months. In the 
beginning of the 2000s, major reforms took place. While parental fees 
for childcare showed considerable variation between municipalities (and 
a tendency to increase over time) before that time, the reforms imposed 
a ceiling on parental fees (maxtaxa). By the year 2003 all municipalities 
had implemented a uniform system which abolished most of the 
regional differences in fees (Skolverket 2007).11 Another important part 
of the reform was the additional obligation for municipalities to provide 
childcare for children whose parents are unemployed or on parental 
leave. 
In Belgium, too, childcare services for young children emerged in 
the mid-19th century but only matured and developed rapidly since 
1970 (Morel 2007). Contrary to the Swedish case, childcare and 
education are separate policy areas. In general, education starts at age 
2.5 when almost all children attend kindergarten until the age of 6. 
Kindergartens are free of charge and entirely state funded, although 
many are privately organized (Vandenbroeck 2006). Childcare for 
children under 3 is a responsibility of the welfare department (a 
competence transferred to the Belgian regions since the 1980 state 
reform). In what follows, we focus exclusively on the Belgian region of 
Flanders which covers about 60% of Belgian inhabitants. In Flanders, 
responsibility for monitoring care for under threes is entrusted by 
decree to the public organization Child and Family (Kind en Gezin, K&G 
hereafter) which sets forward three aims: the reconciliation work and 
                                                 
11  ‘Maxtaxa’ limits parental fees for childcare to 1–3 per cent of gross parental 
income below a fixed maximum for the first three children. No fee has to be 
paid for any subsequent child. 
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family; supporting the development of children; and social inclusion of 
vulnerable groups. It has to be noted that K&G does not organise 
childcare services by itself and that there is no such thing as a legal 
childcare entitlement for young children (unlike in Sweden). 
Flemish parents are entitled to 3 months of parental leave, which 
means that most infants enter childcare services before their first 
birthday. Around 1990, about 20% of children below 3 (0-2.5) were in 
childcare. This number increased to 63% nowadays (45% for Belgium as 
a whole) (Kind en Gezin 2009; Moss 1990). Since the beginning of the 
century, subsequent childcare surveys have indicated a shortage in 
childcare slots (Ghysels and Debacker 2007; Hedebouw and Peetermans 
2009; Vanpée, Sannen and Hedebouw 2001). Research in 2007, for 
example, indicated that 10% of parents had no perspective on a suitable 
place after three months of search (Market Analysis and Synthesis 
2007). This motivated the subsequent Flemish governments to invest in 
expansion and led in 2011 to an ambitious plan to align supply with 
demand by 2020. 
Currently, two important childcare arrangements can be 
distinguished: child-minding facilities accredited and subsidized by 
K&G; and child-minding facilities registered with and supervised by 
K&G but not subsidized (Vanpée, Sannen and Hedebouw 2001).12 
Subsidized services comprise nurseries (kinderdagverblijf) and child-
minding services (onthaalouder). The ratio between the two is more or 
less 33% versus 66% respectively. These receive subsidies covering staff 
(salaries) and running costs but cannot set their own fees (these are 
centrally fixed and income-related) and have to meet strict quality 
requirements. Consequently, there is no regional variation in parental 
contributions among subsidized services. In contrast, private facilities 
can set their own prices. Subsidized services also have to give priority to 
vulnerable groups, such as low-income families and single parents. 
Finally, parents can claim tax deductions for their childcare expenses, 
                                                 
12  Officially, there is also a third variety (child-minding facilities that have only 
complied with their duty to register, but which are not accredited and not 
subsidized by K&G) which is however very scarce. 
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even if their children attend a non-subsidized service (making all 
childcare services de facto subsidized in an indirect way), which is not 
the case in Sweden.  
In sum, while childcare in Sweden is aimed at children aged 1-5, 
almost entirely publicly-provided and integrated in the educational 
curriculum, in Belgium a particular form of public-private partnership 
has emerged with services aimed at children 0-2.5 either directly or 
indirectly (via tax concessions) funded by the state and organized by 
municipalities or privately (Vandenbroeck 2006). In the following 
analysis, we are concerned with all government investment in childcare, 
whether privately or publicly provided, and its allocation among families 
with children under three. For Sweden this relates to subsidies given to 
the public and private service providers alike. For Flanders a distinction 
is to be made between three flows of government funding: subsidies to 
childcare providers, subsidies (in the form of tax concessions) to parents 
using subsidized childcare providers and subsidies (tax concessions) to 
parent using service providers who are not directly subsidized by the 
government. 
3.4 DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
To investigate the social distribution of government investment in 
childcare, detailed data on childcare use, parental contributions, the tax 
system and government expenditures is vital. This excludes the use of 
the EU-SILC dataset, which is used by Eurostat to monitor childcare 
coverage in European countries, because it only provides data on 
childcare use but no information on private costs (parental 
contributions). Hence we use two specific datasets which contain the 
necessary variables (income, private costs, childcare use) to conduct our 
analysis. For Flanders, we rely on the Flemish Families and Care Survey 
(FFCS) of 2004-2005. The FFCS sample is a randomly drawn 
representative survey containing 1065 families with a child under three. 
For Sweden, we draw data from the Swedish Level of Living Survey (LNU), 
year 2000 wave (concerning income year 1999). The LNU is a random 
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sample representing 1/1000 of the Swedish population between 18 and 
75 and contains 435 families with a child under three. For Swedish data 
on government expenditure, we use government-provided expenditure 
statistics for the year 1999 made available by the Swedish National 
Agency for Education (Skolverket 2000b). For Flanders, we rely on a 
detailed and complete overview of the Flemish budget for the year 2003 
(Cantillon et al. 2006) which we have updated to include expenditures 
for the year 2005. The time-gap between the two sources does not need 
to worry us here. In Flanders, the institutional situation has not changed 
and local studies using more recent data demonstrate the relative 
stability of care use among income groups (Hedebouw and Peetermans 
2009) and, hence, the on-going relevance of our study. Our Swedish 
data, however, predates the above-mentioned maxtaxa reform carried 
out between 2001 and 2003. This reform entailed inter alia the 
introduction of maximum parental fees and the obligation for 
municipalities to keep available pre-school slots for certain groups. 
However, recent reviews have shown that the reforms led to a decrease 
in childcare costs which improved the financial basis of low-income 
families (Brink, Nordblom and Wahlberg 2007; Mörk, Sjögren and 
Svaleryd 2009) and to an increase in enrolment rates among those 
families (Skolverket 2007). In short, we can confidently assume that the 
Swedish outcomes nowadays will be better than the results we report in 
this chapter. In other words, the results presented are likely to 
approximate the current situation in Flanders and provide a lower 
bound estimate for the current situation in Sweden. 
As mentioned in the introduction, we limit the scope of our chapter 
to families with a youngest child under three. These families often have 
older children using childcare. Because we want to compare 
homogeneous groups we do not take these into account. Doing so 
would lead to biased results for Flanders were almost full coverage in 
kindergarten for children between 2.5 and 5 is ensured via the 
educational system. Limiting our analysis to children below 3 ensures we 
compare budgetary outlays for childcare only. For our analysis, we 
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divide the Flemish and Swedish households in our sample into five 
income groups (quintiles) using disposable household income.13 Then 
we compile information of the budgetary outlays attributed to childcare 
services for families with a youngest child under three and consequently 
distribute the total budget over the income quintiles. While doing so, we 
take into account the effective use of childcare and control for what 
parents pay (parental contributions net of taxes) given the tariff 
structure in both countries. The final result is a close estimate of the 
genuine (net) government subsidy per income group in both countries. 
Throughout our analyses we will use household income as an 
indicator of social position. It should be noted that income is in itself 
dependent on childcare use. To the extent that childcare services 
facilitate employment and, subsequently, employment contributes to 
household income, the use of childcare can be expected to correlate 
positively with household income. In the same vein, low income 
families can be expected to be – on average – less extensive users of 
childcare than high income families. However, we will show below that 
this mechanistic logic applies in quite different degrees to Flanders and 
Sweden. Moreover, it is exactly the latter result that motivates our 
analysis: is the public funding of services necessarily biased against the 
poor or can a service policy be designed that serves all families equally, 
even if these families differ in their level of material well-being (and 
underlying employment intensity)? Here, we are primarily concerned 
with the distribution over the whole population of families with young 
children. A selection of, for instance, dual earner households only, 
would exclude some of the most vulnerable households from our view, 
while we are expressly interested in how they are affected (or not) by 
public funds for childcare. All in all, the reader should bear in mind that 
household income is both a classification and an outcome variable. 
In effect, our empirical exercise consists of three parts. First, we 
elaborate somewhat more on the use of public and private childcare by 
                                                 
13  Household income is corrected for economies of scale with the so-called 
OECD modified equivalence scale (assigning a value of 1 to the household 
head, of 0.5 to each additional adult member and of 0.3 to each child). 
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the families in our two samples. Second, we dig deeper into the tariff 
system and parental contributions in both countries. Finally, we present 
our analysis of the social distribution of government expenditures on 
childcare. 
3.5 CARE USE IN SWEDEN AND FLANDERS 
To frame our analysis, we begin with a discussion of some relevant 
characteristics and care use of the households in our two samples as 
shown in Table 3-1 and Table 3-2. Generally, both countries resemble 
each other’s characteristics. The average number of children below 
three, the proportion of lone parents and the average working hours in 
the household show the same pattern per income group. The lowest 
income groups are less active in paid employment in both Sweden and 
Flanders. Comparing the working hours in Sweden and Flanders, we 
observe that the total hours worked per week are generally lower in the 
former than in the latter, but that Swedish households in the lowest 
income group tend to work more than their Flemish counterparts. Next 
to this, the proportion of lone parents in Flanders is concentrated in the 
lowest income quintile while they are somewhat more spread among the 
first and second quintile in Sweden. Yet, it is clear in both countries that 
the disadvantage of being a lone parent is skewed towards the lowest 
incomes.  
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Table 3-1 Characteristics and care use of families with a youngest child under 3 
in five income quintiles, Sweden, 1999 
  
No. of 
children 
< 3 
(mean) 
Working 
hoursa 
(mean) 
Workless 
house-
holdb 
(%) 
Lone 
parents 
(%) 
No 
informal 
carec (%) 
Formal 
childcare 
use 
(children 
<3) (%) 
Childcare 
costsd (%) 
Q1 1.1 30 3.7 11.6 38.1 63.7 13.0 
Q2 1.1 39 2.3 10.1 19.0 63.5 8.7 
Q3 1.1 50 1.2 3.5 12.5 65.0 8.2 
Q4 1.0 55 1.2 1.2 13.9 66.0 8.6 
Q5 1.0 59 0.0 0.0 10.6 74.2 7.1 
Mean 1.1 46 1.8 5.3 18.9 66.3 9.0 
N 435 435 435 435 435 435 277 
Source: LNU 2000. Note: a The sum of the working hours of both parents (if applicable) 
in the last week. b No one in the household is engaged in paid employment at the 
moment of inquiry. c Families not using grandparental care at all. d Measured as a 
proportion of monthly disposable income and including only families using childcare 
services (public and/or private). Q = Quintile. 
 
Table 3-2 Characteristics and care use of families with a youngest child under 
3, Flanders, 2005 
  
No. of 
children 
< 3 
(mean) 
Working 
hoursa 
(mean) 
Workless 
house-
holdb 
(%) 
Lone 
parents 
(%) 
No 
informal 
carec 
(%) 
Formal childcare use 
(children<3) 
Childcare 
costsd 
(%) 
Subsidized 
providers 
(%) 
Non-
subsidized 
prov. (%) 
Total 
(%) 
Q1 1.2 21 24.3 20.5 19.7 16.4 9.9 26.4 8.2 
Q2 1.2 45 1.4 8.2 14.4 27.5 21.6 49.1 6.6 
Q3 1.1 56 1.4 3.3 8.6 42.8 24.8 67.6 5.8 
Q4 1.1 64 0.5 1.2 9.4 34.9 40.0 74.9 6.1 
Q5 1.1 65 0.0 2.0 4.5 40.6 32.5 73.0 6.3 
Mean 1.1 50 5.5 6.9 11.3 32.3 25.7 58.0 6.4 
N 1065 1065 1065 1065 1065 1065 1065 1065 703 
Note: See note to Table 3-1. Source: FFCS 2005 
 
The data on care use allow us to distinguish between various type of 
care in a regular week. Formal care represents the total proportion of 
families using government regulated childcare services. The data are 
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provided by the respondent (one of the parents of the children) and 
does not concern intensity of use, only whether there is care use during 
the week or not. Here we do observe clear differences between Sweden 
and Flanders, although both report high total care use figures (66% and 
58% respectively). It is very clear that the use of childcare services is 
quite evenly distributed among income groups in Sweden (with the 
exception of the highest quintile), while biased against the lowest 
incomes in Flanders: they make to a much smaller extent use of 
childcare services (26% and 49% for the first two quintiles). This 
coincides with a higher number of workless households among low-
income families in Flanders compared with Sweden. This should not 
come as a surprise given the close association between income and 
employment on the one hand, and between employment and care use 
on the other. Our data suggest that the high level of care use of low 
income families in Sweden derives from their higher employment rates. 
This is underpinned by the large differences in workless households 
(24% in Flanders versus 4% in Sweden, see Table 3-1 and Table 3-2). 
As such, the difference in the distribution of care use between Flanders 
and Sweden could simply be a reflection of labour supply and demand. 
To test this, we have looked at childcare use among a subsample of 
working mothers. The results show that the bias against the lowest 
incomes attenuates yet does not disappear (use varies between 47% in 
the lowest quintile versus 66% in the highest). In sum, even if controlled 
for employment, Flemish care use is still skewed towards the higher 
incomes.  
How does this result come about? First, it is widely acknowledged 
among policymakers that Flanders suffers from a general shortage in 
childcare supply despite its high coverage rate. This is in particular 
detrimental for low-income families because they face many barriers 
attaining the (available) childcare slots (Market Analysis and Synthesis 
2007). This does not hold for Sweden where municipalities are obliged 
to provide sufficient places in preschool according to demand. But 
maybe the demand is simply lower in Flanders compared to Sweden? If 
that were true, the unequal distribution of care use in Flanders would 
merely be a reflection of labour supply and, thus, childcare as an 
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activation instrument is working the way it is supposed to work: it 
facilitates access to paid employment for those mothers willing to work. 
This explanation, however, is flawed. Previous analyses on the FFCS 
data revealed that 70% of non-working mothers in the lowest quintile 
who are not using childcare report that they would prefer to be 
employed if they had the possibility to (Ghysels and Van Lancker 2010). 
Taken together, the above points to a large untapped labour supply 
among low income families who are disproportionally hit by the current 
lack of childcare slots in Flanders. 
Second, previous research suggest that net childcare costs can offset 
income gains made by employment, especially in the case of low wage 
work (Immervol and Barber 2005). If this would explain the differences 
between Flanders and Sweden, one would expect net costs to differ 
significantly in Sweden and Flanders. This is however not the case (see  
Table 3-1 and Table 3-2). Childcare costs as a proportion of monthly 
disposable income show in both countries a rather digressive pattern, 
and this is especially so in Sweden. There, the lowest income families 
spend on average 13% of their monthly income on childcare (taking 
both public and private care into account) which is almost twice the 
proportion of the highest incomes (7%). Overall, Swedish families 
spend a higher proportion of their income than their Flemish 
counterparts (ranging from 8% in the lowest to 6% in the highest 
quintile). In the next section, we will look more in-depth into parental 
costs. 
Third, Flemish low income families may offset their relatively lower 
use of public care through care alternatives like private care services or 
informal care. Yet, only a marginal share of them find their way to 
private facilities. In fact, the use of private facilities shows an increasing 
trend with income: the higher one’s disposable income, the higher one’s 
use of private care provisions. Then again, the unequal use of childcare 
among income groups in Flanders should perhaps not be a cause for 
concern if those households are able to compensate the lack of formal 
care channels through informal care (e.g. grandparents). Our data 
shows, however, that low income families actually rely to a lesser extent 
on informal care channels than higher income families in both Flanders 
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and Sweden. Among the lowest incomes (first quintile), 20% of Flemish 
and 38% of Swedish families report to receive no grandparental help at 
all. 
3.6 PARENTAL CONTRIBUTIONS AND THE TARIFF SYSTEM 
It is important to take parental fees into account in our analysis: the 
share paid by parents is a reduction of the total childcare cost for the 
government. Hence, when out-of-pocket parental contributions are 
high, costs for the government will be lower and vice versa. As mentioned 
above, before the reforms in the 2000s, Sweden lacked a uniform tariff 
system. Municipalities were free to set their own tariffs which were 
however mostly income-related and time-related (depending on the 
intensity of use) (Brink, Nordblom and Wahlberg 2007). This led to 
considerable differences in parental contributions between 
municipalities: while some households almost paid nothing, others paid 
up to SEK 6000 (€698) per month in 2001 (Skolverket 2007). Moreover, 
the share of childcare costs covered by parents increased from 10% in 
the 1990s to approximately 18% in 1999 (Skolverket 2000b). It is only 
since the maxtaxa reform (supra) that a maximum ceiling on parental 
contributions was imposed and that fees ought to be related to gross 
income. In Flanders, childcare tariffs for subsidized childcare services 
are centrally set and vary with household income and intensity of use 
(thus resembling Swedish practice). For the year 2005, this translated in 
a cost between €1.41 and €25.18 per child per day (Kind en Gezin 
2005).  
How does the distribution of parental contributions for childcare 
look like if we compare Flanders and Sweden? Figure 3-2 shows the 
childcare cost per income group (adjusted for inflation and converted to 
purchasing power parities using 2005 prices to make both cases 
comparable), controlled for the number of children14 and subdivided 
                                                 
14  As an anonymous referee rightly pointed out, controlling for the number of 
children is indispensable which we have done by dividing the total childcare 
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into the median parental contribution (the middle line), the 10% most 
paying families (top line) and the 10% least paying families (bottom 
line). This way we can easily see whether the general pattern of parental 
fees is related to disposable income, and also what happens at the 
extremities. 
Despite the differences between the centrally set and explicit pro-
poor design in Flanders and the municipal variation in the Swedish tariff 
system, the pattern of childcare costs among the different income 
groups resembles each other. The median line shows that in both 
systems the lower incomes tend to pay less than the higher incomes, 
although childcare costs in Sweden seem to be somewhat higher for the 
lowest incomes (which coincides with the figures in Table 3-1 and Table 
3-2 showing that Swedish low income families spend a higher share of 
their income on childcare). In Flanders, the dispersion is larger than in 
Sweden: the least paying families pay less and the most paying families 
pay more. Moreover, some Flemish families in the first quintile face 
extremely high childcare costs: they pay even more than highest paying 
families in the third quintile. The reason for this is quite straightforward: 
Some of the low-income families (see Table 3-2) are forced to rely on 
care by non-subsidized service providers (who can set their own prices 
and are generally more expensive) because they cannot secure a slot in 
the subsidized sector. This is also one of the downsides (next to not 
using external childcare at all) of the problematic access to available 
subsidized childcare slots for some of the low income families in 
Flanders. 
 
                                                                                                                 
cost by the number of children actually using care. Failing to do so would 
make the comparison between income groups redundant given the 
observation that the number of children in care differs between income 
groups. 
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Figure 3-2 Monthly childcare cost by income group, Sweden and Flanders, 
€PPP 
 
Source: own calculations on LNU 2000 and FFCS 2005. Note: The graph shows the out-
of-pocket childcare cost per child by income group subdivided in the median parental 
contribution (the dark middle line), the 10% most paying families (top line, p90) and 
the 10% least paying families (bottom line, p10). Amounts are adjusted for inflation 
and converted to €PPP. 
 
The bottom lines in the graph show childcare costs among the 
lowest paying families, and one can observe that in Flanders some 
families in the third quintile pay almost no childcare fees, despite their 
higher disposable income. In Sweden, the bottom line seems to be more 
related to income. Yet, broadly speaking, both countries represent an 
income-related tariff system, despite their differences in design. If 
families were to use subsidized childcare services to a similar extent over 
the whole income distribution, the distribution of government 
expenditures would be skewed towards the lower quintiles, because in 
these quintiles parental contributions are low and, hence, the profit of 
government expenditures is high (Ghysels and Van Lancker 2011). 
However, as shown in Table 3-2, the use of childcare services offered by 
subsidized providers is not uniformly distributed across income groups 
in Flanders. In the subsequent analysis we will demonstrate how these 
two interrelate. Nevertheless, the similarity of the tariff structures means 
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that differences between the two countries concerning the social 
distribution of government outlays for childcare are not likely to stem 
from the tariff system. 
3.7 THE SOCIAL DISTRIBUTION OF GOVERNMENT FUNDING 
FOR CHILDCARE 
In the final part of this analysis, we combine the above findings on use 
and parental fees with government outlays on childcare for families with 
a youngest child below three. The results reflect the social distribution 
of government subsidies for public childcare. This is not simply a matter 
of dividing a given budget over income groups according to their care 
use. Instead, we have to take parental contributions into account and 
have to distinguish between direct and indirect subsidies. It is the 
combination of all these elements which gives a genuine estimate of 
government efforts and how these benefit different income groups.  
In effect, this exercise consists of two parts. First, we compile 
information of the budgetary outlays of the underlying policy measures 
(budgetary years 1999 and 2005 for Sweden and Flanders respectively). 
Second, we distribute the total budget over five income quintiles taking 
into account both the use of formal childcare, tax deduction (only in 
Flanders) and parental fees. 
In Sweden, Skolverket (2000b) reports an expenditure of SEK 
39,721 billion on childcare services in 1999. This amount includes all 
expenditures at the level of the municipalities and also comprises grants 
for private childcare initiatives. As the budget applies to all children 
between 0 and 12 in different care facilities and our investigation is 
focused on families with young children, we have to fine-tune the 
budget one step further. Based on LNU, we estimate the share of the 
children below 3 using care relative to the total share of children using 
care in Sweden. The resulting proportion (30,9%) is then applied to 
derive an estimate of the government budget on (public and private) 
childcare for these households: SEK 12,273,789,000 or €1,427,184,767. 
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In 2005, the federal and Flemish government spent about €100 
million in direct subsidies on childcare for children under three in the 
Flemish region. Besides these direct subsidies, we also have to take tax 
deductions for childcare into account. The latter function as indirect 
subsidies, replacing part of the contribution of parents to childcare 
service providers with public funds. Because tax figures are not readily 
available in our survey data, we simulated the tax concessions for 
childcare expenses in the income year 2004 for the families in our 
sample. The tax-benefit micro simulation model we used for this 
exercise (MISIM, see footnote 15) provides an estimate of €61 million 
of government expenses for tax deductions for the year 2005.15 These 
concern tax deductions as a result of childcare expenses for children 
under three in the income year 2004 for families living in the Flemish 
region.16 This leaves us with a government budget for childcare of 
€161,214,000. It is important to note that we were not able to compile 
the total budget for Flanders because there exist numerous indirect 
expenses by other government bodies (e.g. municipalities) for which we 
don’t have reliable data.17 But as our calculations account for more than 
70% of the total public efforts for childcare (Cantillon et al. 2006), we 
simply assume that the expenses not accounted for are distributed in a 
                                                 
15  MISIM (MIcroSImulationModel) is a static microsimulation model, which 
enables to evaluate policy alternatives in the field of social security and 
personal taxation. It is a tax-benefit model developed by the Centre for Social 
Policy (Verbist 2002). 
16  The tax reduction related to cash expenditures for childcare services means 
that taxable income of the fiscal unit is reduced with the out-of-pocket costs 
of the childcare service, with a maximum though of €11.20 per day per child 
(for children younger than three, extended to 12 years in 2005). Families who 
do not deduct childcare fees qualify for a lump-sum raise of the income tax 
exemption with €480 (for every child younger than three at the end of the 
income year). 
17  An example of the lacking information regards the incomplete social security 
status of childminders (they are not regarded as employees, but are not 
obliged to pay social security contributions as a self-employed either). To 
avoid the consequences of this lack of professional status, the Belgian 
government developed specific social security regulations for childminders. 
The costs of the latter are not reflected in the subsidies to childcare services, 
but are an indirect transfer to the sector. 
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similar way. The huge difference between the budgets assigned in 
Sweden and Flanders is eye-catching (even if we would be able to take 
into account the total Flemish budget), especially given the high overall 
coverage rate in both countries. Demographics certainly play a role here, 
given the larger population in Sweden (and thus a higher number of 
young children18), but the difference in total budget assigned is 
presumably best explained by the differences in the design of the 
service: 1) guaranteeing childcare slots is an expensive affair; 2) the 
Swedish child-to-staff ratio is smaller on average (5.5 versus 7 in 
Belgium according to the OECD Family Database); and 3) salaries of 
the staff (which have in majority an upper-secondary degree) are 
comparable to average wages in other occupations in Sweden, while this 
is not the case in Flanders.19 
Subsequently, we distribute the estimated budgets over the income 
quintiles in each country, controlled for parental contributions (because 
these represent a transfer of the parents and not from the government) 
and according to the care use of children below 3 in the households in 
our sample (controlled for differences in number of young children 
across income groups). The combined effect of this exercise is showed 
in Figure 3-3 for Flanders and Figure 3-4 for Sweden. 
 
                                                 
18  To give an idea of the differences: 368,968 children between 1 and 6 were 
enrolled in 1999 in Sweden versus 95,538 children between 0 and 2.5 in 2005 
in Flanders. See Kind en Gezin. 2005. "Jaarverslag Kinderopvang 2005 
[Yearbook on Childcare 2005]." Brussels: Kind en Gezin. and Skolverket. 
2000b. "Descriptive data on child care and schools in Sweden in 2000." 
Stockholm: Skolverket.. 
19  In Flanders there exist no general educational requirements for childcare 
staff. Especially childminders often have had no specific training (except their 
experience as a parent). 
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Figure 3-3 The social distribution of childcare subsidies in Flanders, 2005 
 
Source: own calculations. Note: A distinction is made between tax concessions given to 
parents who rely on childcare providers who receive government subsidies (‘added tax 
concessions’, since they accrue to the services that are also directly subsidized) and 
those who do not receive government subsidies (‘separate tax concessions’). 
 
Figure 3-4The social distribution of public childcare subsidies in Sweden, 1999 
 
Source: own calculations. 
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In Flanders, the total government investment in childcare is 
unequally distributed over income groups with the lowest quintile 
receiving a disproportionally smaller share. This inequality can also be 
expressed in figures. The quintile ratio (Q5/Q1), for example, equals 
1.5. In other words, households in the highest quintile profit one and a 
half times as much of public support for childcare than families from 
the lowest income quintile. It is striking to observe that, if one would 
only take account of direct subsidies (given to service providers), 
government efforts would be clearly pro-poor. Despite very unequal 
care use, the income-related tariff structure of subsidized childcare 
ensures that government funds flow towards the lowest incomes. 
However, this pro-poor distribution is completely undone and even 
reversed because of the indirect government subsidies in the form of tax 
deductions. This unequal distribution of tax concessions stems from the 
combination of deductible parental costs (care use multiplied by 
income-related tariff) with the marginal tax rate at which the tax 
concession is calculated. In Flanders, childcare costs are deducted from 
taxable income and, hence, those households paying relatively more 
taxes benefit most from the deduction. At the bottom of the income 
distribution, households pay only small parental contributions for 
childcare and, moreover, they have little taxes to reduce anyway. 
The situation is opposite in Sweden. Here, the lowest incomes 
benefit almost twice as much (Q5/Q1=0.64) from government 
subsidies on childcare than families in the highest quintiles. Phrasing the 
matter differently: 45% of the total budget on childcare flows to the 
households in the first and second quintile. 
To sum up, the Swedish public childcare system is unequivocally 
and successfully pro-poor: public funds flow in majority to families with 
the lower incomes which have guaranteed childcare slots and pay not as 
much parental contributions, while higher income families pay higher 
fees. In Flanders, this pattern is reversed: the bulk of government 
expenditures is allocated to the higher income families, despite the pro-
poor design of the tariff system, because of the right-skewed use pattern 
and the system of tax deductions for both subsidized and non-
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subsidized care providers (which benefit the higher incomes by design, 
see footnote 16). 
3.8 CONCLUSION 
In this chapter we unravelled the social distribution of government 
subsidies on childcare services for families with young children in 
Sweden and Flanders. Both have a long-standing history of heavily 
subsidized childcare services and belong to the highest-coverage 
countries in Europe. Yet, our results show that the impact of childcare 
on families is quite different in the two cases. 
First, we showed that the use of formal childcare is unevenly 
distributed among families with young children in Flanders: lower 
income families tend to use childcare services to a much lesser extent 
than their higher-income counterparts. In Sweden, childcare use is quite 
evenly distributed. Second, we found that the income related tariff 
system in both countries works properly, although some of the lowest-
income families in Flanders face very high childcare costs. Third, and 
most importantly, we investigated government subsidies related to 
childcare services taking care use, parental fees and tax deductions (for 
Flanders) into account and showed that government expenditures on 
formal childcare are unevenly allocated among families with young 
children in Flanders, especially benefiting the higher income categories. 
The combination of greater care use and the system of tax deductions 
(that applies also to childcare offered by non-subsidized care providers) 
undoes the pro-poor design of the tariff structure. The exact opposite 
happens in Sweden: although care use is evenly distributed among all 
families, the lowest incomes benefit almost twice as much from 
government subsidies than the highest incomes because of their lower 
parental contributions and the absence of a system of tax deductions. 
While both systems of public funding of childcare are intended to foster 
social inclusion, only the Swedish example manages to reach the most 
disadvantaged groups in society (e.g. concentration of lone parents 
among the lowest income groups), while the Flemish system does not. 
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We developed the argument that if childcare policies are mainly 
used by those already working, and scarce budgetary resources are 
allocated to those high up in the income distribution, genuine concern is 
warranted about its distributional consequences and its effectiveness as 
a productive social policy instrument. Our findings for Flanders indeed 
raise concern. Increasing government resources are used to fund 
services which mostly benefit the already well-off which means that the 
redistributive effect of those policies will be adverse, which is a 
validation of earlier findings on the effect of services in terms of Gini-
coefficient (Esping-Andersen and Myles 2009; Marical et al. 2008; 
Matsaganis and Verbist 2009). While Saraceno in a recent contribution 
states that “subsidized care (..) has an important redistributive effect” (Saraceno 
2011), we show that this assertion is not automatically true. But even if 
one only looks through an economic lens to services such as childcare 
and if we assume that the essential goal of services is not to redistribute 
income, but the promotion of equal access in relation to needs and 
demands (Kröger 1997), worries about its social distribution in Flanders 
are still warranted from an efficiency point of view: there is a large 
untapped labour market supply in the lowest income groups who do not 
have access to public childcare. We find that in Sweden all income 
groups have access to childcare places, which makes it possible for all 
mothers alike to engage in paid employment, net of other barriers to 
paid employment not taken into account in this study. Broadly speaking, 
we showed that the benefits of ‘productive family policy’ such as 
childcare are more complex than often assumed. 
This brings us to our final point. By zooming in on two high-
coverage countries with a similar history of childcare expansion, we are 
able to provide preliminary evidence that the success of a public 
childcare service in terms of social inequality and efficiency indeed 
depends on the mechanisms and the design of the service, i.e. the way 
government investment in childcare is allocated over families with 
children, not on the coverage rates per se. The greatest difference 
between Flanders and Sweden is the combination of guaranteed 
childcare places and sufficient supply in the latter, not the tariff system 
or parental costs for childcare. Yet, the vast differences in the total 
98 
 
budget allocated to public childcare between Sweden and Flanders 
shows that designing a comprehensive childcare system comes at a great 
financial cost (and supposedly a good deal of ‘political willingness’).  
The above explorations should however not distract us from our 
main finding. Both from a social inequality and an efficiency point of view, 
the Swedish system of subsidized childcare for young children 
outperforms its Flemish counterpart. 
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CHAPTER 4 
UNIVERSALISM UNDER SIEGE? 
EXPLORING THE ASSOCIATION 
BETWEEN TARGETING, CHILD 
BENEFITS AND CHILD POVERTY 
ACROSS 26 COUNTRIES* 
4.1  INTRODUCTION 
In times of economic hardship and fiscal consolidation, government are 
in dire need to find cost-efficient ways to combat rising child poverty 
rates (European Commission 2013a; TARKI 2010). Earlier research for 
developed welfare states has shown that child benefits play an important 
role in reducing child poverty. In this paper, we aim to reinvigorate our 
knowledge on the impact of child benefits on child poverty, in particular 
how child benefit systems should be designed in order to yield the most 
beneficial results in terms of poverty reduction. 
The long-standing wisdom that universally designed benefits 
outperform targeted benefits in terms of poverty reduction has come 
                                                 
*  This chapter has been published as Van Lancker, Wim, and Van Mechelen, 
Natascha (2014), “Universalism under siege? Exploring the association 
between targeting, child benefits, and child poverty across 26 countries”, CSB 
Working Paper, 1401, Herman Deleeck Centre for Social Policy, Antwerp. The 
authors would like to thank Lina Salanauskaite, Gerlinde Verbist, the 
participants of the 2013 FISS Conference in Sigtuna, Sweden, and the 
ESPAnet 2013 Conference in Poznan, Poland, for valuable comments and 
suggestions. 
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under siege in recent years. On the political front, the World Bank, the 
European Commission, and the OECD all have encouraged a move 
towards “more and better” targeting to those in need, often 
accompanied by a call for more conditionality in benefit entitlement 
(European Commission 2013b; Hall 2007; OECD 2011a). The matter 
has also been at the centre of renewed scholarly attention. While Korpi 
and Palme’s (1998) ‘paradox of redistribution’ that benefits targeted at 
the poor achieve less redistribution than universal benefits has long 
been regarded a settled matter, recent empirical studies for OECD and 
EU economies tend to find that targeting is not necessarily associated 
anymore with lower levels of redistribution (Kenworthy 2011; Marx, 
Salanauskaite and Verbist 2013). Investigations for non-OECD 
countries yielded mixed results. Ravallion (2009), for instance, found no 
meaningful relationship between targeting and poverty reduction for a 
benefit scheme in China. In a report commissioned by the World Bank, 
on the other hand, Coady et al. (2004) find that targeted programmes 
perform rather good, although conditional on policy specifics. The 
matter is clearly not settled yet, and should not be approached light-
heartedly by academics. Once implemented, the choice between 
universalism or (more) targeting potentially impacts a large number of 
people, and support for targeting might also conceal an agenda for 
reduced social spending in the face of the economic crisis (Bradshaw 
2012). This warrants an increase in the academic effort to further 
unravel the link between poverty reduction and benefit programme 
design. 
Generally, previous studies suffer from two shortcomings. First, the 
analyses are often limited to the aggregate level which provides no 
guidance for the design of specific programmes (Moene and Wallerstein 
2001). It could very well be the case that the appropriate balance 
between targeting and universalism differs for child benefits and 
pension schemes. Second, the level of targeting is almost always 
operationalised with an index of concentration, in which redistributive 
outcomes are measured rather than the impact of redistributive intentions. 
In this respect, targeting is interpreted as social transfers being more 
beneficial for lower incomes, irrespective whether this comes about due 
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to characteristics of the welfare system (Marx, Salanauskaite and Verbist 
2013). This distorts the interpretation of the results. To enrich the 
earlier findings on the impact of child benefits on child poverty, an in-
depth exploration of the impact of the policy design, i.e. the balance 
between universalism and targeting, is a desirable further step in 
empirical research. Therefore, the aim of this paper is to investigate (1) 
the relationship between child benefits and child poverty reduction; (2) 
whether a universal or targeted approach is more effective in terms of 
child poverty alleviation; and (3) the mechanisms explaining the link 
between (1) and (2). In doing so, we will take into account the general 
characteristics of the child benefit system, the size of the redistributive 
budget and the generosity of benefit levels.  
We contribute to the existing literature, first, by focusing on a 
specific welfare programme instead of the whole tax and transfer system 
for a large number of countries (EU25 + Norway) using recent data; 
second, by devoting attention to the drivers of the redistributive 
outcomes; and third, by applying a methodology in which two research 
methods are united. We combine information on the institutional 
characteristics of child benefit systems by means of the so-called family 
model methodology with an empirical analysis of child poverty 
reduction by means of survey data. This allows to test the intentions of 
policies in relation to its redistributive outcomes. Our results shed light on 
child poverty reduction, the role of policy design and the impact of 
social transfers, which does not only contribute to our theoretical 
understanding of the nature of redistribution, but also feeds into 
policymaking and the matter of cost-efficiency of social transfers in 
times of fiscal consolidation. 
Our paper is structured as follows. First, we review existing 
literature on the targeting-universalism debate, the impact of child 
benefits on child poverty, and the connection between the two. Second, 
we devote some space to a proper definition of the concepts used 
throughout this paper, and subsequently present our data and analytical 
strategy. Our empirical results are found in the fourth section. We end 
this piece with a discussion of our findings and their relevance for the 
broader academic and policy debate on the benefits of targeting.  
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4.2 BACKGROUND 
4.2.1 Theoretical arguments  
The debate on targeting versus universalism essentially boils down to 
the question “who should get what type and degree of social protection?” (van 
Oorschot 2002). The exact meaning of both concepts is not always 
clear, however, and they are often mixed up with related concepts such 
as means-testing or selectivity. Here, we distinguish between 
universalism as a system characteristic and universalism as benefit 
entitlement (Bergh 2005).  
As a system characteristic, the opposite of universalism is selectivity. A 
benefit system is universal if the whole reference population is covered, 
while benefits are selective if eligibility is restricted to a specific category 
of the reference population based on certain conditions (e.g. having a 
low income). For example, child benefits are universal when all children 
are entitled, while they are selective when entitlement is limited to a 
specific group of children (e.g. poor children). Both are mutually 
exclusive: a benefit system is either universal or selective.  
Targeting is concerned with the allocation of resources, i.e. how the 
budget is meant to be distributed (targeting intentions) or how it is 
actually distributed over beneficiaries (targeting outcomes). Remember 
that we are concerned with the targeting intentions, not with the 
outcomes. In this article, targeting intentions are captured by the 
variation in statutory benefit levels across income groups. If, say, low 
income groups are legally entitled to more generous benefits than higher 
income groups, the child benefit system is targeted towards lower 
incomes. By the same token, if higher income groups are entitled to 
higher benefits, the child benefit system is targeted towards higher 
incomes. This implies that selective benefits are always targeted, but also 
that targeting not necessarily implies selectivity. Targeting may occur 
within a universal benefit system as well, previously termed “targeting 
within universality” (Skocpol 1991). When all beneficiaries are entitled 
to equal benefit levels and no targeting occurs, benefit entitlement is 
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universal: every one of the reference group is entitled to exactly the same 
benefit amount. If benefit allocation is not targeted within universal 
benefit systems and both varieties of universalism are united, we speak 
of ‘strict universality’.  
Means-testing, then, is a technique to achieve targeting, a means to an 
end. Policymakers who want to target low-income households, for 
instance, might implement a means-test in the form of an income test. 
In this example, all families fulfilling the criteria of the income test, are 
eligible for the targeted benefits.  
Whether benefits targeted at the poor or universal benefits are 
better to combat poverty has been a controversial issue for a long time, 
and theoretical arguments have been proposed favoring both sides 
(Kahn and Kamerman 1975; Orloff 1993; Skocpol 1991). On the one 
hand, proponents of targeting benefits to the poor argue that it entails a 
more efficient use of resources because social spending goes to those 
who really need it (Besley 1990). This resonates the criticism that the 
middle and higher income classes typically benefit more from social 
spending than the poor (Goodin and Le Grand 1987). Consequently, 
the availability of more resources for those who need it should result in 
higher benefit levels. On the other hand, proponents of universalism 
argue that universal benefits are superior over selective ones, because 
significant administrative costs, lower rates of take-up, and labour 
market and savings disincentives reduce their effectiveness in combating 
poverty (Atkinson 1998; Bradshaw 2012; Notten and Gassmann 2008). 
Moreover, targeting is believed to undermine broad-based political 
legitimacy and public support for the welfare state. Therefore the more 
benefits are targeted at the poor, the smaller the redistributive budget 
will be. That is the political economy argument invoked by Korpi and 
Palme in their seminal 1998 article. They showed that for the period 
between the mid-1980s and the early 1990s, universalism was associated 
with a higher degree of redistribution, and that this relationship was 
driven by the relative size of the redistributive budget. 
In sum, two causal mechanisms driving the relationship between 
benefit design and poverty reduction might be at play: 1) universal 
benefit systems are superior because they have higher redistributive 
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budgets to allocate (the ‘size’ hypothesis); or 2) targeted benefits are 
superior because the available resources are distributed over a smaller 
group which allows benefits to be more generous; hence more effective 
in combating poverty (the ‘generosity’ hypothesis). 
4.2.2 Previous research 
Previous research has mainly focused on the redistributive impact of 
social spending as such. It has been shown extensively that large welfare 
states, i.e. welfare states with large redistributive budgets, tend to reduce 
poverty and inequality more effective than smaller welfare states (Korpi 
and Palme 1998; Nelson 2004), and that social spending is also relevant 
for explaining the variation in child poverty rates across countries 
(Bradbury and Jäntti 1999; Chen and Corak 2008; Gornick and Jäntti 
2010). In particular child benefits have shown to be an important policy 
lever in combating child poverty (Bäckman and Ferrarini 2010; Corak, 
Lietz and Sutherland 2005; Immervoll, Sutherland and De Vos 2001). 
Few studies investigate the design of child benefits in relation to 
poverty reduction, and these studies are often limited to one or a small 
set of countries. Notten and Gassmann (2008) use the change from 
universal to means-tested child benefits in Russia in 2000 as a case-study 
to compare the impact on poverty between the two strategies and find 
that universally provided child benefits are more effective in combating 
poverty. Above all, however, they show that generosity matters most: 
increasing benefit levels yields the highest impact on poverty. 
Matsaganis et al. (2006) use microsimulation techniques and find that 
the introduction of universal child benefit systems in the Southern 
European countries, which are characterised by selective child benefit 
systems (infra), would not necessarily lead to better poverty outcomes. 
They also find that more generous benefits have a larger impact on 
poverty, which obviously comes at a higher cost for the exchequer. 
Salanauskaite and Verbist (Salanauskaite and Verbist 2013) also make 
use of microsimulation techniques to test the effectiveness of family 
transfers in reducing child poverty for five new member states (with the 
main focus on Lithuania). They too find that size of the transfer budget 
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is of great importance, but that design matters as well. The study shows 
that strictly universal systems are least effective in reducing poverty, 
while mixed systems (targeting within universalism) yield better results, 
albeit dependent on specific design characteristics. Finally, a UNICEF 
commissioned study on the impact of a new child benefit programme in 
Mongolia finds that a targeted child programme resulted in leakage to 
non-poor households as well as in the exclusion of poor households 
(Hodges et al. 2007). The authors subsequently advocate a universal 
child benefit system. 
All in all, these studies confirm the importance of size and 
generosity, in line with the hypotheses formulated, yet remain rather 
inconclusive when it comes to child benefit design: should child benefits 
be provided universally or targeted towards lower incomes? In this 
study, we aim to move forward this debate. 
4.3 METHODS 
4.3.1 Data 
This paper draws on two data sources. First, data on targeting is 
provided by the CSB MIPI database, an expert sourced data base on 
minimum income protection provisions for different target groups in 25 
EU countries and three US states (see Van Mechelen et al. 2011, for 
detailed information). CSB MIPI contains standard simulations of net 
disposable income for model family types in various income situations. 
Here we focus on a couple with two children aged 7 and 14 and the tax-
benefit systems in operation in June 2009. We compare four income 
situations: a double earner family where both partners earn the average 
wage, a single earner family where one partner earns the average wage 
while the other is considered to be inactive (not looking for work), a 
similar family where one partner earns the minimum wage, and a family 
on social assistance. In order to gauge the value of the child benefit 
package, we deduct the net income of a hypothetical childless couple 
from the net income of a couple with children at the same earnings 
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level. The child benefit package includes child cash benefits whether 
selective or universal, tax benefits or allowances which reduce the direct 
tax liability in respect of children and any mitigation of local taxes in 
respect of children. Social assistance top-ups for low wage earning 
families that vary by the number and/or age of children, and housing 
benefits or allowances that take account of the presence of a child are 
not considered part of “child benefits” 20. This is to keep consistency of 
terms between the two databases used in this study. A caveat should be 
mentioned regarding the age of the children in the model families. In 
some countries taxes and benefits for children tend to vary substantially 
by age, and by assuming older children we do not take into account 
those benefits that are in particular geared towards young children 
(Bradshaw and Finch 2002). Standard simulations of childcare costs, for 
instance, are particularly difficult to link to survey data because tariff 
systems are often set at the municipal level and support measures for 
child care costs frequently consist in tax subsidies. 
The second data source we rely on is the EU-SILC 2010 (European 
Union Statistics  on Income and Living Conditions) survey, with income 
reference year 2009 which matches the timeframe of the statutory MIPI 
data. The SILC dataset provides unique and comparable data on income 
and living conditions of European households and is maintained by 
Eurostat (although carried out by the statistical offices of the particular 
countries). Moreover, the dataset allows distinguishing child-related 
allowances from other components of the income package which makes 
it extremely suitable for our purpose21. More information about the 
SILC survey can be obtained from the Eurostat website. 
                                                 
20  This definition distorts the picture of the child benefit package of social 
assistance recipients in Denmark and Finland because welfare claimants 
typically pay taxes in both  countries. Given that couples with children 
receive higher welfare payments than childless couples, they pay higher taxes. 
The above definition takes into account the negative impact of higher taxes 
on the child benefit package, while ignoring the positive impact of higher 
assistance amounts. In order to correct for this, we have assumed the child 
tax benefit of social assistance recipients in Denmark and Finland to be zero. 
21  Child-related allowances as recorded in EU-SILC not only consists of child 
allowances, child benefits, and child tax credits, but also includes birth, 
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Countries included in this study are Austria (AT), Belgium (BE), 
Bulgaria (BG), Cyprus (CY), Czech Republic (CZ), Denmark (DK), 
Estonia (EE), Finland (FI), France (FR), Germany (DE), Greece (GR), 
Hungary (HU), Iceland (IS), Ireland (IE), Italy (IT), Latvia (LV), 
Lithuania (LT), Luxemburg (LU), Malta (MT), Netherlands (NL), 
Norway (NO), Poland (PL), Portugal (PT), Romania (RO), Slovak 
Republic (SK), Slovenia (SI), Spain (ES), Sweden (SE), and the United 
Kingdom (UK). 
4.3.2 Measurement 
Targeting 
In contrast to previous studies (e.g. Korpi and Palme 1998; Marx, 
Salanauskaite and Verbist 2013), we do not rely on a concentration 
index to gauge the degree of targeting. Instead, we construct a targeting 
indicator (TI) on the basis of the CSB MIPI dataset which contains 
statutory information on child benefit levels for different income cases. 
Our aim is to capture the targeting intentions of a given country, i.e. 
how the design of the child benefit systems intends to allocate resources 
across income groups. For most of the countries, we have information 
on child benefit levels for four income cases: couples living on social 
assistance (SA), couples living on a minimum wage (MW), couples 
earning average wages (AW) and couples making twice the average wage 
(2AW)22. The four cases are ranked from low to high income levels. 
Several approaches have been proposed in the literature (Brady and 
Burroway 2012); here we use the average of the ratios of child benefits 
between income groups to calculate the targeting indicator TI. The ratio 
                                                                                                                 
adoption and maternity grants, and for some countries parental benefits as 
well. To assess their potential impact on our results, we have repeated our 
analyses excluding families with young children (below 3 years old) from the 
survey. The interpretation of the results does not change.  
22  Exceptions are GR (no general assistance scheme in place), LU (no data on 
average wage earners) and DK, DE, FI, NO, and SE (no national minimum 
wage). 
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shows whether a lower ranked income case is entitled to higher benefits 
compared to the next higher ranked income case. Averaging has the 
advantage of taking not only the extremities (lowest and highest 
incomes) into account, but also what happens in between. Formally, the 
targeting indicator TI is of the form: 
     (   ∑
  
    
 
 
   
) 
With xi denoting the income case i, and n being the number of 
income cases in a given country minus 1. In the expression        , 
income case xi+1 refers to the income case one rank above xi. 
Subsequently, the sum of the ratios is averaged. Following international 
practice (e.g. the concentration index), the result is subtracted from 1 to 
reverse the sign, so that TI < 0 denotes targeting towards lower income 
families, TI > 0 denotes targeting towards higher income families, and 
TI = 0 denotes an equal child benefit for all income cases (strict 
universality, supra). The four income cases together with the values of 
the TI are to be found in table A1 in annex. By way of example, the 
calculation of the TI for Belgium is as follows (amounts are expressed in 
€PPP per month):  
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Which means that child benefits in Belgium are targeted towards 
the lower incomes. In particular, the lower income group gets on 
average 0.065 times higher a child benefit compared to the higher 
ranked income case. 
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Child poverty 
To define poverty, we make use of the Foster et al. (1984) poverty index 
FGT(α), which is of the form: 
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With z denoting the poverty threshold, x the income of the 
household in which person i lives, n the number of individuals, and α 
being a parameter reflecting the poverty measure of interest. When α=0, 
P0 gives the poverty headcount ratio, or the percentage of individuals living 
in a household with an income below the poverty threshold. Thus, 
following European practice, a child (under 18 years old) is defined as 
being poor when living in a household with an equivalized net 
disposable household income below a poverty line set at 60% of the 
national median equivalized household income (the European headline 
at-risk-of-poverty indicator, see Atkinson et al. (2002)). The net 
disposable household income equals the sum of the income of all 
members of the household, including social benefits, minus taxes and 
social insurance contributions. This disposable household income is 
equivalized using the modified OECD equivalence scale23 to take into 
account economies of scale and to render households income 
comparable across households of different size. The child poverty rate 
for a given country is thus the headcount of the number of children 
living in a household below the poverty line (see Decancq et al., (2014), 
for further reading on poverty measurement). To test the robustness of 
our results, we complement the poverty rate with the poverty gap ratio, 
with α = 1. P1 gives the average income shortfall from the poverty line 
                                                 
23  The modified OECD equivalence scale attaches a weight of 1 to the first 
adult, 0.5 to all other household members aged 14 and over, and a weight of 
0.3 to all children under 14 years. The equivalized household income is 
obtained by dividing total household income by the sum of the individual 
equivalence weights. 
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amongst children living in poverty, and should be interpreted as the 
‘depth’ of poverty.  
Poverty reduction  
To measure the impact of child benefits on child poverty rates, we apply 
the so-called ‘standard approach’ (Whiteford 1997). The standard 
approach is to compare the poverty rate before and after including child 
benefits into the equivalized net disposable household income, holding 
the poverty line constant. The relative difference between the before 
and after poverty rate is the poverty reducing impact of child benefits. 
As such, the actual income distribution is compared to a hypothetical 
counterfactual income distribution in which government intervention in 
the realm of child benefits is absent. Although often criticised (Bergh 
2005; Jesuit and Mahler 2010), the standard approach allows to compare 
countries based on a single metric that is easy to interpret. Formally, our 
measure of the relative poverty reduction effectiveness (RPRE) of child 
benefits takes the following form: 
 
     
             
     
     
Where P0pre = poverty risk calculated on equivalized net disposable 
household income less child benefits, and P0post = poverty risk calculated 
on equivalized net disposable household income including child 
benefits. The indicator is expressed in percentage reduction of child 
poverty. A similar approach is followed for the calculation of the 
relative poverty gap reduction effectiveness (RGAPRE) of child 
benefits: 
        
            
     
     
Where P1pre = poverty gap ratio less child benefits, and P1post = 
poverty gap ratio including child benefits. Other scholars have also 
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employed an absolute poverty reduction effectiveness measure, defined 
as the percentage point difference between pre and post poverty rates 
(e.g. Sainsbury and Morissens 2002). Although informative, such 
absolute measure is sensitive to the pre-transfer poverty rate. As such, it 
measures not only poverty reduction, but also captures the starting 
point24. Here, our focus is on poverty reduction as such.  
Explanatory variables: size and generosity 
Finally, two hypotheses regarding the causal mechanisms through which 
either universal or targeted benefits reduce poverty are considered in 
this study. The first relates to the size of social expenditure; the second 
to the generosity of benefits. To measure size of the redistributive budget, we 
calculate for every country the total sum of child-related benefits as 
measured in EU-SILC. This amount is subsequently related to each 
country’s gross domestic product (GDP). An advantage of relying on 
survey (SILC) data and not on administrative data (for instance available 
in the European system of integrated social protection statistics 
ESSPROS), is that our indicator of size represents the actual amount of 
spending that is used to calculate RPRE and RGAPRE. However, the 
correlation with administrative data is strong (r = 0.82) and the results 
do not substantially differ when relying on administrative instead of 
survey data. 
Second, generosity of benefit levels is gauged as the average benefit level 
for the lowest income groups (SA and MW), expressed as percentage of 
the poverty line (see Nelson 2013, for a similar approach). We focus on 
the lowest income groups, and not on average benefit levels, because it 
is explicitly hypothesised that targeting will correlate with higher benefit 
levels for the lowest incomes. We rely on the institutional MIPI data 
                                                 
24  This is not a trivial matter, because the choice of indicator determines 
ranking of countries. Suppose a country A reduces poverty from 80 to 60 per 
cent, while country B reduces poverty from 10 to 5. According to the 
absolute measure of poverty reduction, country A would rank first, although 
it is highly questionable whether that country is actually doing better than 
country B. The RPRE would rank country B first with a score of 50% and 
country A at 25%. 
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and not on the SILC survey, because it is not straightforwardly possible 
to operationalise the institutional information, i.e. the four income cases, 
in the latter (see the discussion on intentions versus outcomes above). 
However, as a robustness check we have tested an alternative approach 
in which we have calculated the average child benefit level per child 
living in a poor family from the EU-SILC. This indicator too correlates 
strongly with the MIPI indicator of generosity (r = 0.78) and the 
interpretation of the results does not change. Both measures of size and 
generosity used in the analyses below are listed in Table A-1 in annex. 
4.4 RESULTS 
4.4.1 Characteristics of child benefit systems 
Table 4-1 distinguishes between three groups of countries on the basis 
of benefit entitlement on the one hand, and the system characteristic of 
child benefit systems on the other: countries with selective child benefit 
systems, countries with mixed systems (targeted benefits within 
universal systems) and those with strictly universal systems (universal 
benefits within universal systems)25. Figure 4-1 ranks the countries in 
our sample according to the degree of targeting. To this end, we 
compare child benefits levels of double earners on twice average wage 
(2AW), single earners on average wage (AW), single earners on 
minimum wage (MW) and families on social assistance (SA) (see above).  
Only 7 out of the 26 countries under investigation operate selective 
benefit systems. Countries where eligibility to child benefits is limited to 
a specific group of beneficiaries are Southern European countries like 
Italy, Portugal, and Spain, and a number of Eastern European countries 
such as the Czech Republic, Slovenia, Poland, and Lithuania. Selective 
benefit systems are targeted by definition, but there is great variety in 
                                                 
25  It should be noted that a number of countries have implemented (temporary) 
austerity measures in their child benefit systems during the crisis. Some of 
these measures are not taken into account in our classification since we 
report on the June 2009 situation. 
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the degree of targeting across these systems. A crucial factor is the 
strictness of the means-test involved. In Czech Republic, for instance, 
one-earner families living on minimum wages tend to receive income 
related cash benefits whereas one-earner families with an average wage 
do not. By contrast, in countries like Italy, Portugal, Slovenia Poland 
and Lithuania even two-earner families with average earnings are 
entitled to income related benefits. 
 
Table 4-1 Classification of child benefit systems, 26 European countries, 2009 
  System characteristic 
  Selective Universal 
Benefit allocation 
Targeted 
IT, PT, ES, CZ, 
SI, PL, LT 
AT, BE, EE, FR, 
GR, IE, LU, LV, 
NL, RO, SK, UK 
Universal / 
DK, FI, SE, NO, 
HU, DE, BG 
 
In most countries, child benefits are provided within a universal 
framework. The universal systems in Belgium, Greece, France and 
Germany, however, are exceptions to some extent. In Belgium and 
Greece working families are entitled to employment-based rather than 
universal non-income related benefits (while non-working families 
usually receive income related benefits). In France only families with 2 
or more children are entitled to non-income related cash benefits. 
Germany, finally, complemented its universal cash benefit scheme with 
an optional model of tax credits and tax allowances in 1996. Families 
with children are taxed in the most favorable way, which is by making 
use of the tax credit in most cases. This model is functionally however 
very similar to strictly universal child benefits. Universal benefits may be 
targeted by granting supplements to specific social groups. In Belgium, 
for example, vulnerable groups like single parents and the long-term 
unemployed receive more generous child benefits. In France, the 
Netherlands, Ireland, Bulgaria and Romania child benefits are targeted 
to low income families through the provision of additional cash benefits 
on top of universal benefit payments.  
In an increasing number of countries tax credits and tax allowances 
contribute to the degree of targeting. There is evidence that during the 
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past decade child benefits have gradually been reallocated towards the 
tax system, termed the ‘fiscalization’ of child benefits (Bradshaw and 
Finch 2002; Ferrarini, Nelson and Höög 2013; Immervoll and Pearson 
2009). The income gradient of child tax benefits largely depends on the 
type and the design of the scheme. An important distinction to make is 
between wasteable and non-wasteable tax credits. Low income families 
often fail to benefit from non-wasteable tax credits or tax allowances, 
simply because they pay no taxes. Refundable or wasteable tax credits, 
however, are functionally very similar to cash benefits. These tax credits 
can be strictly universal if the amount of the tax credit is flat rate, which 
is the case in Austria and Germany, or they can be targeted if amount 
varies according to income (the United Kingdom is a case in point). 
There are few countries where child benefits are strictly universal: 
the Nordic countries, Germany and Hungary.26 In Bulgaria too, the 
targeting index is zero. Although a selective benefit system is in place, 
benefits are flat rate and the means-test only excludes families that are 
relatively rich (earning more than twice the average wage, not included 
in the MIPI data). 
                                                 
26  In Finland housing allowances and social assistance top-ups for low income 
families increase the selectivity of child benefit packages (Van Mechelen and 
Bradshaw 2013). These income elements are however not included in Figure 
4-1. 
 
 
Figure 4-1 The size and composition of the child benefit package at various income positions (couple + 2 children, aged 7 and 14), 26 
countries, 2009 
 
Source: CSB-MIPI (Van Mechelen et al, 2011). Note: there is no statutory minimum wage in DE, DK, FI and NO. The minimum wage scenario 
for Italy is based on Monthly contractual wage for the lowest qualification level in the fur and leather sector. GR lacks a social safety net for able-
bodied persons. 
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As shown in Figure 4-1, the child benefit system in the United 
Kingdom is most targeted towards lower incomes. Here, universal cash 
benefits are combined with generous income-related refundable tax 
credits for children. The top five performers in terms of targeting 
towards low income families further consist of the Czech Republic, 
Slovenia, Romania and Portugal. All these countries have selective 
systems (except Romania). In a substantial number of countries the 
targeting index is above zero, meaning that their child benefit systems 
are targeted towards higher income families. This is the case in France, 
Lithuania, Slovak Republic and most particularly in Spain, Latvia and 
Greece. These countries illustrate the pitfalls of non-refundable tax 
benefits: families on low pay profit less from these tax benefits because 
they pay less taxes.  
It is noteworthy that in many of the countries in our sample, child 
benefits do not systematically increase as one moves down the income 
distribution, even if benefit systems are relatively well-targeted at low 
income families. In Italy, for instance, the selective benefit system is 
contributory and not available to families with insufficient contribution 
records for social insurance benefits, therefore excluding many social 
assistance recipients. Consequently, the most generous child benefits are 
not targeted at the most vulnerable families in general, but to those on 
low pay in particular. Likewise, the Irish ‘Family Income Supplement’ is 
an employment based scheme that gives extra financial support to 
people on low pay. These measures belong to the set of so-called in-
work benefits that are increasingly promoted as a solution for the 
problem of inactivity traps. Again, work-poor families are put at a 
disadvantage. In some countries there are anomalies in the variation of 
child benefits over the income distribution caused by the design of the 
tax system. In Czech Republic, for example, the degree of targeting built 
into its system of selective cash child benefits is partly neutralized by the 
tax benefits for families in the labour market.  
Finally, Figure 4-2 shows the size of the redistributive budget for 
each country in our sample. Again, between-country variation is large. 
Ireland is the biggest spender, with a total budget for child benefits of 
3,3% of GDP. Austria, Hungary, and Lithuania spend around 2% of 
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GDP, while in the majority of countries between 1 and 2% of GDP is 
spent on child benefits. The Mediterranean countries Spain, Italy, 
Greece, and Portugal dedicate only 0,5% of GDP or less on child 
benefits.  
 
Figure 4-2 Size of the redistributive budget for child benefits (% of GDP), 2009 
 
Source: own calculations on EU-SILC 2010. Note : income reference year is 2010 for 
UK; for Ireland, the reference period is the twelve months before the survey was 
carried out. 
 
4.4.2 Child poverty, RPRE and RGAPRE of child 
benefit systems 
Figure 4-3 reports child poverty rates for the countries in our sample as 
well as our indicators of poverty reduction (RPRE) and poverty gap 
reduction (RGAPRE). First of all, we observe great diversity in child 
poverty rates, ranging from over 30% in Romania and around 25% in 
Bulgaria, Latvia, Spain and Italy, to about 10% in Norway, Finland and 
Denmark. 
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Figure 4-3 Child poverty rates and RPRE, European countries, 2009 
Source: own calculations on EU-SILC 2010. Note : income reference year is 2010 for 
UK and the twelve months before the survey was carried out for Ireland. 
 
Second, regarding RPRE, the figure shows that child benefits in 
some countries only have a negligible impact on child poverty rates 
(Spain, Greece), while in others child poverty rates are more than halved 
(Ireland, Austria, Finland, Hungary). A similar pattern can be discerned 
regarding RGAPRE. It is also clear that, generally speaking, countries 
with high child poverty rates have lower levels of RPRE (r = -0.66) and 
RGAPRE (r = -0.64) and vice versa. Where child benefits are not very 
effective in reducing child poverty, the latter is usual high. This is in line 
with previous research demonstrating the importance of child benefit 
systems in reducing child poverty. However, it is also clear that child 
benefits are not the only important factor at play. Denmark and 
Norway, for instance, have among the lowest child poverty rates but not 
the most effective child benefit systems. This relates to contextual 
factors such as labour market performance but also to the availability of 
social transfers and services that are not specifically addressed to 
children but help reduce poverty for all families (Corak, Lietz and 
Sutherland 2005). Indeed, countries with a welfare system capable of 
mitigating poverty for children generally shape beneficial circumstances 
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for all citizens alike (Brady 2009). In the next section, we relate the 
design of child benefit systems (TI) to RPRE and RGAPRE for all 
countries in our sample.  
4.4.3 Targeting and child poverty reduction 
Figure 4-4 and Figure 4-5 show the relationship between targeting and 
poverty reduction and targeting and poverty gap reduction respectively. 
The targeting index takes a value between -1 and 1, whereby a positive 
value means that higher income families tend to receive higher benefits, 
a negative value that lower income families tend to receive higher 
benefits while a value of 0 represents strict universality. 
Figure 4-4 RPRE and TI (r = -0.28) 
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Figure 4-5 RGAPRE and TI (r = -0.37) 
 
 
Prima facie, the scatter plots call into the question the assertion that 
universalism is associated with higher levels of poverty reduction. 
Although the correlations are rather weak, the sign of the coefficients 
suggests that the more child benefits are targeted to the lower incomes, 
the more effective they are in reducing poverty (RPRE) and reducing 
the poverty gap (RGAPRE). Vice versa, countries allocating more 
resources to the higher income groups, such as Greece, Spain, and 
Latvia, are underachievers in terms of both RPRE and RGAPRE. We 
also observe, however, that several countries are concentrated around a 
TI-value of zero and that these countries display great variety in RPRE 
and RGAPRE. Some of these countries (Austria, Ireland, Finland, 
Luxemburg) outperform the most targeted country (the United 
Kingdom), while others (Bulgaria, Italy) hardly do better than Spain and 
Greece. This warrants further qualification, and to gain further insight 
we now investigate the drivers of poverty reduction.  
In the theoretical section (supra), we outlined two hypotheses 
supporting either universalism or targeting as being most effective in 
reducing child poverty. First of all, the size hypothesis predicts that the 
size of the redistributive budget relates to poverty reduction, and that 
universal benefit programmes tend to have larger budgets which 
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explains their good performance. Figure 4-6 shows the relationship 
between size of the redistributive budget and RPRE, Figure 4-7 the 
relationship between size and RGAPRE. The strong and positive 
correlations demonstrate that the redistributive budget is indeed closely 
related to poverty reduction. The more governments spend on child 
benefits, the better they are able to reduce child poverty and to mitigate 
the poverty gap. It could thus be the case that the positive association 
between targeting and poverty reduction we observed in Figure 4-4, is in 
fact driven by the total amount of resources spent. Figure 4-8 plots the 
relationship between TI and size of the budget. The scatterplot 
demonstrates that the association between both variables is almost non-
existent: although countries targeting towards higher income groups 
have the lowest budgets and countries targeting lower income groups 
tend to have higher budgets, the highest budgets are actually found in 
countries characterised by a universal system with only a limited degree 
of targeting (targeting within universalism) or strictly universal benefits. 
This is in line with the size hypothesis. 
Figure 4-6 RPRE and size of the redistributive budget (r = 0.82) 
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Figure 4-7 RGAPRE and size of the redistributive budget (r = 0.74) 
 
Figure 4-8 Size of the redistributive budget and TI (r = -0.13) 
 
Second, the main argument invoked by proponents of targeting is 
that benefit levels will be higher for low incomes because resources are 
deployed efficiently, i.e. they are allocated to those people who really 
need it. To assess the validity of this generosity hypothesis in the case of 
child benefits, Figure 4-9 and Figure 4-10 show the relationship between 
RPRE and generosity of benefit levels and RGAPRE and generosity, 
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respectively. The correlation is positive and of medium strength, 
suggesting that the more generous benefits for lower income groups are, 
the better they succeed in reducing child poverty and closing the 
poverty gap. Notwithstanding this association, countries reporting 
similar levels of generosity often display considerable variation in RPRE 
(Romania and Germany, but also Bulgaria and France are cases in 
point). Figure 4-11, then, displays the association between TI and 
generosity: the correlation is strong and negative, suggesting that the 
generosity hypothesis holds true in the case of child benefit systems 
(without outlier UK, the correlation coefficient is still -0.62). Targeting 
towards lower incomes is associated with higher benefits for the lower 
income groups. This, in turn, leads to better RPRE and RGAPRE.  
Figure 4-9 RPRE and generosity of benefit levels (r = 0.46) 
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Figure 4-10 RGAPRE and generosity of benefit levels (r = 0.54) 
 
 
Figure 4-11 Generosity of benefit levels and TI (r = -0.78) 
 
In sum, we find that size of the budget is positively related to RPRE 
and RGAPRE, and that universal child benefit systems have the highest 
redistributive budget. We however find that generosity of benefits for 
low income families is positively related to RPRE and RGAPRE as well, 
and that targeted child benefit systems tend to have the highest benefit 
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levels. In fact, our results suggest that both channels through which 
child poverty reduction ought to be related to the design of child benefit 
systems (size of the budget and generosity of benefit levels) are 
simultaneously at play. To make sense of this, we will further 
disentangle these results in the next section. 
4.4.4 One size fits all? 
In the theoretical section, we distinguished between selective and 
universal child benefit systems. Does the basic architecture of the 
benefit programme impact on the correlation between targeting and 
poverty reduction? Figure 4-12 shows the relationship between RPRE 
and TI for selective child benefit systems; Figure 4-13 between 
RGAPRE and TI. Figure 4-14 shows the relationship between RPRE 
and TI for universal child benefit systems; Figure 4-15 between 
RGAPRE and TI. 
 
Figure 4-12 RPRE and TI, selective benefit systems (r = -0.63) 
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Figure 4-13 RGAPRE and TI, selective benefit systems (r = -0.72) 
 
Figure 4-14 RPRE and TI, universal benefit systems (r = -0.31) 
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Figure 4-15 RGAPRE and TI, universal benefit systems (r = -0.42) 
 
Within selective child benefit systems, the relationship between TI 
and RPRE (r = -0.63) and TI and RGAPRE (r = -0.72) is strong. The 
more one targets towards lower incomes, the better one is able to 
reduce poverty. For this set of countries, poverty reduction is associated 
with both size (r = 0.82) and generosity (r = 0.79). Targeting, however, 
is strongly associated with generosity (r = -0.90) but much less with size 
(r = -0.18). Indeed, the most targeted selective countries Czech Republic 
and Slovenia spend much less (1 and 1,4% of GDP respectively) than 
Lithuania (2,1% of GDP), that spends about as much as Austria and 
Hungary but targets its benefits towards higher income groups. As a 
result, benefits for lower income groups are not very generous in 
Lithuania (see Table A-1 in annex). This suggests that targeting towards 
lower incomes might be a cost-efficient way to achieve child poverty 
reduction within selective systems, notwithstanding the fact that 
selective child benefit systems generally achieve less poverty reduction 
compared with universal ones. 
Within universal child benefit systems, we also find an association 
between TI and RPRE (r = -0.31) and RGAPRE (r = -0.42), but the 
strength of the relationship is weaker and the variety is greater. 
Moreover, the correlation is driven by Greece. Without Greece, the 
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alleged relationship between targeting and poverty reduction almost 
disappears (RPRE: r = -0.12; RGAPRE: r = -0.22). Greece is not only 
an outlier in statistical terms, but also the odd one out within universal 
systems. Working families are entitled to contributory child benefits 
while non-working families can rely on non-contributory but means-
tested benefits. The poverty reducing capacity of the Greek system 
therefore depends strongly on how closely both systems are aligned and 
on the actual operation of the selective benefit scheme (take-up, 
administrative complexity et cetera). 
For the set of countries with a universal child benefit system, we 
find that not generosity but size is the strongest determinant of poverty 
reduction. Formally, RPRE and RGAPRE are strongly associated with 
size of the budget (r = 0.77 and 0.71 respectively) but in contrast to 
selective benefit systems the correlation between generosity of benefit 
levels and poverty reduction is less strong (RPRE: r = 0.35; RGAPRE: r 
= 0.44). Indeed, countries displaying the most generous benefit levels, 
such as the United Kingdom (Figure 4-1), do not necessarily reduce 
child poverty to the highest extent. Or, otherwise stated, some countries 
with lower benefit levels for low income families manage to reduce child 
poverty more effectively. How can this be? First of all, it could be 
related to the type of benefit. Figure 4-1 shows, for instance, that 
targeting to the lower incomes in the United Kingdom is achieved 
through the tax system, while all income cases are entitled to a relatively 
low universal cash benefit. Countries with lower benefit levels and lesser 
degrees of targeting but higher levels of RPRE, such as Ireland and 
Austria, rely on higher levels of cash benefits. The fiscalization of child 
benefits we mentioned supra could thus be an important trend in this 
respect. Further research is however warranted to disentangle the 
complexity of child tax benefit schemes, and how their peculiarities 
impact on child poverty reduction. Second, it could also be the case that 
the issues of administrative complexity and non-take-up, which are 
often invoked by proponents of universal benefits, are at play. We 
report here on the de jure situation (targeting intentions), but it may be 
the case that the de facto situation (targeting outcomes) is rather different. 
This issue too should be taken into account in further research 
129 
 
endeavours, for instance by combining targeting intentions with 
outcomes in one analytical framework. 
Moreover, the case of Greece demonstrates the importance of the 
direction of targeting. Not only is Greece a low spender (Figure 4-2), it 
is also a country with a positive targeting coefficient which means that 
higher income groups are entitled to higher child benefits than lower 
income groups. Indeed, countries with a positive targeting coefficient 
(Greece, but also Spain, Poland, Latvia, Slovak Republic, Estonia, 
Lithuania and France, see Figure 4-1) are the actual drivers of the 
relationship between targeting and poverty reduction. If we only take 
strict universal countries or countries with benefits targeted towards 
lower incomes (negative coefficient) into account, the relationship 
between TI and RPRE disappears altogether (RPRE: r = 0.06; 
RGAPRE: r = -0.01). It is not that targeting towards lower incomes is 
good for poverty reduction per se; rather it is the case that targeting 
towards higher incomes is bad for poverty reduction. 
The further qualification of our findings we present here does not 
mean, however, that targeting towards lower incomes should be avoided 
at all cost. Instead our results point to the fact that targeting may or may 
not be beneficial for poverty reduction, depending on how it is done. As 
a matter of fact, the countries with the highest levels of RPRE, Austria 
and Ireland, are examples of targeting within universalism: benefit levels 
vary for different income groups. They are characterized by high levels 
of spending (Figure 4-2) and generous benefits levels for low income 
groups (Figure 4-1). 
4.5 CONCLUSION 
Let us begin the summary of our results with the central question at 
stake: “should [social policies] be organized for the poor only or should the welfare 
state include all citizens?” (Korpi and Palme 1998). Alas, there is no 
straightforward answer to this question. In the case of child benefits and 
their impact on child poverty, the correct answer is that ‘it depends’.  
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First of all, for a set of 26 countries, we find that targeting towards 
lower incomes is associated with higher instead of lower levels of 
poverty (gap) reduction, a finding that is in line with most recent 
research findings that the paradox of redistribution is not necessarily 
valid anymore. While investigating the drivers of this relationship, we 
found that size of the redistributive budget is strongly and consistently 
associated with higher levels of child poverty reduction, and that 
universal systems tend to have the highest budgets (confirming the size 
hypothesis). However, we also find that targeting is associated with 
more generous benefit levels for low income families, and that 
generosity is related to higher levels of child poverty reduction as well 
(confirming the generosity hypothesis).  
Second, system characteristics are an important factor to take into 
account. Within selective systems, targeting is strongly and consistently 
related to a better performance in terms of child poverty reduction. 
However, selective systems generally are underachievers, associated with 
low redistributive budgets. In such cases, our results suggest that 
targeting towards lower incomes might be the only feasible way to 
reduce child poverty. Within universal systems, the relationship between 
targeting and poverty reduction is weak and less consistent.  
Third, the direction of targeting is important. In some countries, 
child benefits are targeted towards higher income groups, mainly 
through tax benefits that put the lower income families at a 
disadvantage. These countries are low spenders and underachievers in 
terms of poverty reduction. This is an important factor in explaining the 
relationship between targeting and poverty reduction.  
Finally, the best performing countries are actually countries with a 
system of targeting within universalism. In these countries, two channels 
of poverty reduction are simultaneously at play: they combine high 
redistributive budgets with higher benefit levels for low income families. 
This leads us to conclude that targeting as such might not be the 
problem; rather it is important how targeting is done. 
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CHAPTER 5 
PUTTING THE CHILD-CENTRED 
INVESTMENT STRATEGY TO THE 
TEST: EVIDENCE FOR THE EU27* 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
The social, political and economic environment in which European 
welfare states have to operate has changed dramatically since the oil 
crisis of 1973, which is considered a major turning point in the 
transformation of industrial societies into post-industrial societies. 
Interestingly however, prima facie evidence suggests that welfare states 
have been remarkably robust, ‘immovable objects’, even, in these past 
four decades. This certainly appears to be the case if their evolution 
during this period is compared with the welfare state transformations 
that occurred in the ‘golden’ post-war period (Pierson 1998). The 
picture of the welfare state as a ‘frozen landscape’ is at best only a partial 
truth, however, because there have been important changes in the 
traditional welfare settlement in qualitative terms, both at the level of 
policies and at the level of ideas. Governments began to rethink 
prevailing (social) policy paradigms and recalibrated their social welfare 
                                                 
*  This chapter has been published as Van Lancker, Wim (2013), “Putting the 
Child-Centred Investment Strategy to the test: Evidence for the EU27”, 
European Journal of Social Security, 15, 1, 4-27. This paper was the joint winner 
of the Intersentia/EJSS prize for the best previously unpublished paper 
presented at the 2012 FISS Conference held in Sigtuna, Sweden. I would like 
to thank Bérénice Storms, Lutgard Vrints, Michel Vandenbroeck, Frank 
Vandenbroucke, two anonymous referees and the participants of the FISS 
Conference for valuable comments and suggestions. 
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programmes to meet the new risks and realities stemming from 
profound changes such as economic globalization and international 
competition, demographic changes, the shift from manufacturing to 
service employment, changing family relationships and the massive 
entry of women into the labour market, and new migratory flows27. 
Incrementally at first, but more explicitly since the mid-1990s, a 
common focus on increasing employment, human capital investment 
and cost containment has been developed, underpinned by European 
discourse and policy (Cantillon 2011; Hemerijck 2011). These qualitative 
changes have been designated as the ‘social investment turn’ in social 
policy (Esping-Andersen et al. 2002). This ‘social investment 
perspective’ is at present the dominant scholarly paradigm for making 
sense of the current welfare settlement.  
Basically, the core idea underlying social investment is that 
governments should prepare people for the changed employment 
circumstances in post-industrial labour markets. While social policy 
traditionally aimed to protect people from the market, the idea is now to 
‘empower’ people in order to integrate them into the market (Jenson and 
Saint-Martin 2003). The mainstay of such strategy is human capital 
investment, giving citizens the opportunity to grasp labour market 
opportunities themselves, rather than relying on passive cash transfers 
to repair damage done by the market. In sum, social policy ought to 
invest in people in order to make them resilient and enhance their 
capacity to grab the available opportunities in a changed labour market, 
before they become dependent on benefits (Cantillon and Van Lancker 
2013)28. 
                                                 
27  Summarising forty years of societal transformation and its impact on risk 
structures in an exhaustive and balanced way is an exercise riddled with 
difficulties and most likely a mission impossible. Hence I refer the interested 
reader to Bonoli (2005); Esping-Andersen et al. (2002); Hemerijck (2012a); 
Morel et al. (2012); and Taylor-Gooby (2004) for further reading on the 
welfare state transformations, new social risks and the social investment 
paradigm. 
28  It should be noted that proponents of the social investment idea, such as 
Esping-Andersen, insist that social investment is only one part of the welfare 
settlement and that an adequate income is a precondition for any longer-term 
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In this respect, children and childhood are key to any successful 
investment strategy, not only because the sustainability of the welfare 
state hinges on the number and productivity of future taxpayers, a point 
emphasized by Vandenbroucke, Hemerijck and Palier (2011), but also, 
and maybe foremost, because inequalities in childhood pose a real threat 
to the accumulation of human capital and are the root cause of unequal 
opportunities in the labour market and later life. To quote Esping-
Andersen in his highly influential contribution on this issue, a child-
centred investment strategy “must be a centre-piece of any policy for social 
inclusion” (Esping-Andersen 2002). The linchpin of such a strategy is the 
provision of high-quality early childhood education and care (hereafter 
‘childcare’). The idea is that childcare services not only help to achieve 
social inclusion through the labour market, by allowing mothers of 
young children to engage in paid employment and balance their work 
and family duties, but also further the accumulation of human capital of 
children by providing them with a high-quality and stimulating 
environment. Both dimensions should be particularly beneficial for 
children from disadvantaged backgrounds, ultimately breaking the 
intergenerational chain of poverty. The child-centred investment 
strategy is heavily influenced by the assumption that public investments 
early on yield significant returns in later life in forgone benefits and 
reduced crime rates (Carneiro and Heckman 2003). 
The idea of investment-through-childcare is not a mere academic 
exercise, but impacts on real-life policymaking. The need to increase 
childcare provision is propagated by influential international 
organizations such as (UNICEF 2008) and the OECD (OECD 2001; 
OECD 2006; 2011b), and is also prominently on the European agenda. 
At the Barcelona Summit in 2002 as part of the European Employment 
Strategy (European Council 2002), European member states adopted 
explicit childcare targets to provide childcare by 2010 to at least 33% of 
children under 3 years old and to at least 90% of children between 3 and 
                                                                                                                 
investment strategy. In this view, social investment and social protection are 
mutually reinforcing (Vandenbroucke and Vleminckx 2011). 
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mandatory school age. At present, for the EU, childcare is seen as a 
means to reach the EU2020 targets for employment, early school 
leaving, and poverty (chapter 1), adhering to the investment ideal of 
mitigating inequalities and preparing productive citizens. Obviously, not 
all public investment in childcare services is necessarily linked to the social 
investment idea, but it is safe to say that childcare expansion in the 
European Union (EU) is at least informed by the child-centred 
investment strategy (Morgan 2012). 
In this article, I critically assess the child-centred investment 
strategy and question whether childcare services in European countries 
in their current state are up to the task of producing the anticipated 
benefits. The argument I develop is fairly simple: in order to be 
successful, childcare services should be within the reach of children 
from disadvantaged families who are expected to benefit 
disproportionally, both in terms of child development and maternal 
employment. I argue that if that is not the case, then the child-centred 
investment strategy, in its current form, is bound to fail. Using recent 
comparative data for the EU27, I aim to shed light on this issue and to 
explore some tentative explanations which may ultimately provide 
valuable lessons for European policymakers.  
In the following section, I discuss the basics of the child-centred 
investment strategy, further develop the main argument and articulate 
my research questions. This is followed by a section on the data and 
methods used, and the analyses proper. I end this article with a 
discussion of the implications of my results for the future of child-
centred investment in European countries. 
5.2 CHILD-CENTRED INVESTMENT: BASICS AND PITFALLS 
The development of formal childcare services constitutes an essential 
dimension of the child-centred investment strategy. Such services 
express the goals of the social investment perspective in two ways: they 
invest in the human capital of mothers by helping them engage (or 
remain) in paid work; and they invest in the human capital of children 
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by providing them with quality educational stimulation at an early age. 
Neither of these elements is new, as the reconciliation of paid work and 
family life (and gender equality) was the main rationale for Scandinavian 
countries introducing a service-oriented agenda from the 1970s onwards 
(Ferrarini 2006), and investment in human capital has since long been 
recognised as the predominant mechanism for raising productivity (e.g. 
Becker 1964). Novel to a greater extent in this context, and resonating 
with the more ‘traditional’ goals of social protection, is the explicit 
commitment to social inclusion and the firm belief that childcare will 
prove to be the most efficient policy tool to mitigate social inequalities 
early on in life and to combat child poverty (Esping-Andersen et al. 
2002).  
The post-industrial labour market is characterised by upward skill 
requirements and a declining share of routinised labour of the kind that 
was associated with the industrial era, i.e. traditional working-class jobs 
(Oesch and Menés 2011). These trends are however likely to exacerbate 
the gap between those who can and those who cannot or are not able to 
acquire the skills needed in a ‘knowledge economy’. Thus, a failure to 
increase the resilience of future workers by enhancing their human 
capital (and their labour market prospects) will require increased levels 
of public resources to be devoted to unemployment and social 
assistance benefits. For this reason, the social investment approach is 
particularly targeted at investment in children, since early developments 
in cognitive capacities are critical to developing a capacity to learn. 
Heckman (2006), amongst others, argues that the economic return from 
early intervention is much higher than the return from later 
intervention, e.g. public job training programmes. Investing in young 
children by means of quality childcare will pay large dividends later on in 
terms of tax revenues and forgone social spending, concomitantly 
contributing to sound public budgets. 
The whole idea of childcare as a device for furthering human capital 
is based on a large body of research stemming from neuroscience and 
developmental psychology which established that human capital 
accumulation is especially important in the first years of life (Shonkoff 
and Phillips 2000). Moreover, economic and sociological research 
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established strong correlations between early educational stimulation on 
the one hand and educational achievement and longer-term outcomes in 
terms of labour market attainment and earning capacity on the other 
(Lowenstein 2011; Ruhm and Waldfogel 2012). Yet these benefits are 
conditional on the quality of the childcare services: low quality services 
may be harmful and yield detrimental outcomes in terms of child 
development. Important aspects of quality are the staff-child ratio, the 
quality of staff-child interactions, staff qualifications, group size, the 
curriculum and the integration of care and educational elements (for 
further reading on the issue of quality, see OECD 2012b; Penn 2011). 
The use of high quality childcare services should be especially 
beneficial for children living in disadvantaged families (Esping-
Andersen et al. 2002). It is well established that child poverty has very 
adverse long-term effects. Growing up in poverty is associated with 
worse health outcomes and lower levels of psychological well-being, 
impaired cognitive and emotional development, inadequate schooling 
and an increased chance of early dropout; all of which lead in the longer 
term to lower earning capacities, fewer labour market opportunities and 
a higher risk of incarceration. In short, children growing up in poverty 
face inferior life chances and low levels of social mobility (Duncan et al. 
1998; Hackman, Farah and Meaney 2010; Vleminckx and Smeeding 
2001). Even worse, given the inheritance of social inequality, children 
growing up in poverty have a high chance of becoming poor parents 
themselves. Child poverty is clearly anathema to the ideal of social 
investment which explains why the benefits of high-quality childcare for 
disadvantaged children are emphasized in the child-centred investment 
strategy.  
Childcare is expected to mitigate early inequalities mainly through 
two channels. First, allowing mothers from disadvantaged families 
(often, if not always, having weak labour market profiles) to engage in 
paid employment not only yields benefits in terms of human capital (see 
above) but also raises family income, potentially pushing the family 
above the poverty threshold. It is indeed an established fact that 
maternal employment is a bulwark against child poverty (Chen and 
Corak 2008; Gornick and Jäntti 2012). Secondly, the disparity, in terms 
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of school readiness, between children growing up in low income 
families and those in high income families, is already substantial by the 
time they start school. This is largely so because the former grow up in 
an environment that is less conducive to learning, having parents who 
are less able to facilitate their children’s school readiness than their 
higher-income and higher-skilled counterparts (Augustine, Cavanagh 
and Crosnoe 2009; Ermisch 2008; Waldfogel and Washbrook 2011). 
Obviously, other factors that are interrelated with poverty (such as ill 
health, bad housing, disadvantaged neighbourhoods and impoverished 
social networks) interfere with and contribute to this early disparity in 
school readiness (Brooks-Gunn 2003). In short, because these children 
start off from a position of disadvantage, they have the most to gain 
from high-quality childcare (Magnuson, Ruhm and Waldfogel 2007). 
Bestowing upon these children a stimulating learning environment 
offsets (at least partly) the unequal abilities of parents to improve their 
children’s development, language competence and school readiness, and 
hence narrows the achievement gap (Barnett 1995; Currie 2001). This 
goes beyond short-term but transient gains in cognitive abilities (such as 
gains in IQ or test scores), and manifests itself in terms of social skills, 
motivation and achievement which lead children to be better prepared 
for learning (Heckman 2006). And because learning leads to further 
learning, the effects of equalising initial endowments are long-lasting 
and lead to improved chances for school success and social mobility 
(Brooks-Gunn 2003; Magnuson, Ruhm and Waldfogel 2007; Phillips 
and Lowenstein 2011). These effects have been found in the US as well 
as in Europe for different types of services (Currie 2001; Havnes and 
Mogstad 2011b; Sylva et al. 2004; see also the overview in UNICEF 
2008). Simplifying an enormous body of literature, the overall 
conclusion is that formal childcare services, if they are of high quality, 
promote school readiness.  
To summarize, providing high-quality childcare as part and parcel 
of a child-centred investment strategy is expected to enhance the human 
capital of mothers and children alike, and should in particular yield 
benefits for children from disadvantaged backgrounds and mitigate 
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social inequalities by tackling their root causes. There are, however, 
several reasons why such a child-centred investment strategy might fail. 
First, notwithstanding the fact that positive effects on school 
readiness are increasingly, albeit inconsistently, observed in relation to 
‘regular’ care services in European countries (Vandenbroeck, Roets and 
Roose 2012), the assumptions regarding the benefits for disadvantaged 
children are almost entirely based on experimental evidence drawn from 
highly specific and intensive US-based ‘model programmes’ (in 
particular the Carolina Abecadarian Project; the Chicago Child-Parent 
Center Program and the HighScope Perry Preschool Programme). 
These model programmes do not reflect the heterogeneity in services 
found in European countries and it is not clear whether these findings 
are readily transferable to any given context or scale, for example to 
childcare provided by child minders, which is a common type of non-
parental care in several European countries (Baker 2011; Morrissey and 
Warner 2007). Moreover, two of these programmes (the Child-Parent 
Center Program and Perry Preschool) concern preschool children, while 
the greatest progress in terms of social and cognitive development is 
expected from toddlers (Heckman 2006).  
Secondly, and related to the first point, quality is primordial but 
there is great variety in the quality of care services among and within 
countries. Regular care services for under threes usually focus on care 
and safety rather than on education, and staff often have low levels of 
training (the Nordic countries are exceptions here, see the discussion 
below). It is not clear how a stimulating environment, of the required 
quality, can be achieved in such context. Thirdly, childcare services do 
not operate in isolation and need to be developed in conjunction with 
parental leave, education systems and broader welfare programmes. 
There is evidence of harmful effects of first-year non-parental care in 
terms of cognitive and emotional well-being (Belsky 2001; Han, 
Waldfogel and Brooks-Gunn 2001; NICHD ECCRN 2003), 
highlighting the importance of parental leave systems allowing (at least 
one of the) parents to look after the children themselves during the 
critical early stages of life. European leave regulations differ greatly 
across countries in terms of duration and remuneration, and do not 
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always match the availability of childcare services or provide effective 
incentives for parents to take up leave (for an overview, see Moss 2013). 
Adding to that, previous research has demonstrated that the use made 
of leave is socially stratified which may reinforce prevailing inequalities 
(see chapter 2). A similar argument holds for the transition from 
childcare to compulsory schooling. School systems in many European 
countries are known to reproduce or even reinforce existing inequalities 
which may very well offset much of the benefit gained (Schütz, 
Ursprung and Wößmann 2008). Indeed, US research has shown that 
this is most likely to happen in schools of lower quality (Currie and 
Thomas 2000). And of course, because the quality of parental care also 
differs greatly between socio-economic groups, the existence or absence 
of broader child support arrangements such as home intervention 
programmes (focusing on changing parents’ behaviour) presumably 
plays a role in the success or failure of childcare services too (Ruhm 
2011; Waldfogel 2002). In sum, a successful child-centred investment 
strategy clearly cannot limit itself to childcare services alone. Finally, 
although correlations between the use and availability of childcare and 
maternal employment have been found time and again, some studies 
have shown that the creation of additional childcare places mainly acts 
to crowd out informal arrangements and in particular benefits mothers 
who are already employed (e.g. Havnes and Mogstad 2011b). Even the 
causal effect of childcare on maternal employment is thus not to be 
assumed a priori. 
One argument, however, precedes these issues of quality, 
employment and generalizability. In order to be a beneficial strategy for 
disadvantaged families, childcare services need to be within the reach of 
these families. Recent research casts some doubt as to whether this is 
actually the case in European societies (see chapters 2 and 3; Ghysels 
and Van Lancker 2011; OECD 2011b). If these doubts are well-
founded, childcare may not only fail to mitigate social inequalities but 
may even exacerbate them and raise new issues of social inequality 
between the haves and the have-nots, because the better-off children are 
able to enhance their existing advantage through the benefits of 
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childcare, while the children who would benefit the most are excluded. 
This would actually end up being the reverse of what is aimed for. 
Basically, there are two pathways to ensure the inclusion of 
disadvantaged children: 1) Extending childcare coverage to all children, 
irrespective of family background and parents’ labour market attainment 
(i.e. a strategy of universalising childcare); or 2) if childcare coverage is 
incomplete, giving priority to disadvantaged children to participate (i.e. a 
strategy of targeting childcare). According to Esping-Andersen (2005), 
the universal strategy is preferable from a social investment point-of-
view because it kills two birds with one stone: it gives access to 
disadvantaged children whilst allowing mothers to engage in or remain 
in paid work. In the empirical analysis, I investigate the social 
distribution of childcare use in the EU27. This exercise allows for an 
assessment of whether countries have succeeded in universalising and 
equalising access for all social groups or, if that is not the case, whether 
priority is given to disadvantaged children. 
5.3 DATA, DEFINITIONS AND METHODS 
Data are drawn from the European Union Survey on Income and 
Living Conditions (EU-SILC), wave 2009. The EU-SILC is the main 
source for cross-national research on income and living conditions in 
the European Union as well as for monitoring progress towards the 
Barcelona childcare targets. Although sometimes criticised (e.g. by Keck 
and Saraceno 2011), the SILC data is currently the only data source 
allowing calculation of childcare usage among young children in a 
‘regular week’ for all EU member states. In this analysis, I distinguish 
between two types of care. First, formal care services include care centres, 
nursery schools, professional child minders and family daycare 
providers. Second, informal care relates to care given by grandparents, 
relatives and friends. It should be noted that formal care includes both 
public and private services. The inclusion of private childcare is a crucial 
issue as private-market services, particularly if they are not subsidised, 
may result in hidden inequalities in quality as well as access (I return to 
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this issue in the discussion). The empirical analysis is limited to children 
below the age of three. Although non-parental care should ideally start 
around the age of one (see the discussion above), in several European 
countries children are enrolled much earlier. Furthermore, using this age 
bracket is consistent with the European approach as set down in the 
Barcelona targets and allows for comparison of homogenous groups, 
something that is not possible for children over the age of three as the 
role of educational systems then becomes very diverse across European 
countries making a comparison of service use much more complex. A 
drawback with this approach is that it does not take into account the 
take-up of leave schemes which, without doubt, influence childcare use 
levels negatively, especially for the very youngest children. I return to 
this issue when discussing the results in section 5.5 below. 
In this article, I present a full time equivalent (FTE) measure of care 
use in order to take into account differences in the intensity of care use 
(i.e. hours of attendance per week). It is quite obvious that low-intensity 
use (say for one or two days a week, or for only a few hours a day, 
which is, for instance, common in the Netherlands, e.g. Plantenga and 
Remery (2009)) is not sufficient to allow for maternal employment and 
improve school readiness. Consequently, low-intensity childcare use 
does not adhere to the social investment ideal and simply relying on 
average use might obscure this important dimension. Following 
Meagher and Szebehely (2012), Rauch (2007) and the approach used in 
the OECD Family Database, FTE care use data represents the 
proportion of children who would be receiving child care if all existing 
care use was full-time (30 hours per week or more) FTE29. This gives us 
better insight into the genuine contribution of a particular country’s 
childcare system to the social investment ideal. 
To gauge the social stratification of care use, families with young 
children (defined as families with at least one child below the age of 
                                                 
29  The calculation is as follows: FTE = proportion of children in formal 
childcare * average number of hours per week (as % of 30 hours per week). 
See OECD Family database, PF3.2: Enrolment in childcare and pre-schools 
(http://www.oecd.org/els/social/family/database). 
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six30) are divided into five income groups31 (quintiles) for each country 
and FTE formal care use of children living in low-income and high-
income households is compared. To report the outcomes properly, I 
present for each country an inequality ratio (IR), i.e. the average FTE 
care use among children living in the highest income family (fifth 
quintile) divided by the average care use among children living in a low 
income family (first quintile). An inequality ratio (IR) of 2 thus means 
that children from high-income families are enrolled in FTE childcare 
twice as much as their counterparts from low-income families, while an 
IR of 1 represents an equal distribution of care use. 
The success of both of the strategies discussed above (universal 
coverage for all social groups and priority access for disadvantaged 
children) as child-centred investment strategies is investigated in the 
subsequent section. Average childcare use across the EU27 is examined 
first, followed by an exploration of its social distribution. The 
distributional outcomes as a function of labour market attainment and 
informal care use are also discussed. 
5.4 RESULTS: THE SOCIAL DISTRIBUTION OF CHILDCARE 
USE IN EUROPE 
5.4.1 Average care use 
Figure 5-1 shows the average FTE measure of formal and informal 
childcare use for all children below the age of three in the EU27. The 
                                                 
30  Because we want to compare children who are disadvantaged relative to 
other children, it would not make sense to include all households (including 
childless families) to calculate income groups. 
31  To compare households with a different number of members and different 
needs, household income is standardized using the so-called modified 
OECD-scale. The outcomes are somewhat sensitive to the use of this 
equivalence scale; other analyses (not shown) using non-standardized 
household income however do not alter the overall interpretations of the 
results. In Hungary, Luxemburg and Portugal, however, the IR increases with 
more than 2 points while the IR decreases with more than 2 points in Poland 
and Ireland. 
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disparity in formal care use between countries is enormous, ranging 
from more than 70 per cent of FTE in Sweden and Denmark to barely 
5 per cent in the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic. France, and 
perhaps more surprisingly Italy, Slovenia and Portugal are also high-
coverage countries with FTE use exceeding 50 per cent. A group of 
countries with above-average use consists of Belgium, Spain, Estonia, 
Luxemburg, The Netherlands, Cyprus, Finland, Germany and Malta, 
while Latvia, Lithuania Austria, Ireland, Greece, the United Kingdom 
and the former socialist economies Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania and 
Poland are underachievers with figures ranging from 10 per cent to 30 
per cent. 
 
Figure 5-1 FTE care use for all children below the age of three, EU27 
 
Source: Own calculations using EU-SILC 2009 data. Countries are ranked by average 
FTE formal care use. Average is unweighted. 
 
Regarding FTE informal care use (i.e. care given by grandparents, 
friends or relatives), one can see this is the major form of care for young 
children in some of the low-coverage countries while informal care is 
almost non-existent in Sweden and Denmark. Indeed, the SILC data 
indicate a modest trade-off between informal and formal care use (r = -
0.38): the higher formal care use, the lower the reliance on informal care 
in a regular week, and vice versa.  
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Although childcare use in European countries does not translate 
into consistent clusters of countries (and certainly does not follow the 
traditional welfare regimes), two general observations can be made: (1) 
the Central and Eastern European member states, which, during the 
socialist era, were characterized by high levels of care use have fallen 
back to the bottom of the league table, confirming earlier findings on 
trends in family policy in these countries (see Plantenga and Remery 
2009; Saxonberg and Sirovátka 2006; Szelewa and Polakowski 2008a). 
Slovenia, however, is a startling exception within this group, with 
childcare use at similar levels to high-coverage countries such as France 
and Portugal; (2) even in the high-coverage countries, including Sweden, 
FTE formal care use is not universal: a significant proportion of young 
children are not catered for in formal childcare services.  
Obviously, in evaluating countries’ achievement in relation to 
universal coverage, account should be taken of existing parental leave 
entitlements. In order to neutralize the effect of parental leave uptake, I 
also looked at formal care use among one and two-year olds (results not 
shown). Although average usage figures are higher overall for this age 
group, Denmark remains the only country approaching universal use 
(with 90 per cent FTE formal care use). 
5.4.2 The social stratification of care use 
Let us now turn to the social distribution of care use. Figure 5-2 shows 
inequality ratios for FTE formal care use across the EU27. The data 
demonstrate that care use is socially stratified in the large majority of 
countries. There are only six countries (Czech Republic, Slovak 
Republic, Austria, Lithuania, Malta and Estonia) in which the difference 
in childcare use between children from low-income and high-income 
families is not significant, but none of these countries satisfy the 
condition of universal use. No single European country reports 
significant higher levels of care use for children from low income 
families compared to their higher income counterparts, suggesting that 
childcare services are not targeted towards disadvantaged children in any 
of these countries. 
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Figure 5-2 Inequality in FTE formal care use, children below the age of three, 
EU27 
 
Source: Own calculations using EU-SILC 2009 data. Countries are ranked by average 
FTE formal care use. *: Significance level for the difference between low and high 
income families: p < 0.05. 
 
The magnitude of the inequality is particularly striking in countries 
characterized by low levels of overall FTE care use, such as Poland, 
Romania, Hungary, Bulgaria, the United Kingdom and Ireland, while 
usage is more equal in countries reporting higher levels of FTE care use, 
such as Belgium, Italy, Slovenia and Portugal (France is an exception 
here). Indeed, the inequality ratio (IR) decreases as average usage goes 
up (r = -0.42). However, care is needed in interpreting these figures. 
Although inequality ratios between 1.5 and 2 might seem reasonable 
compared to the extreme inequalities in the left-hand side of the graph 
(from an IR of 5.5 in Poland an IR of 8 in Ireland and an IR of over 9 
in Hungary), in reality they translate into a wide gap when average use is 
at a high level. In the case of Belgium (IR: 1.6), this amounts to 61 per 
cent of children from high-income families enrolled in formal care 
compared to only 38 per cent of children living in low-income 
households. In France, the situation is even more dramatic: an average 
FTE care use of 57 per cent (see Figure 5-1 above) conceals usage rates 
of 15 per cent for low-income children compared to 77 per cent for 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* * 
* * 
* 
* 
* 
* * 
* 
* 
* 
* * 
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
CZ SK PL RO HU BG UK GR IE AT LT LV MT DE FI CY NL LU EE ES BE IT FR SI PT SE DK
In
e
q
u
al
it
y 
R
at
io
 
146 
 
high-income children. Such inequalities increase the gap between the 
‘haves’ and the ‘have-nots’ (Schütz, Ursprung and Wößmann 2008), and 
are detrimental to the whole idea of social investment. The only two 
countries that more or less ensure equal participation in formal childcare 
at high levels are Denmark and Sweden with IRs of 1.2. However, here 
too the inequalities are not negligible (92 per cent vs 75 per cent in 
Denmark and 75 per cent vs 60 per cent in Sweden). 
5.4.3 The role of employment and informal care 
The above findings should be interpreted in conjunction with labour 
market outcomes and the availability of other care arrangements. It is 
well documented that the increase in female labour market participation 
has been a socially stratified process, with large differences in 
employment between low-skilled and high-skilled women (Cantillon et 
al. 2001; Gesthuizen, Solga and Künster 2011). To the extent that 
employed parents rely on childcare services and the employment of 
parents also explains their position in the income distribution, the social 
stratification of care use could simply be a reflection of unequal labour 
market patterns (Ghysels and Van Lancker 2011). If this were true, the 
inequality in FTE childcare use should disappear when the sample is 
limited to children with employed mothers32. This is investigated in 
Figure 5-3, and the results demonstrate that, for the majority of 
countries, the difference in care use is no longer significant. For these 
countries, labour market attainment does indeed explain the 
stratification of care use33. This calls for a balanced interpretation. The 
relationship between childcare use and maternal employment is 
presumably reciprocal: availability of childcare services gives mothers of 
young children a better option to engage in paid employment which in 
                                                 
32  Mothers are regarded to be employed if they declare themselves to be (full-
time or part-time) employed at the moment of interview, which matches the 
time frame of the childcare questions. 
33  One has to be careful still. The inequality is probably not explained away by 
employment in Portugal. Due to a small number of cases (n=94), the IR of 
2.2 is near-significant (p = 0.052). 
147 
 
turn will induce a higher demand for childcare places (Steiber and Haas 
2012). If one assumes that employment and childcare use move 
together, advocates of activation will not necessarily be worried by the 
unequal outcomes in childcare use: childcare use will equalise when 
employment patterns converge. Advocates of social investment, 
however, cannot be satisfied with such a state of affairs: a child-centred 
investment strategy is explicitly committed to furthering the human 
capital of disadvantaged children, which surely includes children whose 
mother is not (yet) employed.  
Furthermore, bringing employment into the equation does not 
explain the social stratification in care use for all countries in the same 
way. In some of the low-coverage countries huge inequalities are 
maintained (or even exacerbated, cf. Czech Republic and the United 
Kingdom), while in others the inequality in care use is mitigated but not 
fully explained by labour market participation. In Italy, for instance, the 
inequality ratio (IR) is 1.5 which translates to usage rates of 45 per cent 
of children in low-income families compared to 67 per cent of children 
in high-income families. Similarly, for France this amounts to 34 per 
cent compared to 86 per cent; and for Slovenia to 50 per cent compared 
to 68 per cent. In these countries, childcare participation is constrained 
for children from low-income families even if their mothers are employed. 
From an activation perspective, this does not have to be a problem 
if these families are able to fulfil their care demands through informal 
channels. Indeed, it is often assumed that more disadvantaged families, 
including low income families, families where the mother has a lower 
level of education, minorities and immigrant parents, are more likely to 
depend on informal arrangements as their primary source of childcare 
(Debacker 2008; Henley and Lyons 2000). Again, however, social 
investment advocates cannot be satisfied with informal care for 
disadvantaged children because these arrangements are often not 
conducive to promoting school readiness (see above). Figure  shows the 
inequality ratio of informal care use in the EU27 for all mothers (dark 
bars) and for employed mothers (grey bars). In several countries, no 
significant difference between income levels can be discerned; but when 
there is a difference, the use of informal care is biased against low-
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income families. This pattern is not confined to specific countries but 
emerges across low, middle and high-coverage countries. The results do 
not support the assumption that low-income families rely more on kith 
and kin while high-income families fulfil their care demands through 
formal childcare services: low-income families are less likely to use both 
formal and informal care. 
 
Figure 5-3 Inequality in FTE formal care use, children below the age of three 
with employed mothers, EU27 
 
Source: Own calculations using EU-SILC 2009 data. Countries are ranked by average 
FTE formal care use. * significance level, p < 0.05. 
 
It could however be that the expected trade-off between informal 
and formal care explains the inequality in care use only among working 
mothers. The grey bars in Figure 5-4 show that, if all mothers are 
considered, in almost all countries differences between income levels 
disappear, but inequalities still prevail in some countries (Germany and 
in particular Belgium are cases in point). An even more important 
finding, evident from Figure 5-4, is that there is not a single country in 
which a significantly higher proportion of children from low-income 
families are cared for by grandparents, relatives or friends than are 
children from high-income families. In other words, the existing 
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inequality in FTE formal childcare use amongst working mothers is not 
explained by a trade-off with informal arrangements. 
 
Figure 5-4 Inequality in FTE informal care use, children below the age of three, 
EU27 
 
Source: Own calculations using EU-SILC 2009 data. *: significance level, p < 0.05. 
5.5 DISCUSSION: LESSONS LEARNED AND THE WAY 
FORWARD 
These empirical results are sufficiently clear cut to warrant attention 
from policy makers concerned with implementing a successful child-
centred investment strategy. It is crystal clear from the above analysis of 
current childcare outcomes that the majority of EU member states still 
have a long way to go in universalizing and equalizing formal care use 
for children below the age of three. Although one cannot directly infer 
problems of rationing from the usage figures that are deployed in this 
article, there is ample evidence of shortages in childcare availability in 
almost all European countries (except for the Nordic countries), and in 
particular the Central and Eastern European countries (see the overview 
in Plantenga and Remery 2009). This finding is supported by research 
on the effects of childcare on female labour supply: while early research 
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focused on the role of childcare costs (e.g. Blau and Robins 1988), 
currently the consensus seems to be that availability is key for maternal 
employment, and this is particularly true in the European context where 
childcare in almost all countries is subsidized one way or the other 
(Kreyenfeld and Hank 2000; Viitanen 2005; Wrohlich 2011). Indeed, 
detailed country studies show that almost all European countries have 
either implemented an income-related tariff system for their publicly-
provided or subsidized childcare services or provide childcare subsidies 
targeted towards low-income families when childcare has to be 
purchased in the private market (an exception here is Ireland, where both 
availability and affordability are problematic) (European Parliament 
2007; UNICEF 2008). Obviously, childcare costs play an important role 
in families’ care decisions, and this is particularly true of low-income 
households for whom childcare costs are proportionately higher. Yet, 
lowering prices cannot increase childcare participation if parents are not 
able to access a free childcare place in the first instance (Farfan-Portet, 
Lorant and Petrella 2011). Consequently, while continuously monitoring 
affordability for low income families, European countries need to 
substantially increase the number of available childcare places. That is 
the first lesson that can be learned. 
Notwithstanding its importance, increasing childcare supply is not a 
sufficient condition for equalizing formal care use. Consider the 
example of the three Nordic countries, where childcare places are 
guaranteed as a social right and no problem of rationing occurs. While 
Denmark and Sweden do indeed display high levels of care use, and 
distribute it equally among social groups, Finland reports much lower 
levels of childcare use with a bias against low-income families. Finland is 
similar to Sweden and Denmark in that a place in public childcare is a 
social right and is heavily subsidized, but differs from them in that it 
introduced a cash-for-care scheme in 198534 as an alternative to 
                                                 
34  Sweden had a similar system installed in 1994 by the then centre-right 
government only to be abolished in 1996 by the subsequent centre-left 
government. It was reinstalled again in 2008 by a centre-right government. 
Municipalities are however free whether to offer it to its citizens. Although it 
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childcare services (Ellingsæter 2012). Underpinned by a ‘freedom of 
choice’ rhetoric, a cash benefit is paid to families with a child under the 
age of three who is not enrolled in childcare; de facto extending the 
period of parental leave until a child’s third birthday (Sipila, Repo and 
Rissanen 2010). The popularity of the scheme explains the low levels of 
formal care use compared to Sweden and Denmark (in 2007, 52 per 
cent of Finnish children under the age of three were cared for at home, 
(Repo 2010)). Without going into too much detail here, it is actually an 
incentive for mothers (who are still responsible for the bulk of 
caregiving work) not to use formal childcare, especially for those with 
low earning-potential who have limited employment opportunities (infra; 
Meagher and Szebehely (2012)). The Finnish cash-for-care scheme thus 
contributes to the inequality in outcomes reported in Figure 2 above. A 
similar policy ambiguity can be found in other countries that are 
characterized by high inequality in care use across income groups, such 
as France, where family policies include both the provision of childcare 
to encourage maternal employment and cash benefits to encourage 
mothers to take care of the children themselves (Morel 2007). Here, too, 
the incentive structure encourages low-paid mothers to stay at home. 
Unlike the availability of parental leave in the critical first year of a 
child’s life, long periods of home-care leave go against the child-centred 
investment prescription of extending childcare coverage to all children 
on the one hand, and are detrimental for maternal employment 
opportunities, in particular for mothers with lesser career prospects, on 
the other (Gornick and Hegewisch 2010). Thus, the second lesson that 
can be learned is that a child-centred investment strategy is in dire need 
of a consistent set of policies; this highlights the importance of including a 
broad set of policies into the analytical framework. 
This lesson connects to labour market policy: a consistent child-
centred investment strategy cannot but include the implementation of 
consistent employment policies. The results showed that inequality in 
                                                                                                                 
is too premature to sort any significant effect, it cannot be but interpreted as 
a divergence from a consistent investment approach. 
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care use disappeared in the majority of countries when the analysis was 
limited to children whose mother is employed. Again, the Nordic 
countries serve as a useful example here. Sweden and Denmark pursued 
a consistent investment-oriented labour market policy (with strong 
emphasis on activation policies and training programmes), influenced by 
the notion that gender equality can only be achieved by increasing 
women’s employment opportunities and men’s opportunities to take 
care of children (the so-called ‘dual earner/dual carer’ model, Korpi 
2000). This entailed a focus on the provision of generous parental leave 
entitlements and public sector employment, and the creation of labour 
market conditions conducive for low-skilled women (Korpi, Ferrarini 
and Englund 2013). In most other countries (including Finland), 
however, employment opportunities for women are more limited, and 
this is particularly true for low-skilled women. Few countries have 
followed a consistent investment approach towards employment 
(Bonoli 2012; Vandenbroucke and Vleminckx 2011). This is the third 
lesson: ensuring that childcare services are able to mitigate social 
inequalities entails a focus on increasing maternal employment across all 
social groups. However, quality is important here, as it is with childcare. 
When mothers experience job instability with, for instance, 
unpredictable working hours and/or fluctuating work schedules, which 
in turn induces parental stress and leads to volatility in non-parental care 
arrangements, employment may negatively affect the socioeconomic 
development of children (Johnson, Kalil and Dunifon 2012). Such jobs 
are typical of the kind of employment engaged in by disadvantaged 
families. 
This brings me to the final lesson. Even when governments have 
implemented a consistent set of policies and the conditions for a 
successful child-centred investment strategy are fulfilled, equal use of 
childcare services across social groups will not be guaranteed (cf. 
Denmark which is approaching but not achieving universal coverage). 
This may be due to the specificities of policy implementation (e.g. how 
is the service exactly delivered?; are there unforeseen barriers for 
enrolment?), calling for more in-depth studies of policy design (one 
example, covering Sweden and Belgium, is Van Lancker and Ghysels 
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(2012)). Second, irrespective of implementation issues, childcare use not 
only depends on structural opportunities and constraints, but also on 
social and cultural values in relation to motherhood and children’s 
needs. Some parents will always be unable or unwilling to enroll their 
children in non-parental care services (Lewis, Campbell and Huerta 
2008). Such families are in need of other policy options, and a smart 
child-centred investment approach should acknowledge that. 
So, then, what is the way forward for European countries? Only in 
Denmark, and to a lesser extent in Sweden, do the outcomes more or 
less adhere to a successful child-centred investment strategy. In these 
countries, funding for childcare services is supply-sided, a childcare slot 
is a social right for each child over the age of one, out-of-pocket fees are 
related to disposable income, services have to meet strict quality 
requirements (e.g. they must conform to centrally-set educational 
curricula and staff-child ratios) and childcare staff are properly trained 
and adequately paid (OECD 2012b). It is quite clear from the results 
that the majority of countries have a very long way to go in order to 
come close to the Danish experience; achieving this would require 
governments to switch into higher gear and take a huge leap forward. 
To have an idea of the size of the effort needed, Figure 5-8 shows 
spending on childcare in percentage of GDP. Although it is only 
illustrative, using Denmark as a benchmark immediately demonstrates 
the budgetary effort faced by some countries. Doubling (Belgium, The 
Netherlands, the United Kingdom), tripling (Germany, Spain, Slovenia, 
Estonia,) or even quadrupling (Poland, Austria, Czech Republic, Slovak 
Republic) the public investment in childcare will certainly require 
political commitment but may be very hard to achieve for some of the 
underachievers, in particular the Central and Eastern European member 
states; and this is particularly true in a social and economic context of 
austerity in which short-term fiscal consolidations rather than achieving 
longer-term investment goals are the prime policy goals (e.g. Hemerijck 
2012b). 
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Figure 5-5 Average net government spending on childcare, percentage of GDP, 
2007 
 
Source: Own calculations using the OECD SOCX database. Note: Childcare includes 
spending on day-care services, pre-primary (ISCED0) education and, where applicable, 
tax credits for childcare. 
 
It is not only the budgetary effort that is almost inconceivable; one 
should also be aware of path dependency in expanding childcare. 
Indeed, publicly providing and/or subsidizing childcare services may, in 
particular, not be feasible in those countries where childcare services are 
mainly provided through the market (i.e. in Ireland and the United 
Kingdom, but also in the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Austria and the 
Czech Republic, according to the OECD Family Database). Although 
market-driven childcare provision does not necessarily exclude 
government involvement, as policymakers can stimulate demand in 
various ways, e.g. through demand-side subsidies such as childcare 
vouchers and tax rebates, from a social investment point-of-view this 
option might not be viable because private provision is associated with 
lower quality, higher private costs and problems of rationing, especially 
in disadvantaged neighbourhoods. For instance, the Netherlands has 
seen a shift from supply-side to demand-side subsidies following its 
2005 Child Care Act, which led to a proliferation of for-profit facilities 
at the expense of not-for-profit facilities. These for-profit facilities tend 
to be more concentrated in neighbourhoods with higher purchasing 
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power, at the detriment of poorer areas (Noailly and Visser 2009). 
Disregarding the important issue of service delivery, whatever choices 
governments make (or have made in the past) and irrespective of who 
bears the main burden of the cost, the total cost of universalizing high-
quality childcare services for all social groups will hover around the 
same order of magnitude (for a similar argument, see Esping-Andersen 
2005). 
5.6 CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, I have put forward the argument that childcare services 
should be within reach of disadvantaged children in order to be 
effective in increasing maternal employment rates, increasing children’s 
human capital and mitigating social inequalities. The results 
demonstrate, however, that in almost all EU member states childcare 
coverage is not universal and is socially stratified. Children from low-
income families are enrolled in formal childcare to a much lesser extent 
than children from high-income families. The only country approaching 
the child-centred investment ideal of universalizing and equalizing 
childcare coverage is Denmark. In discussing the results, I pointed out 
some lessons for governments that wish to pursue a child-centred 
investment strategy: they should increase the availability of high-quality 
childcare places while simultaneously increasing employment 
opportunities for all social groups, and these initiatives should be 
embedded in a broader set of consistent investment policies. For most 
EU member states, this will require a huge budgetary effort which may 
not be feasible in the short or even in the long term. Further research 
should concentrate on identifying strategies through which governments 
can ensure access to qualitative childcare for children from 
disadvantaged backgrounds, given budgetary constraints and path-
dependent institutional configurations. 
The main lesson to draw from this analysis is that the children who 
would benefit most from being integrated into high quality childcare are 
the ones currently most likely to be excluded. This is likely to exacerbate 
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rather than mitigate social inequalities in early life. Hence, the 
unavoidable conclusion is that existing child-centred investment 
strategies are bound to fail. 
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CHAPTER 6 
EXPLAINING PATTERNS OF 
INEQUALITY IN CHILDCARE USE 
ACROSS 31 DEVELOPED 
COUNTRIES* 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
The provision of early childhood education and care services (hereafter: 
childcare) is high on the policy agenda. It is increasingly seen as a most 
promising instrument for mitigating social inequalities and is promoted 
at the policy level in just about all developed countries. Childcare has 
been on the agenda of the European Union since the mid-1990s and the 
adoption of the 1992 Childcare Recommendation. At the other side of 
the Atlantic, Barack Obama identified the expansion of Head Start and 
Early Head Start as one of his priorities at the start of his presidency 
(Obama 2007).  
The emphasis on childcare fits neatly into the social investment 
perspective, which is now the dominant approach to social 
policymaking in Europe and elsewhere (Cantillon and Vandenbroucke 
2014; Esping-Andersen et al. 2002; Morel, Palier and Palme 2012). In 
                                                 
*  A more elaborate version of this chapter has been published as Van Lancker, 
Wim and Ghysels, Joris (2013) “Great expectations, but how to achieve 
them? Explaining patterns of inequality in childcare use across 31 developed 
countries”, CSB Working Paper, 1305, Herman Deleeck Centre for Social 
Policy, Antwerp. Comments and suggestions by the participants in the ISA 
RC19 2012 Annual Conference, the 13th Annual ESPAnet Conference, and 
by Sarah Marchal and Stephen Windross are gratefully acknowledged. 
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this respect, childcare may be regarded as an integral part of ‘productive 
social policy’ in which the objective of social inclusion through 
employment is key (Chapter 1). The underlying idea is that investing in 
young children by means of high-quality childcare not only yields short 
and long-term benefits for the children themselves, but also for society 
as a whole.  
The potential benefits of childcare (throughout this article we use 
formal childcare, childcare and childcare services as synonyms) are 
mainly realized through two channels. First, childcare is expected to 
increase maternal employment rates, which in turn leads to greater 
gender equality by distributing labour and care more equally between 
partners and by enabling women to earn a wage of their own. Moreover, 
(child) poverty is reduced because household income increases and 
families have more resources at their disposal (Stier, Lewin‐Epstein and 
Braun 2001; Uunk, Kalmijn and Muffels 2005). Second, childcare is seen 
as beneficial for young children because it enhances human capital and 
leads to better learning outcomes and school readiness in the short run, 
and better social and labour market prospects in the longer run 
(Heckman 2006). Yet these benefits are conditional on the quality of the 
childcare services: low-quality services may be harmful and produce 
detrimental outcomes in terms of child development. 
It is important to note that the expected returns of childcare are 
particularly large for disadvantaged families. First, it has been 
meticulously documented how increased female labour market 
participation has been a socially stratified process, with low-educated 
women participating to a much smaller extent than their higher-
educated counterparts (Cantillon et al. 2001; Evertsson et al. 2009). 
Moreover, because of the process of educational homogamy, dual 
earnership has also been adopted in an uneven way in modern societies, 
exacerbating the labour market disadvantage and the welfare gap 
between low-skilled and high-skilled families. These families thus have 
the most to gain in terms of labour market participation. Second, children 
of disadvantaged families in particular are expected to benefit in terms 
of development because they start from a disadvantaged position and 
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consequently stand to gain the most (Magnuson, Ruhm and Waldfogel 
2007). It is well established that child poverty has adverse long-term 
effects on the life chances of these children as well as on their 
opportunities to become productive adults (Duncan et al. 1998; 
Hackman, Farah and Meaney 2010). Bestowing upon children a 
stimulating learning environment may offset the unequal abilities of 
parents to stimulate their children’s development, language competence 
and school readiness, and hence to narrow the development gap 
(Barnett 1995; Currie 2001). Because learning leads to further learning, 
the effects of equalizing initial endowments are long-lasting, leading to 
improved chances for school success and social mobility (Brooks-Gunn 
2003; Magnuson, Ruhm and Waldfogel 2007; Phillips and Lowenstein 
2011). To summarize, providing high-quality childcare is expected to 
enhance the human capital of mothers and children alike, and should in 
particular yield benefits for children from disadvantaged backgrounds.  
If these great expectations are warranted35, the implication is that in 
particular children from disadvantaged socio-economic backgrounds 
should be enrolled in high-quality childcare. After all, their mothers are 
often out of work, and they have the most to gain in terms of child 
development. If childcare coverage over socioeconomic groups is 
unequal and disadvantaged children have less access to childcare 
services, the opportunity and development gap between them and their 
better-off counterparts will likely widen rather than narrow (see Chapter 
5). This would be the opposite of what governments want to achieve 
with the expansion of childcare services. In the previous chapters it was 
shown that inequality in access to and use of formal childcare services is 
the norm rather than the exception in European countries (Chapters 2, 
3 and 5). Here, our aim is to study patterns of inequality in childcare use 
from a welfare state perspective. To date, attempts to explain inequality 
in childcare use have been rather idiosyncratic and have focused on 
specific countries or regions (Fuller and Xiaoyan 1996; Meagher and 
                                                 
35  There is some room for doubt. For lack of space, we will not provide a 
review of the critical literature here, but refer the reader to Chapter 5; 
Melhuish 2004; and Vandenbroeck et al. 2012. 
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Szebehely 2012; Meyers et al. 2004; Spieß, Kreyenfeld and Wagner 2003; 
Van Lancker and Ghysels 2012), without much consideration for the 
broader processes and institutional characteristics that are fundamental 
to understanding the social context in which childcare services are 
provided. Because women are still responsible for the bulk of 
childrearing activities, even in the so-called egalitarian welfare states, the 
institutional and normative arrangements that structure women’s 
employment and care patterns will be particularly relevant to our 
endeavor. 
What explains the observed inequality in childcare coverage 
between social groups across countries? This fairly simple yet important 
question has to date attracted little if any scholarly attention. This lacuna 
in the literature is unfortunate, as a proper understanding of the 
mechanisms driving inequality in childcare service use is crucial for its 
success as a policy instrument to mitigate social inequalities in early life, 
to further child development and to foster maternal employment. 
Drawing on the comparative social policy literature, this article intends 
to explore the determinants of the observed inequality in childcare 
coverage for a broad set of countries. Given the lack of both prior 
theoretical understanding and comparative data (see below), this study is 
exploratory in nature.  
The first section draws on the comparative social policy literature to 
infer hypotheses on the determinants of childcare inequality. The 
second describes the data and methodology applied. Subsequently, an 
overview is provided of childcare coverage and inequality across thirty-
two countries. This is followed by a bivariate exploration of the 
processes underlying the inequality in childcare use, formalized in a 
simple regression exercise. We conclude with a brief discussion of the 
results and its caveats. 
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6.2 THE CONFIGURATION OF WELFARE STATES AND 
CHILDCARE INEQUALITY: THEORY & EXPECTATIONS 
The main aim of this paper is to explore the determinants of inequality 
in childcare coverage between disadvantaged and advantaged children 
across welfare states. Hitherto, the field of comparative social policy 
research has been dominated by the welfare regime approach, which is 
basically an attempt to flesh out the content of welfare states based on the 
relationship between the market, the state and the family (see also 
Abrahamson 1999; Arts and Gelissen 2002; Esping-Andersen 1990; and 
Powell and Barrientos 2011for reviews and criticisms). Although the 
issue of services has been generally neglected in much of the 
comparative literature (Jensen 2008), the analytical framework has been 
effectively applied in understanding patterns of inequality in access to 
education (Allmendinger and Leibfried 2003; Triventi 2013) and health 
care services (Reibling 2010; Van Doorslaer, Masseria and Koolman 
2006). Childcare inequality, too, may be expected to be determined by 
the institutional configuration of welfare states. Drawing on the 
comparative social policy literature, there are in fact three dimensions of 
social policy that are potentially related to inequality in childcare use. 
6.2.1 Dimension 1: universalism 
A key principle in the classification of welfare states, universalism is a 
complex notion that has been interpreted and applied in different ways 
(Anttonen 2002). Esping-Andersen (1990), for instance, discusses 
universalism in conjunction with social rights and citizenship, in 
particular the question of whether entitlements to benefit schemes 
promote equality of status or social stratification. Others have used it to 
describe a logic of redistribution, referring to the targeting and 
distribution of (cash) benefits (e.g. Korpi and Palme 1998). In research 
that tries to connect social services to welfare regimes, universalism is 
interpreted in terms of accessibility: for a service to be universal, it 
should be accessible to all in need of that particular service (Rauch 
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2007). Accessibility is determined by multiple aspects of service delivery, 
however, and a dysfunction in any of these aspect may induce inequality 
in its use. First and foremost, for a service to be accessible it must 
obviously be available. Indeed, there is a strong argument that equality 
in care use will not be achieved when childcare supply is rationed. For 
instance, there is some evidence that, in a situation of rationing, the 
availability of childcare will decline disproportionately in more 
disadvantaged and lower-income neighborhoods (Henley and Lyons 
2000; Vandenbroeck et al. 2008). Moreover, childcare rationing has a 
discouraging effect on maternal labour supply (Del Boca and Vuri 2007; 
Wrohlich 2011). Given the abovementioned fact that the low-skilled 
mothers have far fewer labour market opportunities than their higher-
skilled counterparts, inequality in childcare use stemming from rationing 
might result in a negative feedback loop, exacerbating inequalities in the 
labour market as well. 
Related to this first aspect, and referring to universalism as 
connected to social rights (supra), is the matter of service guarantee 
(Rauch 2007). Currently, in Finland, Norway, Denmark, Estonia and 
Sweden, children have a legal right to formal childcare services. Hence, 
one might expect inequality to be smaller in these countries. Finally, 
availability also depends on the private costs, i.e. the out-of-pocket fee 
parents are required to pay for service use. Research has shown that the 
impact of childcare costs is greater for mothers with a lower earnings 
potential, such as the low skilled (Baum 2002). 
6.2.2 Dimension 2: state-market mix 
Several authors report an increasing tendency towards marketization of 
care services (Brennan et al. 2012; Lloyd and Penn 2012). This evolution 
is not confined to the liberal welfare regimes where market forces are 
traditionally seen as the major provider of welfare, but also manifests 
itself in the Nordic countries. Although the childcare landscape in most 
countries still reflects a ‘mixed economy’, where the public sector as well 
as the private and the voluntary sectors are engaged in providing 
childcare services, the phenomenon of marketization might increase 
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inequality in childcare coverage (OECD 2006). An increasing body of 
research demonstrates that private childcare provision is generally 
associated with lower quality, higher private costs and problems of 
rationing, especially in disadvantaged neighborhoods (OECD 2012b). 
Obviously, market-based provision does not exclude government 
involvement, which can range from licensing and regulation, to 
subsidizing of consumers or services, to direct provision (Plantenga and 
Remery 2009; White and Friendly 2012). In the UK and US, for 
example, a two-tier system is in place. Families are encouraged to satisfy 
their care requirements in the private market by means of demand-side 
subsidies such as tax credits or rebates and childcare vouchers. At the 
same time, in line with the logic of public welfare as a measure of last 
resort in the liberal welfare regime, services targeted at disadvantaged 
children, families and neighborhoods are directly funded and provided 
by the government (Sure Start in UK and Head Start in the US being 
among the most well-known examples). In countries such as Belgium, 
childcare services are set up by private not-for-profit providers, but 
these are almost completely publicly funded. A similar system exists in 
France and Portugal, where the majority of services are independently 
established but dependent on state funding. In Sweden, most services 
are provided by the municipalities, centrally regulated and publicly 
funded (chapter 3).  
In conjunction with marketization, the level of government 
involvement most likely also determines childcare inequality outcomes. 
If government intervention is low and restricted to licensing, for 
instance, high-quality facilities will be expensive because they entail high 
production costs (higher staff wages and qualifications, lower staff-to-
child ratio). Consequently, access is restricted to parents who can afford 
it (OECD 2006). This effect may be offset by a higher level of 
government intervention in the form of subsidies, so that high-quality 
care becomes affordable, or by directly providing high-quality services 
(Immervol and Barber 2005). Other researchers have warned, however, 
that demand-side subsidy programmes may lead to a higher take-up of 
lower-quality services rather than enabling parents to buy high-quality 
care in the market (Sosinsky 2012), if service provision is left to the 
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private sector and quality is not monitored adequately. All in all, 
considering that the capacity to pay determines access to care facilities 
and the quality of care received when government involvement is low, 
the balance between marketization and government involvement is 
expected to play a role in determining inequality in childcare coverage 
(Meagher and Szebehely 2012). 
6.2.3 Dimension 3: defamilization 
After the publication of his Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism (1990), 
Esping-Andersen was widely criticized by feminist scholars for 
neglecting the work-care nexus in classifying welfare states; he was 
accused of ‘gender blindness’, as it were (Knijn and Ostner 2002; Lewis 
1992). More specifically, critics have argued that welfare regime 
approach should be supplemented with the concept of defamilization, 
i.e. the degree to which women are able to uphold an acceptable 
standard of living independently of their families (Lister 1994).  
Childcare services and parental leave schemes are generally seen as 
the most important defamilizing policy tools. Indeed, childcare services 
relieve women (at least to some extent) from (child) care duties, 
enabling them to take up paid work in the labour market (Gornick and 
Meyers 2005). As a matter of fact, childcare use and maternal labour 
market participation are highly correlated and the relationship between 
the two is presumably reciprocal: availability of childcare services 
enhances the options of mothers of young children to engage in paid 
employment, which will in turn induce greater demand for childcare 
services (Steiber and Haas 2012). Given the fact that labour market 
opportunities are not evenly distributed across educational levels, one 
may expect countries with high employment levels among low-skilled 
mothers, and thus low levels of employment inequality, also to report 
low levels of childcare inequality. It might also be the case that families 
who are unable to obtain formal childcare rely on informal care 
channels instead. Although the availability of informal care is generally 
on the decline (Ghysels and Van Vlasselaer 2008), it is often assumed 
that more disadvantaged families (including low-income families, 
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families with a low-educated mother, minorities, immigrant parents) are 
more likely to depend on informal arrangements (i.e. the extended 
family, grandparents, other relatives) as their primary source of childcare 
(Henley and Lyons 2000). Recent research finds that this might be due 
to a combination of personal preferences and the availability and 
affordability of nearby formal care arrangements (Debacker 2008). Thus 
we may expect the availability of informal care arrangements and 
childcare service to be inversely related. Parental leave, then, enables 
parents to interrupt employment in order to provide care for their 
children themselves while fostering parents’ bond with the labour 
market by maintaining the contractual link between employer and 
employee (Hegewisch and Gornick 2011; Ray, Gornick and Schmitt 
2010). Short periods of particularly well-paid leave have been shown to 
be beneficial to female employment rates: young women are encouraged 
to strengthen their labour market attachment before giving birth in the 
knowledge that they will suffer only minor income loss and will be able 
to safely return to their jobs afterwards, especially if the leave period is 
aligned with the availability of childcare services (De Henau, Meulders 
and O'Dorchai 2007).  
However, in countries offering only limited public support for 
childcare services, long periods of leave act as a disincentive for female 
employment and provide support for the breadwinner model. This 
impacts in particular on women with low levels of education, because 
their lower earnings potential provides fewer financial incentives to 
return to work (assuming they were in work prior to childbirth), and 
they often have fewer resources to pay for formal childcare (Hegewisch 
and Gornick 2011). It has indeed been shown that women with lower 
earnings are more likely than high-earning women to make use of long 
care leaves (Morgan and Zippel 2003b). However, when long leaves are 
unpaid, mothers in less affluent families may not be able to afford to 
take them. A similar mechanism is at play in the case of so-called home 
care allowances or cash-for-care schemes. During the 1980s and 90s, 
countries such as Finland, France, Hungary and Norway introduced an 
allowance for parents to stay at home with their children as an 
alternative to formal childcare services, de facto extending the period of 
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parental leave up to three years. Such policies actually create an 
incentive for mothers not to use childcare, especially for those with a 
low earnings potential and limited employment opportunities. Thus we 
may expect countries with long parental leaves or home care allowances 
to exhibit higher levels of inequality in childcare coverage.  
Cultural factors should also be taken into account, as they may be 
the cause or the effect of social policy development and may influence 
parents’ attitudes and decisions concerning care arrangements (Keck 
and Saraceno 2013; Pfau-Effinger 2004). A large body of research has 
investigated the role of cultural factors on employment decisions of 
mothers, finding that women with traditional values on motherhood 
and gender roles report a lower commitment to paid work (Cloïn, 
Keuzenkamp and Plantenga 2011; Fortin 2005; Steiber and Haas 2012). 
Moreover, several studies show that norms differ along educational lines 
and that specifically lower-educated women hold more traditional views 
on gender roles and motherhood. Similar patterns are found among 
low-income and working-class families (Crompton 2006; Duncan 2005; 
Duncan, Edwards and Reynolds 2003). Moreover, it impacts upon 
decisions regarding the preferred care arrangements of those mothers in 
much the same manner (Debacker 2008). There is also some evidence 
that the role of norms on employment and care decisions of mothers 
differ between countries. Although the overall picture is one of greater 
acceptance of working mothers in recent decades, a report on European 
Union countries suggests that norms on motherhood, employment and 
care use have become more traditional in several Central and Eastern 
European countries (Plantenga and Remery 2009), a trend described as 
‘refamilization’ (Saxonberg and Szelewa 2007). In a context where the 
dominant cultural norm is against working mothers, it is more difficult 
to behave differently (van der Lippe and Siegers 1994), particularly for 
low-skilled mothers who often have fewer employment opportunities 
and a low earnings potential. Research has demonstrated that the 
positive effect of higher education on attitudes towards work and 
motherhood is greater in countries with less traditional views on 
maternal employment (Sjöberg 2004). Moreover, there is evidence that 
the impact of defamilizing policies such as childcare services and 
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parental leave provision is mitigated if cultural attitudes encourage a 
traditional gender division of care and employment (Budig, Misra and 
Boeckmann 2012). Thus, the difference in views on care and 
employment between different social groups might (at least partly) 
explain the observed inequality in childcare coverage. 
In Table 6-1, a summary of the dimensions of the welfare state 
configuration that are potentially related to childcare inequality is 
provided together with their expected relationship. In the next sections, 
we will explore which of these dimensions are actually related to 
inequality in childcare use. 
 
Table 6-1 Summary of welfare state dimensions potentially related to childcare 
inequality 
Dimension Expected relationship 
Universalism  
Coverage More coverage  less inequality 
Cost Higher costs  more inequality 
Social right Childcare as a social right  less inequality 
State-market nexus  
Supply More public supply  less inequality 
Government spending Higher spending  less inequality 
Defamilization  
Low skilled maternal employment Higher employment rates  less inequality 
Leave Long periods of well-paid leave  more 
inequality 
Attitudes amongst low skilled mothers More conservative norms on motherhood  
more inequality 
Informal care use More use of informal care  more inequality 
6.3 DATA, MEASUREMENT, AND ANALYTICAL STRATEGY 
6.3.1 Data 
Data are drawn from the European Union Survey on Income and 
Living Conditions (EU-SILC), wave 2009. The EU-SILC is the main 
data source for cross-national research on income and living conditions 
in the European Union as well as for monitoring progress towards the 
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Barcelona childcare targets. The analysis is complemented with data for 
the US and Australia, drawn from the National Household Education 
Surveys Program (NHES), wave of 2005, and the Household, Income 
and Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) Survey (wave 10, reference 
year 2010) respectively. The NHES includes an Early Childhood 
Program Participation Survey (ECPP) in which parents are asked about 
their childcare arrangements. Both surveys allow replication of the EU-
SILC variables. 
One of the main obstacles to our research endeavour is the lack of 
reliable and comparative data to test the hypotheses derived from the 
literature. We therefore gather country-level data and indicators from 
different databases to test which determinants may be related to 
childcare inequality. Our independent variables are drawn mainly from 
the OECD Family Database and the Multilinks Database, and from cross-
national surveys such as the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) 
and the European Values Survey (EVS). Where necessary, these data are 
supplemented with country-specific sources.  
6.3.2 Measurement of inequality 
The dependent variable is inequality in formal childcare coverage. Formal 
care services include care centres (including (early) Head Start and Sure 
Start), nursery schools, professional child minders and family daycare 
providers. To measure formal childcare coverage, we calculate a full time 
equivalent (FTE) measure of formal care service use in order to take into 
account differences in the intensity of care use (i.e. hours of attendance 
per week): FTE care use data represents the proportion of children who 
would be receiving childcare if all existing care use were full-time (30 
hours per week or more, see chapter 5). The calculation is as follows: 
FTE = proportion of children in formal childcare * average number of 
hours per week (as % of 30 hours per week). 
The empirical analysis is limited to children below the age of three. 
Although research suggests that non-parental care should ideally start 
around the age of one (Han, Waldfogel and Brooks-Gunn 2001), 
children are commonly enrolled much earlier in a number of countries. 
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Furthermore, this age bracket allows for homogenous comparison: over 
the age of three, the role of educational systems becomes very diverse 
across developed countries, with some countries achieving full coverage 
in the education system and others catering for these children in 
childcare services. As a measure of the socioeconomic status, generally 
three variables are used in the literature: income, occupational class and 
education (Mackenbach and Kunst 1997). Here we use the educational 
level of the mother, because 1) we are unable to reproduce family 
income for the US data; and 2) occupation is strongly correlated with 
childcare use, as will become apparent below. Furthermore, maternal 
education is critical for children’s development and well-being. Not only 
do high-educated mothers rely on their human capital to select childcare 
services for their young children, but a large body of research has shown 
that they also use it to facilitate their children’s cognitive and social 
development (see Augustine et al. 2009, for an overview). Obviously, if 
low-skilled mothers use childcare services to a lesser extent, their 
children face a “double disadvantage” (UNICEF 2008). Children in our 
sample who are under the age of three are allocated to one of three 
groups (low, medium and high) according to the educational level of the 
mother (or father in cases where the mother is absent), as measured 
with the ISCED classification. 
To gauge inequality, we compute a relative index of inequality (RII) in 
FTE childcare coverage. The RII is a regression-based inequality index 
that is often applied in the empirical literature on socioeconomic 
disparities in health (Kakwani, Wagstaff and Van Doorslaer 1997; 
Keppel et al. 2005). It offers some advantages over other inequality 
indices, including the ratio used in Chapter 5: 1) It is sensitive to the 
distribution of socioeconomic groups over the population and therefore 
takes into account the different size of educational categories within 
countries; and 2) it is calculated over the full range of the distribution of 
educational levels (and not only low and high levels of education, as is 
the case with the inequality ratio). This allows meaningful comparisons 
between countries. We proceed as follows. First, for each country in the 
dataset, we calculate a slope index of inequality (SII) in FTE childcare 
coverage through a regression in which FTE childcare coverage is the 
170 
 
dependent variable and educational level the independent variable, 
adjusted for age. The age adjustment captures the cross-country 
differences in the age children usually start being enrolled in childcare 
services. The SII is in fact the slope of the regression line and should be 
interpreted as the absolute effect on FTE childcare coverage of moving 
from the lowest level of education to the highest. Because the SII is 
sensitive to the mean FTE coverage of the population36, we divide the 
SII by the weighted average FTE childcare coverage of each country in 
order to obtain the RII in a second step (and Keppel et al. 2005for 
further reading on inequality measurement; see Mackenbach and Kunst 
1997). The RII takes a value of 0 if childcare coverage is equal over 
education levels, a positive value if inequality is biased against lower 
educational levels and a negative value if inequality favours lower 
educational levels. Table A-2 in annex shows the weighted average FTE 
childcare coverage and the values of both the SII and RII indices. A 
drawback of using the RII is that it complicates the interpretation of 
inequalities. Therefore, we add the distribution of FTE childcare 
coverage over educational groups to Table A-2 in order to facilitate 
interpretation of inequalities between educational groups within 
countries. 
6.3.3 Independent variables 
Drawing on the relationship between the state, the market and the 
family, we identify three sets of explanations (universalism, the market-
state nexus, and defamilization) for childcare inequality. Table 6-2 
summarizes these dimensions and how they are operationalized. Details 
of the measures are provided in Table A-3 in annex. 
 
  
                                                 
36  Suppose that childcare coverage doubles, then the SII would double as well, 
even though the relative distance between socioeconomic groups would 
remain the same. In this article, we are interested in the drivers of inequality 
per se, not in the drivers of changes in coverage levels. 
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Table 6-2 Operationalization of explanatory dimensions 
Independent 
variables 
Operationalization Source Reference year 
    
Universalism    
Coverage FTE formal childcare 
coverage (%) 
EU-SILC, HILDA, 
NHES 
2008, 2010, 
2005 
Cost Net childcare costs for a 
low-income couple with 
two children in full-time 
‘typical’ care (% of 
average wage) 
 
OECD Tax-Benefit 
model, see 
Richardson, 2012 
and Immervoll and 
Barber, 2005 
2008 (2002 for 
US) 
Social right Legal entitlement to 
childcare services 
(dummy) 
Multilinks Database 2009 
    
State-market nexus    
Supply The number of publicly 
provided or subsidized 
childcare slots per 100 
children 
Multilinks Database, 
OECD 2009,  
Yamauchi 2010 
Between 2000 
and 2005 for 
EU countries,  
AU 2006 
Government 
spending 
Spending on childcare (% 
of GDP) 
OECD Social 
Expenditure 
database, OECD 
Family Database 
2009 (2005 for 
US, 2010 for 
AU) 
    
Defamilization    
Low skilled maternal 
employment 
Employment rate of 
mothers with a low level 
of education and a 
youngest child < 3 (%) 
EU-SILC, HILDA, 
NHES 
2008, 2010, 
2005 
Leave Length of well-paid (> 
60% of average wage) 
leave (months) + squared 
leave (centred at 9 
months) 
Multilinks Database, 
OECD Family 
Database (Iceland, 
Australia, US) 
2008, 2010, 
2005 
Attitudes amongst 
low skilled mothers 
Share of mothers with a 
low level of education 
holding traditional beliefs 
on motherhood (%) 
European Values 
Study 2008, 
International Social 
Survey Programme 
2002 (US and AU) 
2008, (2002 US 
and AU) 
Informal care use FTE informal childcare 
use (%) 
EU-SILC, HILDA, 
NHES 
2008, 2010, 
2005 
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The dimension of universalism relates to the importance of 
availability in equalizing care use, which may be influenced by the 
coverage rate and by whether there is a legal entitlement to formal 
childcare, and private childcare costs. As regards costs, the OECD has 
calculated ‘typical’ monthly net childcare costs (fees minus cash 
government subsidies and tax benefits), i.e. out-of-pocket expenses for 
full-time care use in a ‘typical’ formal childcare facility for a low-income 
family (assuming two children, aged two and three, where the male 
earns 67% and the female 50% of the average wage respectively, see 
Richardson (2012) for details). Finally, information on whether families 
have a legal entitlement to formal care services is gathered from the 
Multilinks Database and dummy-coded.  
The state-market nexus set of explanations relate to the role of 
government in providing and subsidizing childcare. To obtain a general 
insight into the extent of government involvement in the childcare 
market, we also include public spending on childcare services (in % of 
GDP), calculated on the basis of the OECD Social Expenditures 
Database. For the few countries lacking detailed information, we relied 
instead on figures readily available in the Family Database. Finally, we 
also include a measure of the number of available childcare slots in 
public, publicly funded or centre-based (for the US and AU) facilities as 
a share of children aged 0-2 years (no data for Iceland, Malta and 
Romania). These numbers warrant due caution, because they are based 
on a variety of data sources that cannot be harmonized. However, to the 
best of our knowledge, this is the only available cross-country indicator 
on childcare supply.  
To test the dimension of defamilization, we calculate the employment 
rate of low-skilled mothers with a youngest child under the age of three 
on the basis of EU-SILC. We also construct a measure on traditional 
beliefs on motherhood amongst low-skilled mothers on the basis of a 
question on attitudinal values regarding motherhood, asked in the 
European Values Survey (EVS) wave of 2008 for European countries 
and the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) wave of 2002 for 
the US and AU (no data for Malta). We use the question “A pre-school 
child is likely to suffer if his or her mother works” and collapse the 
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answer categories “strongly agree” and “agree” into one proportion 
measuring the degree to which maternal employment is perceived as 
detrimental to a young child (Steiber and Haas 2009; Uunk, Kalmijn and 
Muffels 2005). For testing the impact of parental leave provisions, we 
include a measure of ‘well-paid leave’ drawn from the Multilinks 
database. Well-paid is defined as amounting to at least 60% of average 
wage. We use the measure of well-paid leave, and not the total length of 
(paid or unpaid) leave, because we expect precisely the combination of 
long duration with reasonable compensation to have an impact on low-
skilled mothers’ labour market attachment, and thus on inequality in 
formal care use. We expect the trend to be curvilinear, with short and 
well-paid leaves associated with lower inequality in childcare coverage 
and long, well-paid leaves with higher inequality. While the exact tipping 
point is not known, the literature suggests that the ideal period of leave 
lasts between 6 months and 1 year. Here, we follow the approach 
outlined in Keck and Saraceno (2013), where squared leave centred at 9 
months is included. Finally, as regards use of informal care, we apply a 
similar method of measurement as for FTE formal coverage: informal 
care relates to care provided by grandparents, relatives and friends in a 
regular week, and we combine intensity and availability of such care 
arrangements into an FTE measure of informal care. 
6.4 ANALYTICAL STRATEGY 
Given the exploratory purpose of our paper, the nature of our data and 
the small number of observations (n = 31), attention is paid first and 
foremost to the quality and plausibility of hypotheses (Bonoli 2013). To 
this end, we first conduct bivariate explorations to investigate whether 
the selected indicators are plausible drivers of childcare inequality. 
Second, as a first and careful attempt to check the robustness of our 
results, we rely on multivariate regression to compare the selected 
hypotheses. 
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6.5 EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
6.5.1 Inequality in childcare coverage 
Figure 6-1 Formal childcare coverage in FTE (left axis) and Relative Inequality 
Index (right axis), children 0-2, % 
 
Source: Own calculations based on EU-SILC 2009, HILDA 2010, NHES ECPP 2005. 
Black triangles indicate significant differences between maternal educational levels (p < 
0.05), white triangles indicate non-significance. 
 
Figure 6-1 shows that the diversity in FTE childcare coverage of 0 to 2 
year-olds is huge, ranging from more than 70% of young children 
enrolled in FTE formal care arrangements in Denmark, and around 
60% in Iceland and Sweden, to 10% or less in Central and Eastern 
European countries such as Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, Poland, and 
the Slovak and Czech Republics. Despite their common legacy of high 
female employment rates facilitated by the extensive availability of 
daycare provisions for pre-school children, the current coverage rates 
are indicative of a refamilization trend (supra). Moreover, Figure 6-1 
shows that even in the high-coverage countries, FTE formal care use is 
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not universal. A significant portion of children are not catered for by 
formal childcare facilities. Only Denmark and Iceland succeed in 
ensuring equality at high levels of care use. 
The black triangles in Figure 6-1 represent the RII of FTE formal 
childcare coverage. In just a few countries are we unable to discern a 
significant difference in FTE coverage: in Denmark, Iceland, Portugal, 
Malta and Estonia, children from different social backgrounds are more 
or less equally represented in formal childcare services. In all other 
countries in our sample, children with a low-educated mother are 
significantly less likely to use formal childcare services than children 
with a higher-educated mother. The inequalities are particularly striking 
in low-coverage countries such as Poland, Romania, and Bulgaria, but 
also in countries with high levels of FTE formal care use such as 
France, the Netherlands, Luxembourg and the US (see Table A-2 in 
annex for coverage rates across levels of education). Such outcomes cast 
doubt on the efficiency of childcare as an instrument for mitigating 
social inequalities. 
Given the fact that 1) no country has succeeded in expanding FTE 
formal childcare coverage to cover all children; and 2) most countries 
display (often huge) inequalities between social groups in FTE formal 
childcare coverage, we cannot expect childcare to mitigate social 
inequalities just yet. In the next section we set out to explore how the 
institutional configuration of the welfare state is related to the observed 
inequalities in FTE childcare coverage. 
6.5.2 Bivariate correlations 
The set of explanations related to the dimension of universality concern 
the availability and accessibility of childcare facilities. We expect higher 
FTE coverage to be associated with lower levels of inequality, and 
higher out-of-pocket fees with higher levels of inequality. Figure 6-2 and 
Figure 6-3 show the bivariate relationship between these independent 
variables and RII. We also expect countries with legal entitlement to 
childcare to exhibit lower levels of inequality.  
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Figure 6-2 FTE formal childcare coverage and Relative Inequality Index (r = -
0.69) 
  
It should be noted first and foremost that Figure 6-2 shows a strong 
and negative association between FTE coverage and RII (r = -0.69). 
The higher the coverage rate, i.e. the more children are covered through 
formal childcare facilities, the more equal its distribution becomes. This 
suggests that universalism, i.e. universalizing childcare coverage, is 
indeed a major precondition for equality promotion. 
Second, Figure 6-3 shows the relationship between childcare costs 
and RII. Essentially, there is no association between the two (r = 0.08); 
if we discard outlier Ireland, the association actually becomes negative (r 
= -0.13). This prima facie suggests that childcare cost has little 
explanatory value for childcare inequality. A rather low net childcare 
cost does not preclude high levels of inequality, and vice versa. Finally, 
we also expected legal entitlement to childcare to be inversely related to 
childcare inequality. As it turns out, the average RII in countries where 
childcare is a ‘social right’ is indeed significantly (RII: 0.16; 95% CI[0.05-
0.28]) lower than in countries without such entitlement (RII: 0.49; 95% 
CI [0.37-60.5]). 
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Figure 6-3 Out-of-pocket childcare costs and Relative Inequality Index (r = 
0.08) 
 
We also hypothesized that the state-market balance in childcare 
provision would be associated with childcare inequality. In particular, we 
expected a larger role for government in providing and or subsidizing 
childcare facilities to be related with lower inequality. Figure 6-4 shows 
that the correlation between our indicator of childcare supply (the 
number of slots in publicly operated or subsidized facilities) and RII is 
indeed negative and rather strong (r = -0.56). The more slots that are 
publicly provided and/or funded by government, the more equal care 
use becomes. Similarly, Figure 6-5 shows a negative, albeit weak, 
relationship between government expenditures for childcare and RII (r 
= -0.25). This suggests that governments have to spend more in order 
to equalize access, yet that high spending does not preclude inequality 
(France is a case in point. All in all, state involvement in childcare 
provision does seems to be determinative of childcare inequality.  
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Figure 6-4 Childcare supply and Relative Inequality Index (r = -0.56) 
 
Figure 6-5 Government expenditure on childcare services and Relative 
Inequality Index (r = -0.25) 
 
Finally, we also expected the manner in which women’s 
employment is structured to play a role in explaining childcare 
inequality. Higher employment rates amongst low-skilled mothers ought 
to be associated with lower levels of childcare inequality, given the close 
link between the two. Conservative norms on motherhood are expected 
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to coincide with higher levels of childcare inequality, while well-paid 
parental leave provision should have a U-curved relationship with 
childcare inequality. In Figure 6-6, low-skilled maternal employment 
shows the expected relationship with RII (r = -0.39). The more low-
skilled mothers of young children are employed, the more their children 
tend to be enrolled in formal childcare facilities, and the lower inequality 
in childcare coverage. Figure 6-7 suggests that the more low-skilled 
mothers hold conservative views on motherhood and employment, the 
less they are likely to use formal childcare (r = 0.29). Although the 
strength of the relationship is weak, suggests that cultural explanations 
must be taken into account.  
Figure 6-6 Low skilled maternal employment and Relative Inequality Index (r = 
-0.39) 
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Figure 6-7 Attitudes on motherhood and Relative Inequality Index (r = 0.29) 
 
We consider the relationship between the length of well-paid 
parental leave (including cash-for-care schemes) and childcare inequality 
in Figure 6-8. We expect the relationship to be curvilinear, and the 
quadratic fit indeed suggests that RII is higher when leave is either very 
short or very long (r = 0.24). Long periods of remunerated leave seem 
to act as a disincentive for low-skilled women to (re)enter the labour 
market. Finally, Figure 6-9 shows that the relationship between RII in 
FTE formal care and the number of children using informal care 
arrangements is positive (r = 0.33), as expected. Generally speaking, the 
use of informal care arrangements seems to be associated with higher 
inequality in formal care arrangements. 
Thus, prima facie, it seems that all three dimensions identified on a 
theoretical basis are related to inequality in childcare coverage across 
children from different social backgrounds. We find meaningful 
associations between RII and FTE childcare coverage, government 
spending and public childcare supply, parental leave schemes, informal 
care arrangements, and attitudes on motherhood. We find no evidence 
of a relationship with private childcare costs. 
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Figure 6-8 Length of well-paid parental leave and Relative Inequality Index (r = 
0.24) 
 
 
Figure 6-9 Informal care arrangements and Relative Inequality Index (r = 0.33) 
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6.5.3 Regression results 
The above bivariate explorations provide preliminary evidence for the 
role of universalism, government involvement, and defamilization 
policies. To test the robustness of these explanations, we conduct OLS 
regression analyses in which RII is regressed on the explanatory 
variables. Ideally, we would like to test the independent effect of all 
explanatory variables in a single model. Table 6-3 however shows that 
low-skilled maternal employment and the number of publicly provided 
childcare slots are highly correlated with childcare coverage (r = 0.75 
and 0.82 respectively). The simultaneous inclusion of these variables in 
the same regression model would lead to problems of multicollinearity. 
To overcome this, we follow our theoretical approach and include every 
explanatory dimension separately in the regression model. As such we 
clarify within every dimension the explanatory weight of the country 
characteristics we distinguished earlier. Given the small sample size and 
some minor issues of heteroskedasticity, we adjust the standard errors 
using the Huber-White sandwich estimator37. 
 
Table 6-3 Correlations between explanatory variables 
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Cost -0.09 
       
Social right 0.52 -0.06  
     
Supply 0.82 0.05 0.56 
     
Expenditures 0.67 -0.15 0.63 0.71 
    
Maternal 
employment 
0.75 -0.27 0.16 0.48 0.41 
   
Attitudes -0.40 -0.22 -0.43 -0.60 -0.55 -0.14  
 
Parental leave -0.05 -0.24 0.26 -0.12 0.20 0.02 0.27  
FTE Informal 
care 
-0.29 -0.09 -0.45 -0.45 -0.61 -0.03 0.48 -0.15 
Note: for data sources and definitions, see Table 6-2. 
                                                 
37  Regression diagnostics are available from the authors upon simple request. 
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Yet even so, when interpreting the results, one should be aware that 
the small number of observations reduces the explanatory power of the 
model and increases the risk of type-II errors. The results should thus 
be regarded as an exploratory and tentative attempt at explaining 
childcare use inequality. We performed several sensitivity analyses (not 
shown) to assess the robustness of our findings. First, to check for 
outliers, we re-estimated all models using a jack-knife procedure 
omitting one country in each estimation (see Kenworthy 1999 for a 
similar approach). Second, Poland and Ireland were identified as 
potentially influential cases, hence we also estimated all three models 
without these countries. Finally, we estimated the models including per-
capita gross domestic product (GDP) to control for differences in 
wealth and economic development. In all three cases, the interpretation 
of the results was unaffected. Figure 6-10 shows the standardized 
coefficients of the independent variables; full models with robust 
standard errors are provided in Table A-4 in annex. 
In the first model, we regressed explanations relating to the 
dimension of universality on RII. Figure 6-10 shows that coverage is 
strongly related to RII. An increase in FTE coverage with one standard 
deviation is associated with 0.62 standard deviation decrease in RII. In 
contrast, neither legal entitlement to a childcare slot nor private 
childcare costs are related to childcare inequality. 
Model 2 shows the standardized coefficients of the independent 
variables relating to government involvement in childcare provision. 
The supply of public or subsidized childcare slots per 100 children is 
significantly and negatively related to RII. An increase in supply with 
one standard deviation is associated with a 0.72 standard deviation 
decrease in RII. The coefficient for government expenditures is not 
significantly different from zero. The two coefficients together suggest 
that it is not spending per se, but the manner in which resources are spent 
that matters. In other words, what matters is the number of childcare 
slots that are created. From a public spending point of view, this result 
calls for further research on the role of the private sector in childcare 
service provision, as it suggests that some countries are more efficient 
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than others in the provision or support of childcare services that are 
equally distributed over the population. 
The third model, finally, shows the standardized coefficient for the 
indicators reflecting the dimension of defamilization. The coefficients 
confirm the association between employment and childcare inequality. 
A standard deviation increase in the employment rate of low-skilled 
mothers results in a 0.3 standard deviation decrease in childcare 
inequality. A separate role of culture cannot be confirmed in this model. 
The share of low-skilled mothers believing that “a pre-school child is 
likely to suffer if his or her mother works” is not significantly related to 
childcare inequality. The coefficients of well-paid leave and squared 
leave show that, ceteris paribus, a standard deviation increase in the 
duration of well-paid leave that initially lasts longer than 9 months is 
associated with a 0.5 standard deviation increase in childcare inequality. 
Shorter periods of leave are not significantly associated with childcare 
inequality. Finally, although the bivariate procedure described above 
suggests that the use of informal care arrangements was associated with 
higher inequality, its actual impact on RII is negligible. 
In sum, the regression models only provide evidence for the role of 
childcare coverage and public supply, maternal employment and 
parental leave policies. The prima facie evidence provided through 
bivariate associations for informal care use, cultural values, government 
expenditures, and the legal entitlement to a childcare slot are not 
confirmed. Both bivariate and multivariate exercises did not confirm 
any meaningful relationship between childcare costs and inequality. 
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Figure 6-10 Standardized regression coefficients on age-standardized Relative 
Inequality Index 
 
Note: the figure shows standardized coefficients of three separate models (full 
estimates in Table A-4 in annex). Shaded bars are significant (p < 0.05), blank bars are 
not significant. 
 
We should however take care not to jump to conclusions on the 
basis of these regression models. As the three explanatory dimensions 
and their underlying indicators are substantively interwoven, we risk 
rejecting a hypothesis regarding a direct impact while the relationship 
might be of an indirect nature. Consider the case of the impact of 
cultural values on childcare inequality. Insofar as long and well-paid 
parental leave policies are a reflection of the dominant norm regarding 
motherhood, the impact of cultural values might be important yet 
uncaptured by our model. This cannot be accounted for given the 
methodology applied and the data at hand. Similarly, the impact of a 
legal entitlement to a childcare slot might be of a second order in that it 
ensures the provision of sufficient supply, which in turn has a significant 
impact on childcare inequality. For example, the good results of 
Denmark and Iceland, and the relatively low inequalities in Sweden, may 
be due to the fact that in these countries all children from the age of one 
onwards are legally entitled to a childcare slot and government is obliged 
to meet demand.  
Our finding that private childcare costs are not associated with 
childcare inequality should also be qualified. Most of the early research 
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on childcare in the 1970s and 1980s was economic in nature and 
focused in particular on the role of childcare costs in the US, i.e. the fees 
parents had to pay themselves, in explaining female labour supply and 
childcare demand (Blau and Robins 1988; Connelly 1992). These studies 
invariably indicated (though not always to the same extent) that 
mothers’ decision to take on employment and to purchase childcare was 
highly sensitive to childcare costs. More recent inquiries for a broader 
set of countries, however, tend to find that childcare costs are important 
only in interaction with availability and childcare supply, and that 
primarily the latter determines childcare use in European countries 
where childcare is often heavily subsidized and regulated but rationed 
(Del Boca and Pasqua 2005; Wrohlich 2011). Detailed country studies 
have indeed shown that several of the European countries have 
implemented an income-related tariff system for their publicly provided 
or subsidized childcare services (European Parliament 2007; UNICEF 
2008). Even in countries where childcare services are mostly privately 
provided, such as the US or the UK, parents with low incomes almost 
always qualify for government subsidies via targeted benefits or tax 
exemptions. 
Our results confirm the truism that ensuring the affordability of 
childcare is futile if there are not enough slots available anyway. That is 
not to say that costs are irrelevant, particularly in the case of low-income 
families and/or in specific countries (notably Ireland and the United 
States). Moreover, the affordability of childcare depends not only on 
childcare costs as such, but also on the broader tax-benefit system and 
labour market policies and how these affect family income. OECD 
analyses have shown that in some countries employment is unattractive 
to low-income families, irrespective of childcare costs (Immervol and 
Barber 2005). Hence cost is by no means the only relevant factor when 
it comes to affordability. Our results should therefore be qualified as 
shedding light on the direct drivers of childcare inequality, reflecting the 
current institutional setting of countries. 
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6.6 CONCLUSION 
In one of its first comprehensive reports on childcare, the OECD noted 
that “a public supply-side investment model managed by public authorities brings 
more uniform quality and superior coverage of childhood populations than parent 
subsidy models” (OECD 2006). We may now add that they also bring 
more equality. Achieving equality in childcare coverage is a necessary 
condition for childcare services to be effective in facilitating maternal 
employment and breaking the intergenerational chain of child poverty 
by furthering human capital and child development. In the majority of 
countries, however, childcare coverage is stratified by maternal 
educational level. Children from families with a low-educated mother 
use formal childcare to a much lesser extent than children living in 
families with a high-educated mother. The only countries succeeding in 
equalizing use at high coverage levels are Denmark and Iceland. All 
other countries in our sample report low rates of formal childcare usage, 
high levels of inequality in formal care use, and in most cases a 
combination of both. 
How can this childcare inequality be explained? Our results shed 
light on the impact of (aspects of) the welfare state configuration on 
inequality in childcare use. We find that childcare coverage and supply, 
maternal employment, and well-paid parental leave schemes are 
associated with inequality in childcare coverage. For a country to 
increase equal coverage across social groups, our results suggest that the 
number of available childcare slots should be increased, in particular by 
means of public provision or supply-side subsidies. Governments 
should also pursue a coherent set of labour market and family policies. 
The latter is an important observation, as the objectives of family and 
labour market policies may be at odds. We find, for instance, that long 
periods of well-paid parental leave can increase inequality in childcare 
coverage, because low-skilled mothers are encouraged to become 
homemaker. At the same time, our results demonstrate that a high share 
of low-skilled maternal employment can decrease inequality in childcare 
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coverage. Policymakers should be well aware of such incoherencies 
when implementing social policy.  
Some caveats are in place though. Our explanatory power is limited 
because of the exploratory nature of our analysis and because we are 
constrained by data availability. Some possible explanations, such as the 
local and regional distribution of childcare slots, the complex systems of 
government subsidies and the specific rules and regulations (for instance 
regarding quality regulations, priority rules for disadvantaged families) 
might be very country-specific. Moreover, the lack of reliable and 
comparative data on service characteristics (in particular relating to the 
quality of services), and the inability to reliably distinguish private from 
public care facilities impedes our endeavor. It is also questionable 
whether all dimensions of welfare states identified on the basis of the 
literature are appropriately measured by the available indicators. Despite 
these drawbacks, this chapter constitutes a first attempt at improving 
our understanding of the important issue of inequality in childcare use. 
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CHAPTER 7 
INVESTING IN CHILDCARE 
SERVICES: A SHOT MISFIRED? A 
PANEL APPROACH TO INEQUALITY 
IN CHILDCARE USE ACROSS 
EUROPEAN COUNTRIES* 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
In the previous chapters I have shown that childcare services are 
increasingly regarded one of the most important policy levers to 
mitigate social inequalities under the social investment paradigm. Part 
and parcel of the so-called child-centred investment strategy, high-
quality childcare is expected to be effective in reducing poverty and 
increasing employment rates by allowing both parents to engage in paid 
employment, and to benefit the cognitive and non-cognitive 
development of young children as well. This in particular holds for 
children from a disadvantaged background, ensuring later educational 
success and improved labour market prospects. 
In this chapter, I aim to further our knowledge on childcare as a 
potential equaliser by adopting a dynamic approach towards childcare 
use and government investment. Expanding the number of childcare 
places has been a government priority across European welfare states in 
                                                 
*  I would like to thank Annemie Nys and Vincent Corluy for their much 
appreciated help with the data. 
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recent years, and almost all countries have increased expenditures on 
childcare. But does such increase in government expenditures also lead 
to a better performance in terms of equity? Based on several cross-
sectional waves of EU-SILC data (2006-2010) and spending data 
derived from the OECD SOCX database (2005-2009), I look at 1) 
trends in spending, childcare use, and inequality in childcare use; and 2) 
the relation between spending and childcare use as well as between 
spending and inequality in childcare use. If an ever increasing public 
effort for childcare services does not lead to an expansion of its use 
across the income distribution, that shot might be misfired indeed. A 
dynamic account of childcare and inequality will allow us to gain better 
insight in the impact of government investments on inequality in 
childcare coverage in the era of social investment. 
7.2 BACKGROUND AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Viewing the issue of childcare through Matthew’s lens (see chapters 2, 3, 
5 and 6) reveals that the use of formal childcare services is socially 
stratified: higher income families or families with a highly educated 
mother use childcare services to a much larger extent than lower income 
families or families with a lower skilled mother. Chapter 5 hypothesizes 
that due to this social gap in childcare use, government investment in 
childcare is likely failing to live up to its inequality-reducing potential or, 
worse, exacerbate rather than mitigate social inequalities. The results of 
chapter 6 suggested that government expenditures on childcare services 
as such are not sufficient to reduce inequality; what matters is how the 
budget is spent. In chapter 2, then, it was shown that government 
investment in childcare services has increased in all European countries 
in the pre-crisis period even though between-country variation remains 
huge. The Scandinavian countries, but also continental countries such as 
France, the Netherlands, and the liberal country the United Kingdom 
are amongst the big spenders; In contrast, the Central and Eastern 
European countries, the Southern countries, but also Ireland and 
Austria are low spenders. Spending on childcare certainly does not 
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follow the traditional Esping-Andersen typology of welfare states 
(Bonoli and Reber 2010). Moreover, ample differences are in place 
regarding how government budgets are spent. Some countries (e.g. the 
United Kingdom and the Netherlands) subsidize demand through a 
voucher system or tax credits, other countries subsidize not-for-profit 
providers (e.g. Belgium, France, Portugal) while in still other childcare 
services are mainly provided by the government (e.g. Sweden, 
Denmark). Finally, during the first years of the crisis (2007-2009), the 
increase in spending came to a halt in several countries and even 
reversed in Greece, Slovenia, and the United Kingdom.  
Findings from the previous chapters are based on cross-sectional 
empirical analyses; in this chapter I want to explore the impact of social 
spending on inequality in childcare coverage over time. Although there 
is a large body of research investigating the impact of social spending on 
income inequality (e.g. OECD 2008 for an overview), to my knowledge 
no study has looked into the relationship between social spending and 
inequality in childcare service use. Some researchers have explored the 
determinants of childcare spending, though. Bonoli and Reber (2010) 
empirically investigated political arguments for public spending on 
childcare expansion across OECD countries. They found that childcare 
demand (as measured by women’s employment) and partisan effects (as 
measured by the presence of social democratic and religious parties, and 
the share of women in parliament) are related to public spending on 
childcare. Moreover, they also found evidence for a crowding out effect: 
countries that spend more on old age have little budgetary room to 
manoeuvre and spend less on ‘new risk policies’, including childcare 
services. Here, I will depart from the varied pattern of spending on 
childcare over time and between countries, and explore the following 
research questions: 
 
Research question 1: did the increase in government spending for 
childcare services yield higher levels of childcare coverage for children aged 0-2 
years?  
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Research question 2: does more government spending for childcare 
services lead to less inequality in the coverage for children aged 0-2 years?  
7.3 DATA AND VARIABLES 
Drawing on data from EU-SILC and the OECD SOCX database (see 
previous chapters), in this chapter I estimate the effect of public 
spending on childcare services on 1) childcare coverage for children 
aged 0-2; and 2) inequality in coverage for children aged 0-2. I have 
reliable38 data for 22 European countries over five years (from 2005 to 
2010). Countries included are Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, 
Ireland, Iceland, Italy, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, 
Portugal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and the United 
Kingdom. 
The dependent variables are childcare coverage for children aged 0-2 years 
and inequality in childcare coverage for children aged 0-2 years. Coverage is 
calculated as a FTE measure, similar to the one used in chapters 5 and 
6. I have also tested the raw coverage rates with consistent results (not 
shown). Inequality is measured using a relative index of inequality (RII) 
in FTE childcare coverage, similar to the one use in chapter 6. Because I 
only make use of data from EU-SILC in this chapter to calculate 
inequality indices, I am able to gauge socioeconomic disparities using 
equivalized disposable income instead of educational level of the 
mother. I have proceeded as follows: First, I calculated income quintiles 
for families with young children based on standardized disposable 
household income in order to rank these families from low to high 
                                                 
38  EU-SILC was launched in 2003 including 6 EU countries, and started 
formally in 2004 with 15 EU countries, but childcare data from the 2004 
wave are often unreliable and the results for some countries diverge 
substantially from official statistics or the subsequent SILC waves. From 
2005 onwards, the results are far more stable. Most recent wave available for 
researchers is 2011, but at this point detailed spending data in the OECD 
SOCX database is only available up to 2009. 
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incomes. Second, for each country in the dataset, a slope index of 
inequality (SII) was calculated by means of an OLS regression in which 
FTE childcare coverage is the dependent variable and income quintile 
the independent variable, adjusted for age. Third, the SII is divided by 
the weighted average of FTE coverage for children aged 0-2 years. I 
have also tested other measures of inequality, such as the quintile ratio 
(see chapter 5) and the concentration index (see Lambert, 2001, for 
further reading), again with consistent results (not shown). 
The independent variable of interest is spending on childcare services. 
Drawing on the methodology developed in Meeusen and Nys (2014), I 
draw spending data from the detailed OECD SOCX database which 
categorizes absolute amounts of yearly spending. Included here is 
spending on family programmes (‘daycare/home-help services’ and 
‘other benefits in kind’), expressed as percentage of GDP.  
Because spending will be driven not only by deliberate (political) 
efforts to increase spending, but also by demand and demographic as 
well as economic pressures, I include the following control variables. 
First, Maternal employment, calculated as the employment rate of mothers 
with a youngest child under 3 years (adhering to the ILO definition of 
employment of have worked at least 1 hour during the reference week) 
as a proxy for childcare demand. Second, the proportion of the population 0-
5 calculated as a share of the total population to control for 
demographic pressures. Third, the natural logarithm of GDP per capita, 
expressed in 2005 US dollars, to control for level of economic 
development. It can be expected that the level of economic 
development partly determines the scope for social spending. Finally, 
the results from chapter 6 suggest that institutions such as parental leave 
also have an influence on the level of inequality in childcare coverage. 
To capture this, I also include the period of well-paid leave (centred at 9 
months, see chapter 6) and its square. For the model estimating the 
impact of spending on inequality, I also add the FTE coverage rate as a 
control variable. As we shall see below, it is essential to asses inequality 
in conjunction with overall coverage rates. 
Bonoli and Remer (2010) noted that childcare is a domain in which 
issues of reverse causality are particularly salient. Moreover, the process 
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of change affected by social spending is bound to be inert: one cannot 
expect investments in childcare to have an immediate impact on 
coverage rates, certainly not in the case of supply-side subsidies. To 
account for (at least part) of this inertia and for the issue of reverse 
causality, the independent variables are lagged one year. Descriptive 
statistics for the variables are shown in Table 7-1. 
 
Table 7-1 Descriptive statistics of dependent and independent variables 
Variable N Min Mean Max Overall 
SD 
Between 
SD 
Within 
SD 
Dependent         
FTE Childcare coverage 111 .017 .301 .771 .174 .176 .028 
RII 111 -.02 .207 .574 .152 .143 .053 
Independent        
Childcare spending (% of 
GDP) t-1 
111 .1 .769 2 .480 .477 .088 
Natural log of GDP per 
capita (PPP US$) t-1 
111 2.07 3.39 4.48 .601 .616 .040 
% of population age < 5 t-1 111 .042 .055 .077 . 008 .008 .001 
Maternal employment rate 
(child < 3) t-1 
111 .135 .534 .830 .191 .191 .039 
Well-paid leave (centered at 9 
months, weeks) 
111 -9 -1.488 15.9 6.035   
Well-paid leave squared 111 .04 38.308 252.81 48.534   
7.4 ESTIMATION METHOD 
This chapter is based on an unbalanced panel in which 111 observations 
are distributed across 23 countries (N) and 5 years (T). No reliable data 
on maternal employment is available for Hungary in 2005 and for 
Slovak Republic in 2009 and 201039, and France is not included in the 
EU-SILC in 2008. Compared with purely cross-sectional data (for 
                                                 
39  For Slovak Republic, the maternal employment rates decline sharply in 2009 
on the basis of EU-SILC, while being stable in the prior survey years. A 
similar exercise on the basis of the Labour Force Survey did not reveal such 
decline, nor do the official employment statistics for Slovak Republic. 
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instance used in chapter 6), panel data40 are appropriate to study 
dynamics of change, in casu dynamics of change in social spending on 
childcare coverage and inequality. Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
regression models are not suitable in the presence of serial correlated 
error terms (Hicks 1994). For instance, one cannot assume that social 
spending within a country is not interdependent over time, which means 
that the error terms will not be independent from one year to another. 
Several estimation methods to properly analyse panel data have 
been proposed in the literature. Bonoli and Remer (2010) estimate a 
pooled regression analysis with panel-corrected standard errors (PCSE). 
However, Beck and Katz (1995) have noted that this estimation method 
is only suitable for Ts larger than 20. Hence, since I have more N 
(country observations) than T (time points), a PCSE pooled regression 
model is less appropriate for my purposes. To deal with this problem, it 
is often suggested in the literature to use Fixed Effect (FE) or Random 
Effect (RE) models (Bartels 2008). Both modelling approaches account 
for unobserved heterogeneity inherent in clustered data. In fact, an F-
test and the Breusch-Pagan LM test formally showed that the presence 
of fixed effects (FE) as well as random effects (RE) cannot be rejected. 
Here I estimate a RE model for theoretical as well as methodological 
reasons (Brady 2005). FE models assume constant variance across 
groups but, theoretically speaking, it makes little sense to assume that 
the impact of spending on childcare coverage and inequality will be 
constant between countries. E.g. some countries subsidize demand 
through childcare vouchers while in other countries childcare services 
are publicly supplied. The kind of spending differs between countries 
which means that I’m interested in the between-country as well as the 
within-country (over time) variance, which warrants the use of a RE 
model. Methodologically speaking, because FE models absorb 
approximately 1/T degrees of freedom, estimates are inefficient in small 
                                                 
40  In sociology, panel data of this kind are often referred to as time-series cross-
sectional (TSCS) models, although Beck and Katz (1995) make a clear 
distinction between the two: TSCS data has fewer N but many T, while panel 
data are supposed to have more N but fewer T. 
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samples such as the one at hand in this chapter. Moreover, because 
variation in spending over is often limited in the sample, their effects 
will be highly collinear with the fixed effects (Wooldridge 2003). 
Formally, a Hausman (1978) specification test indicated that a RE was 
preferable to a FE model as well.  
7.5 DESCRIPTIVE RESULTS 
7.5.1 Trends in childcare spending 
Table 7-2 summarizes spending on childcare services as a percentage of 
GDP in 23 European countries between 2005 and 2009 (the spending 
data are lagged one year). First of all, corroborating the trends in 
spending data on family policy discussed in chapter 2, the average 
spending on childcare services has increased from 0.72% of GDP to 
0.83%. However, the data show considerable variation in levels of 
spending as well as in changes over time. Countries such as Iceland, 
Ireland, Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom have quite 
substantially increase their childcare efforts; for Ireland this amounts to 
an increase with 60%. Two countries have actually decreased their 
budgetary efforts: Netherlands and Slovenia. The former have increased 
spending up to 2007 while in 2008 a sharp decrease occurs. In 2009 the 
budget started to rise again. In several countries, the increase was 
modest (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, 
Germany, Italy, Spain) or non-existent (Czech Republic, Greece, 
Hungary, Luxemburg, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic). In 2009, 
spending levels range from 0.1% of GDP in Greece to 2.0% of GDP in 
Denmark and Sweden. 
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Table 7-2 Social spending on childcare services, European countries, % of GDP 
Country 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Change 2005-2009 
AT 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.50 0.10 
BE 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.90 0.10 
CZ 0.50 0.50 0.40 0.50 0.50 0.00 
DK 1.90 1.90 1.80 1.90 2.00 0.10 
EE 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.40 0.40 0.10 
FI 1.00 0.90 0.90 1.00 1.10 0.10 
FR 1.20 1.20 1.30 1.20 1.30 0.10 
DE 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.50 0.10 
GR 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.00 
HU 0.70 0.70 0.60 0.60 0.70 0.00 
IS 1.20 1.40 1.50 1.60 1.70 0.50 
IE 0.50 0.50 0.60 0.70 0.80 0.30 
IT 0.60 0.70 0.60 0.70 0.70 0.10 
LU 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.60 0.40 0.00 
NL 1.10 1.30 1.30 0.80 0.90 -0.20 
NO 0.80 0.80 0.90 1.00 1.20 0.40 
PL 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.00 
PT 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.00 
SK 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.00 
SI 0.60 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 -0.10 
ES 0.50 0.50 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.10 
SE 1.60 1.70 1.80 1.90 2.00 0.40 
UK 0.80 0.90 1.00 1.00 1.10 0.30 
Mean 0.72 0.74 0.75 0.77 0.83 0.11 
SD 0.43 0.46 0.48 0.47 0.51 0.16 
CV 0.60 0.62 0.63 0.61 0.62 1.51 
Source: Meeusen and Nys (2014) based on OECD SOCX database. Additional 
calculations by Annemie Nys. 
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Second, although the period under consideration is short, there is 
no evidence for convergence (see Kittel and Obinger 2003 for a similar 
approach). The coefficient of variation reported in Table 7-2 slightly 
increases, which means there is no indication for sigma convergence 
(convergence in spending levels). There is no evidence for beta 
convergence or catch up either. Beta convergence indicates that 
countries with initial low levels of spending report faster growth in 
spending on childcare than countries with already high spending levels. 
Given the importance attached to childcare services at the European 
level, one might expect that laggard countries would feel pressured to 
start investing more. This is however not what happened. Figure 7-1 
shows the 2005-2009 change in spending on childcare as a function of 
spending in 2005. In fact, in turns out that countries with initial high 
levels of spending have grown faster than welfare states with 
underdeveloped childcare systems. 
 
Figure 7-1 2005-2009 change in spending on childcare and spending on 
childcare in 2005 
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7.5.2 Trends in FTE childcare coverage and inequality 
Table 7-3 summarizes the evolution of FTE childcare coverage for 
children aged 0-2 years between 2006 and 2010; Table 7-4 the evolution 
of inequality in FTE childcare coverage for children aged 0-2 years 
between 2006 and 2010. Across the 23 countries included in the sample, 
FTE coverage has known a modest increase of 1.8 percentage point 
(+7%). The general figure disguises substantial variation between 
countries, however. In some countries FTE coverage has strongly 
increased: in particular Germany (+59%), Estonia (+37%), Norway 
(+26%), and Slovenia (+23%). In others a decrease can be observed, 
notably in Belgium (-15%), Greece (-33%), and Italy (-35%). The 
coefficient of variation provides no evidence for sigma convergence. 
Likewise, Figure 7-2 provides no evidence for beta convergence. 
Despite the general but small increase in FTE coverage across countries, 
a real process of catching-up has not occurred. 
 
Table 7-3 Evolution of FTE childcare coverage for children aged 0-2 years, 23 
European countries, % 
Country 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Change 2006-2010 
AT 11 12 12 14 11 0 
BE 48 44 47 37 40 -7 
CZ 2 2 2 3 4 2 
DE 17 19 22 25 28 10 
DK 72 71 72 73 77 5 
EE 19 23 19 29 26 7 
ES 38 37 35 34 36 -2 
FI 26 25 25 26 28 1 
FR 38 38  44 44 6 
GR 18 15 16 16 12 -6 
HU  11 10 10 11 1 
IE 18 25 22 17 23 5 
IS 52 59 60 58 58 6 
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IT 37 33 35 33 24 -13 
LU 36 31 31 35 39 3 
NL 30 33 35 36 38 8 
NO 38 39 46 45 48 10 
PL 8 9 8 7 8 0 
PT 43 38 46 48 44 1 
SE 46 48 51 59 50 3 
SI 31 33 35 35 39 7 
SK 9 9 5   -4 
UK 19 19 20 17 17 -2 
Mean 29.8 29.2 29.8 30.7 30.9 1.8 
SD 16.6 16.5 18.0 18.2 18.1 5.7 
CV 0.56 0.57 0.61 0.55 0.58 3.09 
Source: own calculations on EU-SILC. 
 
Figure 7-2 2006-2010 change in FTE childcare coverage and FTE childcare 
coverage in 2006 (r = 0.10) 
 
Note: FTE childcare coverage 2007 for Hungary. Change in FTE childcare coverage 
2006-2008 for Slovak Republic. 
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Table 7-4 demonstrates that inequality in FTE childcare coverage 
(as measured by a relative index of inequality, RII, supra) decreased on 
average with 7% (-0.02). In 2006, the RII ranged from 0.01 in Iceland 
(an RII of 0 means total equality: children from different income groups 
use FTE childcare to the same extent) to 0.57 in Ireland. Given a 
standard deviation of 0.16, a 0.02 decrease is rather small. The 
coefficient of variation increased which means there is no evidence for 
sigma convergence. Inequality levels did not converge between countries, 
rather the contrary happened. Some countries report an above-average 
decrease of inequality: Austria (-0.13), Greece (-0.10), Finland (-0.9), 
Slovenia (-0.08), Ireland (-0.6), Norway (-0.6), France (-0.5), Germany (-
0.5), Netherlands (-0.4), Hungary (-0.3, between 2007 and 2010), Slovak 
Republic (-0.3, between 2006 and 2008) and Czech Republic (-0.3). 
Others display an increase in inequality: Portugal (+0.13), Italy (+0.09), 
Belgium (+0.07), Luxemburg (+0.06), Iceland (+0.02), Poland (+0.02), 
and the United Kingdom (+0.02). 
 
Table 7-4 Evolution of inequality in childcare coverage for children aged 0-2 
years, 23 European countries, RII 
Country 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Change 2006-2010 
AT 0.22 0.17 0.11 0.07 0.09 -0.13 
BE 0.17 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.23 0.07 
CZ 0.26 0.48 0.44 0.05 0.22 -0.04 
DE 0.11 0.08 0.09 0.13 0.06 -0.05 
DK 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 -0.02 
EE 0.03 0.16 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.00 
ES 0.20 0.18 0.18 0.23 0.20 0.00 
FI 0.26 0.32 0.27 0.18 0.18 -0.09 
FR 0.39 0.35  0.34 0.34 -0.05 
GR 0.49 0.45 0.36 0.26 0.39 -0.10 
HU  0.20 0.26 0.32 0.18 -0.03 
IE 0.57 0.45 0.46 0.46 0.52 -0.06 
IS 0.01 -0.02 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.02 
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IT 0.09 0.11 0.08 0.13 0.18 0.09 
LU 0.14 0.18 0.12 0.18 0.20 0.06 
NL 0.28 0.26 0.27 0.26 0.24 -0.04 
NO 0.15 0.14 0.09 0.13 0.09 -0.06 
PL 0.52 0.54 0.41 0.55 0.54 0.02 
PT 0.05 0.16 0.24 0.13 0.18 0.13 
SE 0.04 0.01 0.04 0.08 0.02 -0.02 
SI 0.11 0.04 0.08 0.11 0.03 -0.08 
SK 0.21 0.31 0.18   -0.03 
UK 0.37 0.40 0.31 0.45 0.39 0.02 
Mean 0.21 0.23 0.20 0.20 0.20 -0.02 
SD 0.16 0.16 0.13 0.15 0.15 0.06 
CV 0.76 0.69 0.68 0.74 0.77 -3.89 
Source: own calculations on EU-SILC. 
 
With regards to beta convergence, Figure 7-3 shows a negative 
relationship between initial inequality in childcare use and change in 
inequality in childcare use. This suggest that there has been some 
catching up: countries with high levels of inequality showed a relatively 
faster decline of inequality (if any) compared with countries that had 
already lower levels of inequality. This is what one would expect. After 
all, there is little room for improvement when inequality levels are 
already at a low point, which is for instance the case in Iceland and 
Denmark. In contrast, countries with high levels of inequality and low 
levels of coverage have much room for further improvement. From a 
social investment point of view, the challenge for most countries lies in 
increasing coverage while simultaneously ensuring equity. This is what 
happened in Germany, Ireland, Norway, Netherlands and Slovenia.  
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Figure 7-3 Change in inequality in childcare coverage and inequality in 
childcare coverage (r = -0.36) 
 
Note: FTE childcare coverage 2007 for Hungary. Change in FTE childcare coverage 
2006-2008 for Slovak Republic. 
7.5.3 Childcare spending, coverage and inequality: a 
bivariate assessment 
Generally speaking, the data for 23 European countries suggest an 
increase in spending and coverage and a decrease in inequality. Yet there 
is no evidence for sigma and beta convergence with regard to spending 
levels and coverage rates; above all European 23 countries are 
characterized by variety. Some countries report an increase in coverage 
but an increase in inequality as well, others have had a decrease in 
coverage and an increase inequality. Only few have attained both 
objectives of growth and equality. How are these two objectives related 
to changes in childcare spending? Figure 7-4 and Figure 7-5 model the 
bivariate relationship between change in childcare spending and change 
in coverage on the one hand, and between change in childcare spending 
and inequality in childcare coverage on the other hand.  
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Figure 7-4 shows that there is a positive but very weak relationship 
between the 2005-2009 change in spending on childcare services and 
the 2006-2010 change in FTE childcare coverage. Prima facie, more 
spending is associated with higher coverage rates but several countries 
that have increased childcare spending did not experience an 
accompanying increase in coverage. Figure 7-5 shows that there is 
basically no relationship between 2005-2009 spending change and 2006-
2010 change in inequality in childcare coverage. Prima facie, more 
spending tends not to be associated with lower inequality, yet above all 
the results are characterized by substantial variation between countries. 
In the next section, I will engage in multivariate analyses in order to 
shed more light on the impact of spending on childcare coverage as well 
as inequality.  
Figure 7-4 change in childcare spending and change in FTE childcare coverage 
(r = 0.13) 
 
Note: change in FTE coverage between 2007-2010 for Hungary and between 2006-
2008 for Slovak Republic. 
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Figure 7-5 Change in childcare spending and change in inequality in FTE 
coverage (r = 0.03) 
 
Note: change in inequality between 2007-2010 for Hungary and between 2006-2008 for 
Slovak Republic. 
7.6 MULTIVARIATE RESULTS 
The first two columns in Table 7-5 display models estimating the impact 
of lagged spending on childcare coverage, the final two columns display 
models estimating the impact of lagged spending on inequality in 
childcare coverage. The R² statistic shows that lagged spending is much 
better able to predict FTE childcare use (m1) than inequality in 
childcare use (m3). Most of the variation occurs between units instead 
of within, which is expected because spending on childcare is often 
stable within countries over time. 
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Table 7-5 Random Effects models of FTE childcare coverage and inequality in 
childcare coverage on childcare spending 
  FTE childcare coverage Inequality in childcare 
coverage 
  m1 m2 m3 m4 
      
Childcare 
spending in  of 
GDP t-1 
 0.120 (.03) 
*** 
0.112 (.03) 
** 
-0.080 (.04) 0.002 (0.05) 
      
Mat. emp. rate t-1   0.189 (.07) 
** 
 0.011 (.11) 
      
Population < 5 t-1   -1.231 (2.20)  0.969 (3.36) 
      
Logged GDP per 
capita t-1 
  0.100 (.04) 
** 
 -0.034 (.05) 
      
Well-paid leave    0.006 (.00)  -0.010 (.01 
*) 
      
Well-paid leave 
squared 
  -0.001 (.00)  0.000 (.00) 
      
FTE childcare 
coverage 
    -0.364 (.16) 
* 
      
Constant  0.21 (.04) 
*** 
-0.125 (.14) 0.27 (.04) 
*** 
0.348 (.18) 
* 
      
Rho  0.93 0.88 0.83 0.75 
R² within  0.03 0.05 0.01 0.02 
R² between  0.57 0.73 0.14 0.51 
R² overall   0.54 0.70 0.13 0.48 
N  111 111 111 111 
Note: standard errors between parentheses. Significance: *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p 
< 0.05.  
 
Drawback of a RE model is that the coefficients are difficult to 
interpret because both within-entity and between-entity effects are 
included. Model 1 (m1) in Table 7-5 shows that childcare spending as a 
percentage of GDP in t-1 has a strong impact on childcare use in t. 
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More specifically, the estimate shows the average effect of childcare 
spending on childcare use when spending changes across time and 
between countries by one unit. Here, a one percent change in childcare 
spending in t-1 yields a 12% increase in FTE childcare use. The 
estimates in model 2 (m2) suggest that spending in t-1 led to higher 
coverage in t, even controlled for demographic pressures, economic 
development and maternal labour market participation. 
As for research question 2, model 3 (m3) shows a non-significant 
estimate of spending in t-1 on inequality in FTE childcare use. To be 
precise, a one percent increase in spending on childcare is associated 
with a 0.08 reduction of inequality; this is only half a standard deviation. 
Controlled for demographic pressures, economic development, 
maternal labour market participation and FTE childcare coverage, the 
estimate becomes redundant altogether. Hence, the estimates in model 4 
(m4) suggest that spending in t-1 does not yield less inequality in FTE 
childcare coverage. I have also tested models without controlling for 
FTE childcare coverage, and the interpretation of the results does not 
change. 
How should this result be interpreted? The strength and 
significance of the FTE childcare coverage variable might give us a clue 
here. We know from Chapter 5 that FTE coverage and inequality are 
inversely related and that inequality in childcare use tends to attenuate as 
coverage rates go up. The fact that more spending as such is not related 
to less inequality but more FTE coverage is, corroborates the hypothesis 
formulated in Chapter 6 that not spending as such is determining 
inequality; rather it depends how spending is done. In short, 
government investment in childcare should lead to an expansion of 
places available. Countries may pursue this goal through different 
strategies, depending on the path-dependent choices they have made in 
the past, for instance regarding the role of the private market (Morgan 
2005). Consider the examples of Norway and the Netherlands. The 
former followed a supply-side strategy with the expansion of publicly 
and privately provided childcare services (via municipal grants to finance 
services, similar to the Swedish practice, see Chapter 3) while the latter 
has followed a demand-side trajectory including an expansion of 
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subsidies for families with children whilst leaving service provision to 
the market. For the brief period under consideration here, both 
countries have succeeded in simultaneously increasing coverage and 
mitigating inequality. 
There may be limits to the demand-side strategy, however. In a 
context of demand-side subsidies such as childcare vouchers or tax 
credits and private-market supply of services, quality is often low, prices 
are high, and availability is volatile (Lazzari and Vandenbroeck 2012; 
Lloyd and Penn 2012). Moreover, research on the Dutch experience 
proves that for-profit companies providing childcare services often 
choose to settle in well-off neighbourhoods ensuring sufficient returns 
(Noailly and Visser 2009). In fact, subsidizing parents does not 
necessarily influence the spatial availability and quality of service 
provision, unless a mixed strategy of regulation, supply-side and 
demand-side subsidies is pursued. In sum, the current state of the 
literature would lead us to expect that only a public supply-side 
investment model is able to bring about more equality in service use; 
that was also one of my conclusions in the previous chapter. In contrast, 
the results from this chapter suggest that spending on parents and not 
on services (as is the case in the Netherlands) might still be an effective 
strategy to increase coverage and decrease inequality. In order to 
decisively test whether spending on the demand- or supply-side of the 
childcare market are both effective strategies to ensure equality in 
childcare use, one should ideally be able to distinguish government 
spending on public and private childcare providers, or on the supply or 
demand side. Unfortunately, such data does not exist. Given the fact 
that none of the high-coverage, low-inequality countries have pursued a 
demand-side strategy, it remains to be seen whether this is a viable 
policy option in the long term.  
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7.7 CONCLUSION 
First of all, the descriptive findings on trends in spending, childcare use, 
and inequality in childcare use corroborate Randall’s findings from more 
than a decade ago: “EU childcare policy has lacked real teeth, being better able to 
influence the terms in which childcare is discussed than substantive policy” (Randall 
2000). Despite the importance attached to childcare policies at the EU 
policy level, and its prominence within the social investment strategy, 
there is no evidence for convergence across European countries in 
terms of childcare service spending or childcare service use.  
Second, childcare spending is associated with higher levels of 
childcare. Although spending has increased across European countries 
during the 2005-2009 period, in fact the countries with already high 
levels of spending tended to move up another gear and report the 
biggest change in spending levels. In any case, the multivariate results 
suggest that spending on childcare services does indeed yield higher 
coverage levels.  
Third, childcare spending is not necessarily associated with lower 
levels of inequality in childcare use. Although the limited number of 
time points in the dataset should refrain us in drawing strong 
conclusions on the impact of spending over time, the results suggest 
that spending as such is not sufficient to mitigate social inequalities in 
childcare use. More precisely, spending should lead to a wider 
availability of childcare places for young children across the income 
distribution. The more universalized childcare coverage becomes, the 
better its performance in terms of equality will be. 
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CHAPTER 8 
CONCLUSION 
Starting from a passus in the Gospel of Matthew and Mertonian functional 
theory, I have investigated two central research questions in this 
dissertation. First, I have dealt with the question who benefits from 
government investment in child benefits, parental leave schemes, and 
childcare services. This was in fact an inquiry into whether and how a 
Matthew effect looms under contemporary family policy measures. 
Second, using the Matthew effect as an analytical tool to evaluate policy 
outcomes, I have explored the consequences of government investment 
in family policy. This enabled me to assess whether government 
expenditures are deployed in such way that the current family policy 
measures attain the envisaged objective. In doing so, I devoted 
considerable attention to the role of policy design. It is now time for 
fitting the pieces of the puzzle together. 
8.1 FOR WHOSE BENEFIT? 
The Matthew effect is the moniker given to the phenomenon that the 
rich tend to get richer while the poor tend to stay poor. In social policy, 
the Matthew effect indicates that higher income groups benefit more 
from social policy measures than the lower income groups, an 
unintended yet often dysfunctional by-product of deliberate policy 
action. To investigate whether this phenomenon could also be discerned 
in the three mainstays of family policy in developed welfare states, I 
looked into 1) the social distribution of the outcomes of child benefits, 
parental leave, and childcare services; and 2) the allocation of 
government spending for these measures across different social groups. 
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The results from chapter 2 clearly demonstrate that for families 
with a youngest child aged 0-6 years, the uptake of parental leave 
schemes and the use of formal childcare services is biased in favour of 
higher income families and families with higher educated mothers. In 
contrast, child benefits are allocated more equally across the income 
distribution for the age group under consideration. Chapter 5 sketched a 
similar picture for childcare service use amongst children aged 0-3 years: 
children living in a household with a low skilled mother use childcare 
services to a much lesser extent than children living in a higher skilled 
household. In that chapter I formulated the hypothesis that a Matthew 
effect in childcare service use is likely to counteract the anticipated 
objective of government investment in childcare policies. Under the 
social investment paradigm, childcare services are put forward as an 
effective means to mitigate inequalities in early life. The fact that the 
social distribution of its use is biased in favour of children growing up in 
higher income families leads me to conclude that this strategy will fail to 
deliver. Similarly, if the objective of child benefits is to reduce child 
poverty, the phenomenon of the Matthew effect will make government 
investment in child benefits less effective. Indeed, chapter 4 showed 
that child benefit systems in which low income families receive higher 
benefits compared with higher income families are more successful in 
reducing child poverty. In contrast, countries in which higher incomes 
receive higher child benefits, the performance in terms of poverty 
reduction is weak. Viewing the outcomes of family policy measures 
through Matthew’s lens provides us with insights on their effectiveness 
which would have been concealed otherwise.  
The results demonstrate that we have good reasons to care about 
the social distribution of the benefits of family policy measures. It 
cannot be assumed that families from different social and economic 
backgrounds will react in a homogeneous way to the options and 
opportunities shaped by family policies. How families, in casu mothers 
and fathers, react to policies aimed at the care-employment nexus not 
only depends on policy specifics, but also on the context-specific nature 
of human agency and the unequal distribution of opportunities (Goodin 
1998), for instance in the labour market. The inequality in childcare 
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coverage is indeed strongly related to labour market participation: the 
more employment opportunities are expanded over the income 
distribution, the lower inequality in childcare use will be (chapter 5). It is 
sometimes argued that the post-industrial society has freed itself from 
social class and traditional bonds (e.g. Beck 1992), and transformed into 
a place where everyone has the opportunity to be, in William Henley’s 
words, the master of his own fate. Time and again, however, research 
shows that people are just as determined by their background and social 
context as they were half a century ago (Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992; 
Pintelon et al. 2013). The findings of this dissertation confirm that this 
also holds for ‘new’ risk policies such as childcare services and parental 
leave schemes. 
8.2 ARE MATTHEW EFFECTS UNAVOIDABLE? 
One of the premises I adopted in the introductory chapter of this 
dissertation is that Matthew effects are not inevitable. When it comes to 
parental leave, however, the Matthew effect is a universal observation: 
thus far no country succeeds in equalizing its uptake across the income 
distribution. This is a rather obvious consequence of the nature of such 
schemes because parental leave uptake is closely tied to labour market 
participation. Given the unequal participation of women in the labour 
market, with lower skilled women (and mothers in particular) reporting 
lower employment rates compared with their middle and higher skilled 
counterparts, the Matthew effect is likely to be inextricably bound to 
parental leave schemes. The unequal distribution of parental leave is 
only partially explained by differences in employment, however. In 
Sweden, where the social gap in employment rates is low (see chapter 3), 
the Matthew effect occurs as well. This might be due to the types of 
jobs held by parents in the lowest tiers of the labour market, or the 
system of remuneration (which is related to previous earnings, hence 
works to the advantage of higher earners) might impede leave use for 
families with insufficient resources. 
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For childcare services, matters are different: Denmark, Iceland, and 
to a lesser extent Sweden do succeed in avoiding a Matthew effect. 
Childcare services in these countries are widely used across the income 
distribution and as a result, coverage rates are high and inequality is low. 
Giuliano Bonoli (2007) has argued persuasively that ‘time matters’ in the 
development of social policy, and that certainly holds true for family 
policy. Countries that were confronted with new needs stemming from 
the post-industrial transition and the increase in female labour market 
participation, and consequently reoriented their policies early on, now 
yield much better results in terms of equity. Does it follow that it might 
only be a matter of time before other countries join the ranks of these 
frontrunners in achieving high childcare coverage rates whilst avoiding a 
Matthew effect? Alas, the findings from chapter 7 do not give us too 
much of a reason to be that optimistic. In the period from 2005 to 2009, 
there was no convergence in spending levels. As a corollary, in the 2006-
2010 period there was no convergence in childcare coverage rates. 
Although the data point to a modest decrease of inequality across 
European countries, above all there still is a great deal of variation 
between countries.  
The results from the analyses I have done throughout this 
dissertation suggest that we should not (and presumably cannot) count 
on achieving equity over time without a substantial boost in the 
spending effort of governments. To be precise, in order to decrease 
inequality in childcare use, public spending on childcare should lead to 
an across the board increase in childcare availability. The results from 
chapter 6 brings me to the conclusion that the most effective way to 
achieve this objective is through a supply-side commitment. Generally 
speaking, the more places that are publicly subsidized or provided by 
(local) governments, the lower the level of inequality in its use amongst 
young children. Moreover, these childcare services generally achieve a 
more consistent level of quality. Given the importance of childcare 
quality for child development, an issue I have discussed in chapter 5, 
this is an important consideration from a social investment point-of-
view. 
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However, in chapter 7 I have shown that some countries have 
simultaneously achieved higher coverage rates and lower levels of 
inequality in childcare use through demand-side subsidies and 
stimulating for-profit service provision. Irrespective of the issue of 
quality, the jury is still out on the most effective policy strategy to 
achieve the best outcomes in terms of equity. Drawing on the varieties 
of capitalism literature, Kimberly Morgan (2005) juxtaposes two policy 
trajectories for countries to achieve high levels childcare coverage. On 
the one hand, in countries with a liberal market economy (e.g. the 
United Kingdom) childcare demands are catered for by for-profit 
providers whilst government involvement is limited to targeted service 
provision for a small share of low income families and subsidizing 
parents through tax credits and/or vouchers. In such countries, a 
private market can flourish because of the availability of a low-wage, 
low-skill social service workforce. On the other hand, in coordinated 
market economies (e.g. Sweden) private services are much more difficult 
to sustain because labour markets are more regulated; hence the social 
service workforce is less flexible and more expensive. Here, private 
market provision will not deliver high levels of coverage and extensive 
childcare service development can only occur through massive public 
investment (Bonoli and Remer 2010). Therefore, it might be the case 
that the kind of spending leading to equality in childcare outcomes will 
be dependent on a particular country’s institutional features and path 
dependent labour market structure and social policy development. 
Unfortunately, providing a definite answer to this question is at present 
not possible due to data constraints (infra). At this point, a 
straightforward and (admittedly) simple conclusion is this: whatever 
policy trajectory chosen, ensuring equality in childcare use across 
children from different social backgrounds will require governments to 
step up their spending efforts. 
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8.3 THE ROLE OF POLICY DESIGN 
Not only spending is important, policy design is an equally crucial factor 
in explaining the social distribution of the benefits of family policy 
measures. Case studies for Sweden and the Belgian region of Flanders in 
chapter 2 and chapter 3 allowed for an in-depth investigation of the 
allocation of government budgets for family policy and the role of 
policy design. The analyses showed that the lower income families are 
the main beneficiaries of spending on childcare services in Sweden, 
while the opposite is true in Flanders. This is not only the result of 
different patterns of maternal labour market participation, but also 
stems from differences in policy design. In Sweden, a place in childcare 
is guaranteed, public funds are geared towards service supply, and the 
tariff system is related to disposable income. In Flanders, a similar 
income-related tariff system is in place, but no guarantee exists. 
Moreover, governmental outlays are not only used to subsidize the 
provision of services but also to compensate parents of young children 
for their childcare expenses through a tax deduction scheme. This tax 
deduction scheme is more beneficial for families higher up in the 
income distribution; hence the Matthew effect occurs. 
This also sheds light on the importance of the internal consistency 
of policy initiatives. In Flanders, for instance, the impact of the income-
related tariff structure is undone by the simultaneous implementation of 
a tax deduction scheme. In a similar vein, in chapter 1 and chapter 5 I 
discussed the Finnish case where a place in childcare is guaranteed while 
at the same time a home-care allowance (HCA) is in place. Both policies 
work in opposite directions: childcare services serve to reconcile the 
presence of children in the household with paid work; a home-care 
allowance serves to allow parents (mothers in particular) to refrain from 
paid work and become a homemaker. Finally, in chapter 6 I used 
regression analysis to disentangle the institutional determinants related 
to inequality in childcare coverage. The results suggested that long 
periods of well-paid leave effectively counteract childcare use. In sum, if 
the objective is to include children growing up in low income families 
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into high-quality childcare, which is the main idea behind the child-
centred investment strategy, a consistent policy strategy should be 
pursued.  
8.4 DIRECTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
In his famous 1918 speech Science as a vocation (Wissenschaft als Beruf), 
Max Weber argued that “every scientific ‘fulfilment’ raises new ‘questions’; it 
asks to be ‘surpassed’ and outdated” (Weber, 1919, cited in Weber 1991, 
138). The results I have presented in this dissertation are no exception 
to this general rule. 
First of all, we need more data. I’m well aware of the fact that this is 
an often-heard outcry among social scientists. But in the case of family 
policy research it is a genuine problem up to the point that if scientific 
progress is to be made, acquiring more data becomes indispensable. For 
example, the finding that not spending as such but the manner in which 
resources are spent is important to achieve more equality in service use, 
allows to formulate new hypotheses on the impact of a demand-side, 
supply-side, or a mixed strategy in providing government subsidies for 
childcare services. To advance our knowledge on this policy-relevant 
issue, we need data allowing to differentiate between spending on 
demand-side and supply-side subsidies, or between spending on not-
for-profit and for-profit providers. Such data is however not available. 
An alternative would be to use data on the share of childcare places that 
are publicly or privately provided, as I have done in chapter 6. It is 
however unclear whether these figures are cross-country comparable 
and reliable, and there is no recent data available. The systematic 
collection of childcare data began in the 1980s in the wake of the 
formation of the European Commission Childcare Network in 1986. In the 
three reports issued by the Network, problems with the childcare data 
collected from governments were manifold: not comparable, unreliable, 
often missing, and “extremely inadequate” when it came to the extent 
and forms of private provision (Randall 2000, 349). Although many of 
these problems have been addressed with the introduction and 
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availability of EU-SILC data, several of the gaps and issues with the 
reliability of the data remain relevant still.  
This brings me to the second point: we need better data. Wolfgang 
Keck and Chiara Saraceno (2011) have recently published a report in 
which they scrutinize the reliability of the childcare data in the EU-SILC 
database. They conclude that the data are not reliable for more than half 
of the countries, presumably because the sample sizes are too small. In 
my own analyses, this proved to be problematic in particular for 
countries with low levels of childcare use such as Czech Republic and 
Slovak Republic. To improve the reliability of the data, one solution is 
to calculate confidence intervals for the coverage rates (see Goedemé 
2013for further reading) and to perform statistical tests for comparing 
means. I have done so in chapters 5 and6; unfortunately, Eurostat 
provides no information on the appropriate weighing procedure for the 
childcare variables. Moreover, Keck and Saraceno (2011) suggest that 
responses to the questions on childcare use are not always consistent. 
Respondents are asked to provide weekly caring hours for their children 
in different institutional settings (childminders, center-based services, 
pre-primary school, et cetera) during a regular week. Keck and Saraceno 
(2011) discuss the example of Germany for which the distribution of 
the responses suggests that a fair share of parents have provided the 
number of days per week instead of the requested hours per week. Such 
inconsistencies are difficult to take into account. Finally, given the small 
sample sizes in EU-SILC, it is not feasible to include the regional level 
as a unit of analysis. Given the great variety in childcare coverage rates 
and childcare availability within some countries (Italy, Germany, and 
Belgium are cases in point), adopting a regional perspective in issues of 
childcare inequality would nevertheless be a desirable step for further 
research. 
Third, family policy outcomes should be analysed in a 
comprehensive, analytical framework. Most research in the realm of 
family policy thus far has focused on a single policy area, for instance 
the impact of leave or childcare on particular outcomes (Hegewisch and 
Gornick 2011). In this dissertation as well, I have separately assessed the 
outcomes of three measures of family policy. For instance, I have 
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shown in chapter 6 that the implementation of long periods of well-paid 
leave as an institutional feature of welfare states is related to higher 
inequality in childcare use. A next research step would be to combine 
data on childcare use with data on parental leave uptake in order the 
assess its combined impact on care and employment decisions amongst 
families with young children from different social backgrounds. This 
requires a dataset in which this kind of information is reliably asked for 
a sufficient sample of families with young children. 
Fourth, future research attempts to take the Matthew effect into 
account should take due account of intensity of care use and intensity of 
labour market participation. In chapter 5, I employed a full-time 
equivalent measure (FTE) of childcare use but a simple, binary 
headcount measure of employment. I found out that inequality in 
childcare use amongst young children disappeared in several countries 
when only taking working mothers into account. Obviously, 
employment is not a binary event in real life; how does the intensity of 
work relate to the intensity of childcare use and parental leave uptake? It 
is well established in the literature that part-time work might be more 
readily available for low skilled women (De Henau, Meulders and 
O'Dorchai 2010; Fagan and Rubery 1996). Moreover, recent research on 
the impact of high-quality childcare services use on school readiness and 
labour market outcomes suggest that part-time care is as effective as 
fulltime care in terms of child development (Sylva et al. 2010). Suppose 
low skilled women follow a part-time strategy in work and care while 
high skilled mothers follow a fulltime care/fulltime work strategy. Both 
strategies may be desirable from a social investment point-of-view, and 
further research should take this into account. 
Finally, the debate on childcare inequality needs to be pushed 
further empirically. One of the future research endeavours is to relate 
data on income mobility and intergenerational earnings elasticity (e.g. 
Corak 2006) or data on educational outcomes (such as PISA, e.g. 
OECD 2012c) to inequality in childcare service use. This would allow to 
empirically test the hypothesis that inequality in childcare use might 
increase rather than mitigate social inequalities. 
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8.5 FAMILY POLICY AND THE FUTURE OF SOCIAL 
INVESTMENT? 
Elsewhere with Bea Cantillon I have criticized the social investment 
perspective for failing to address the issue of class and the issue of care 
(Cantillon and Van Lancker 2013). In this dissertation, both dimensions 
converge to an inseparable unit of analysis. What do the results learn 
with regards to the future success of the social investment strategy? 
Under the social investment paradigm, labour market integration is 
not only regarded a superior way to achieve income protection and 
social inclusion at the individual level, but also an indispensable feature 
of ‘productive’ social policy systems because higher employment levels 
decrease benefit dependency and contribute to sound public finances, 
hence to the future sustainability of the welfare state. The prime channel 
to achieve this ideal of social inclusion through labour market 
participation is long-term investment in human capital, to begin in early 
life (Hemerijck 2012a). Family policy measures such as parental leave 
and in particular childcare services are an important part of the social 
policy package to achieve both objectives of higher employment rates 
and early life investment in human capital. This should be in particular 
beneficial for children from a disadvantaged background, ultimately 
breaking the intergenerational chain of poverty.  
The results from chapters 2, 3 and 5 suggest, however, that the 
expectations regarding the benefits of early human capital investment 
policies for reducing poverty and inequality may be too optimistic due 
to the presence of a Matthew effect. More specific, in the domain of 
childcare a Matthew effect is dysfunctional and emerges as a first-order 
as well as a second-order effect. The intended objective to break the 
intergenerational chain of poverty will not be achieved as long as its use 
is socially stratified and as long as the higher incomes benefit more from 
these policies compared with the lower incomes. Moreover, it might 
even exacerbate rather than mitigate social inequalities in the long run.  
Given the prevalence of the Matthew effect in the use of childcare 
services in the majority of European welfare states, a child-centred 
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investment strategy is not likely to achieve short-term progress in 
mitigating inequalities in early life. This is significant, because the 
consequences of growing up in poverty are far-reaching. First, it is well 
established that child poverty has adverse long-term effects on the life 
chances of these children as well as on their opportunities to become 
future productive adults (Duncan et al. 1998; Hackman, Farah and 
Meaney 2010). Second, given the inheritance of social inequality, 
children growing up in poverty have a great chance of becoming poor 
parents themselves (Corak 2006). In short, children growing up in 
poverty face inferior life chances and low levels of social mobility, and 
one can easily assume that the externalities of childrearing in poor 
circumstances will be negative. As a matter of fact, little progress has 
been made in combating child poverty in developed welfare states over 
the last decades (Chen and Corak 2008; TARKI 2010). Moreover, 
families with lower incomes have far less financial, human and social 
capital at their disposable to invest in their children compared with 
higher income households, with adverse consequences for child 
development (Bradley and Corwyn 2002). Research for the US, for 
instance, shows that high-income families spend about seven times 
more on their children than low-income families (Kaushal, Magnuson 
and Waldfogel 2011). For social investment proponents, this is a 
deplorable conclusion.  
Enter child benefits. A large body of research has demonstrated 
that child benefits are of paramount importance in policy strategies for 
reducing child poverty (Bradshaw 2012; Kamerman et al. 2003; 
Salanauskaite and Verbist 2013). Chapter 4 has shown how child benefit 
systems have the potential to achieve a substantial reduction of child 
poverty. Given the fact that the resources available to parents is the 
strongest determinant of parental investment (Kornrich and 
Furstenberg 2013), child benefits are capable of providing families with 
sufficient resources to ensure the well-being of their children. In the 
social investment literature, however, the issue of income protection 
through cash benefits is regarded in a rather ambiguous way and often 
pejoratively referred to as being ‘passive’ (in contrast to ‘active’ or 
‘activating’ services). This can be traced back to the different intellectual 
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and political influences that have shaped the social investment 
perspective in different countries (Morel, Palier and Palme 2012). Case 
in point is the fact that the two key publications underpinning the 
intellectual framework of social investment, i.e. The Third Way (Giddens 
1998) and Why we need a new welfare state (Esping-Andersen et al. 2002), 
are at odds regarding the role of social protection. While social 
investment as put forward by Giddens (1998) should ultimately replace 
traditional forms of social protection, an interpretation that heavily 
influenced Third Way politics, Esping-Andersen (2002) draws on the 
Scandinavian variety of social investment to argue against Giddens that 
social investment and traditional social protection are both 
indispensable: “income security is a precondition for an effective social 
investment strategy” (Esping-Andersen et al. 2002). Therefore, both old 
and new forms of family policy should be the mainstay of any successful 
social investment. 
I hope that my work will convince the reader that viewing the 
outcomes of family policy through Matthew’s lens is both necessary and 
illuminating. Max Weber wrote that “in science, each of us knows that what he 
has accomplished will be antiquated in ten, twenty, fifty years” (Weber 1919; cited 
in Weber 1991, 138 ). I eagerly await my results to become outdated, for 
that would mean that the Matthew effect in family policy outcomes has 
been remedied. 
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ANNEX 
Table A-1. Income cases and targeting indicator, 2009 
 Income cases TI Size Generosity RPRE RGAPRE 
 2AW AW MW SA      
AT 366,122 389,709 417,852 366,1223 -0,004 2,22 17,8 55,8 80,2 
BE 330,491 330,491 340,719 396,5124 -0,065 1,64 18,5 31,3 63,1 
BG 82,3929 82,39289 82,3929 82,3929 0 1,04 12,2 11,2 30,6 
CZ 92,2643 92,2643 257,096 164,832 -
0,4760 
0,93 19,0 33,6 58,0 
DE 307,033 307,033  307,033 0 1,78 15,2 38,6 71,3 
DK 165,772 165,772  165,772 0 0,99 6,1 34,3 60,4 
EE 88,8376 88,8376 49,6994 49,6994 0,147 1,82 5,8 37,3 58,8 
ES 92,6935 79,4516 49,7085 49,7085 0,172 0,22 3,2 2,5 5,2 
FI 169,914 169,914  169,914 0 1,6 5,6 51,4 80,1 
FR 247,082 274,509 289,662 164,572 0,089 1,37 11,1 39,0 70,4 
GR 156,209 115,537 58,8264  0,376 0,27 4,1 3,2 9,0 
HU 150,266 150,266 150,266 150,266 0 2,14 19,5 51,0 83,4 
IE 264,685 264,685 393,839 264,685 -0,053 3,31 18,1 55,2 81,0 
IT 145,326 199,512 358,228 0 -0,056 0,47 10,2 13,6 26,5 
LT 64,5287 64,5287 64,5287 45,0402 0,101 2,11 7,9 33,1 47,9 
LU   550,805 564,974 -0,026 1,75 18,2 45,9 76,3 
LV 86,915 86,915 44,428 32,840 0,250 1,64 5,6 18,6 38,7 
NL 283,057 165,079 248,775 248,617 -0,030 0,73 11,5 32,3 65,6 
NO 159,660 159,660  159,660 0 1,3 6,0 38,6 63,1 
PL 73,759 73,759 69,450 50,940 0,108 0,55 6,9 19,5 41,9 
PT 45,646 73,066 60,3839 59,5759 -0,138 0,54 5,4 13,2 35,2 
RO 41,773 62,742 69,003 65,245 -0,182 0,69 16,5 14,2 40,5 
SE 192,800 192,800  192,800 0 1,42 9,1 40,0 63,1 
SI 133,078 305,407 264,044 264,044 -0,387 1,43 17,2 38,1 69,3 
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SK 111,042 111,042 111,042 58,1624 0,159 0,91 8,8 26,2 51,3 
UK 167,4666 220,436 653,321 653,321 -0,760 1,73 33,4 40,7 72,0 
Source: CSB MIPI Database and EU-SILC 2010. Note: for the income cases: monthly 
amounts, expressed in €PPP, for a couple family with two children (7 and 14 years 
old). There is no statutory minimum wage in DE, DK, FI and NO. The minimum 
wage scenario for Italy is based on Monthly contractual wage for the lowest 
qualification level in the fur and leather sector. GR lacks a social safety net for able-
bodied persons. Size is expressed in % of GDP, generosity as % of the poverty line. 
225 
 
Table A-2. FTE formal childcare coverage across educational levels, and 
inequality indices 
 FTE formal childcare coverage 
Age-adjusted 
SII 
RII N 
 Educational level Weighted mean    
 
Low Medium High  coef (SE)   
AT 8.0 10.9 24.6 13.8 9.527 (2.03) 0.689 458 
AU 10.7 17.2 18.3 16.9 3.242 (1.36) 0.192 809 
BE 18.5 38.4 44.8 37.3 12.222 (1.96) 0.328 622 
BG 3.8 7.9 31.1 10.9 10.597 (2.16) 0.969 308 
CY 21.2 27.4 35.3 31.1 10.973 (4.34) 0.353 230 
CZ 2.7 2.7 4.4 3.0 1.494 (1.00) 0.492 695 
DE 18.1 21.7 31.3 25.0 9.952 (2.20) 0.397 725 
DK 75.8 74.0 75.2 73.1 -0.758 (2.36) -0.010 499 
EE 36.5 23.0 32.1 28.8 2.989 (2.46) 0.104 403 
ES 24.0 33.5 41.5 34.0 9.718 (1.42) 0.286 1057 
FI 11.7 21.7 31.3 26.0 8.894 (1.98) 0.342 857 
FR 17.2 40.7 70.7 49.7 26.654 (1.87) 0.536 864 
GR 15.1 7.0 24.8 15.8 8.381 (2.01) 0.532 557 
HU 6.3 9.0 16.0 10.2 5.585 (1.65) 0.546 626 
IE 6.7 9.5 28.6 17.0 13.725 (2.05) 0.808 418 
IS 57.4 56.7 59.1 58.0 4.107 (2.18) 0.071 400 
IT 26.3 36.3 38.5 33.5 7.602 (1.26) 0.227 1681 
LT 2.4 9.6 32.5 19.7 16.547 (3.48) 0.840 207 
LU 21.2 27.2 50.6 35.5 15.841 (1.79) 0.446 645 
LV 13.8 18.5 30.8 21.2 9.403 (2.20) 0.443 461 
MT 40.2 34.4 36.5 37.6 -2.049 (3.16) -0.055 295 
NL 18.3 34.7 53.5 40.4 18.140 (1.60) 0.449 909 
NO 35.2 41.9 53.6 45.1 9.482 (2.46) 0.210 507 
PL 2.1 3.2 14.0 6.8 8.558 (1.20) 1.253 1195 
PT 42.5 64.0 50.8 48.3 6.911 (3.68) 0.143 243 
RO 3.5 9.0 14.4 8.0 6.618 (2.06) 0.832 275 
SE 42.1 63.6 69.4 63.9 11.157 (2.46) 0.175 596 
SI 19.7 33.4 40.4 35.3 7.692 (2.15) 0.218 803 
SK - 3.8 3.6 3.5 1.779 (1.68) 0.516 356 
UK 8.6 10.9 30.1 17.2 13.493 (1.96) 0.787 525 
US 20.3 33.0 44.3 38.8 11.800 (1.04) 0.304 3855 
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Source: own calculations on EU-SILC 2009, HILDA 2010 and NHES ECPP 2005. 
Selection: children under three years old. (-) = no observations. SII refers to the “slope 
index of inequality” and RII stands for “relative index of inequality”. Please refer to 
the main text for an explanation of these concepts. 
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Table A-3 Overview of indicators 
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AT 9.7 17  9 0.4 3.7 28.1 16.0 85 
AU 11.0 13  25.45 0.4 0 81.0 23.1 42 
BE 7.6 4  34.2 0.7 3.4 31.4 32.8 33 
BG 17.7 11  7 0.8 25.3 265.7 29.7 54 
CY 38.7 16  17.7 0.3 4.1 24.0 28.9 81 
CZ 13.4 11  8 0.4 6.4 6.8 16.0 38 
DE 4.3 14  10.2 0.5 15.4 41.0 17.8 58 
DK 0.0 11 Yes 56 1.4 12.1 9.6 57.7 5 
EE 12.3 7 Yes 22 0.4 18.9 98.0 23.0 62 
ES 12.4 8  16.6 0.6 3.7 28.1 38.7 56 
FI 1.8 12 Yes 21 1.8 9.2 0.0 12.9 13 
FR 8.8 9  43 1.3 3.7 28.1 38.9 34 
GR 45.9 5  7 0.1 10.1 1.2 22.3 69 
HU 7.0 6  6 0.7 24.9 252.8 10.6 64 
IE 12.1 45  15 0.4 0 81.0 14.9 31 
IS 3.3 8  - 0.9 3.0 36.2 44.3 20 
IT 16.3 -  11.4 0.7 4.6 19.4 34.7 82 
LT 11.1 12  18 0.6 26.1 292.4 37.0 83 
LU 8.1 5  14 0.4 3.7 28.1 45.9 64 
LV 8.7 11  16 0.6 13.7 22.1 31.9 74 
MT 10.8 22  - 0.6 0 81.0 23.4 - 
NL 14.1 6  14.5 0.9 3.7 28.1 50.0 35 
NO 2.0 17 Yes 37 1.3 12.0 9.0 47.2 35 
PL 23.5 7  2 0.3 4.1 24.0 18.7 64 
PT 26.2 3  19 0.5 3.7 28.1 56.8 69 
RO 43.0 -  - 0.8 26.0 289.0 30.1 57 
SE 0.5 6 Yes 49.8 1.6 12.8 14.4 32.6 43 
SI 20.6 9  27 0.5 11.9 8.4 49.2 44 
SK 12.7 7  17.7 0.4 0.0 81.0 8.6 52 
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UK 12.4 10  26 0.8 1.5 56.3 27.4 30 
US 13.1 34  35.5 0.3 0 81.0 24.5 31 
Mea
n 
13.4 11.9  20.9 0.6 8.6 66.9 30.5 50.3 
SD 29.4 8.9  13.6 0.3 8.3 85.9 13.5 21.3 
N 31 29 31 28 31 31 31 31 30 
Note: (-) = no information available. Sources and operationalization of these indicators 
in Table 6-2. Indicator ‘coverage’ can be found in Table A-2.  
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Table A-4 Unstandardized and standardized coefficients from OLS regression 
models predicting RII (robust standard errors) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 b (SE) β b (SE) β b (SE) β 
Coverage -1.037  
* 
(.289) -.618       
Cost .001 (.005) -.019       
Social right -.096 (.096) -.122       
Supply    -.015  
* 
(.005) -.723    
Government 
spending 
   .178 (.130) .236    
Maternal 
employment 
      -.683  
* 
(.290) -.319 
Attitudes       .100 (.176) .073 
Parental 
leave  
      -.007 (.007) -.190 
Parental 
leave² 
      .002  
* 
(.001) .490 
Informal 
care 
      .508 (.297) .200 
          
R² .468 .341 .419 
N 29 28 30 
Note: Significance: * p < 0.05. Please refer to the main text for data explanations 
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NEDERLANDSTALIGE 
SAMENVATTING 
Centraal in dit werk staat het Mattheuseffect, genoemd naar een passus 
uit het evangelie van Mattheus (13,12): “Want aan ieder die heeft, zal gegeven 
worden en wel overvloedig. Maar aan degene die niet heeft, zal zelfs nog ontnomen 
worden wat hij heeft.” Eerder empirisch werk heeft inderdaad aangetoond 
dat veel maatschappelijke fenomenen en processen gekenmerkt worden 
door een Mattheuseffect.  
In het sociaal beleid betekent het Mattheuseffect dat het profijt van 
het overheidsbeleid vooral ten goede komt aan de midden- en hogere 
inkomensgroepen en minder aan de laagste inkomens. Herman Deleeck, 
bijvoorbeeld, was een van de eersten om dit fenomeen systematisch te 
analyseren in relatie tot het sociaal beleid. Zijn onderzoek voor de jaren 
zeventig wees uit dat bijvoorbeeld de kinderbijslagen in België vooral 
ten goede kwamen aan rijkere gezinnen. De reden hiervoor was 
tweeledig: enerzijds hadden de rijkere gezinnen gemiddeld gesproken 
iets meer kinderen en stroomden die kinderen veel vaker door naar het 
hoger onderwijs (compositie-effect); anderzijds waren de kinderbijlsagen 
erg universeel georiënteerd (beleidseffect). Deze universele oriëntatie wil 
zeggen dat de uitgaven voor de kinderbijslagen ongeveer in gelijke mate 
ten goede kwamen aan alle gezinnen met kinderen, ongeacht het 
inkomen van het gezin in kwestie. Het compositie-effect en het 
beleidseffect samen zorgden er voor dat de kinderbijslagen de rijken 
rijker maakten.  
In dit werk onderzoek ik de uitkomsten van het hedendaagse 
gezinsbeleid, en daarvoor gebruik ik de observatie van het 
Mattheuseffect als analytisch kader. Twee vragen staan centraal: 1) Wie 
plukt de vruchten van overheidsinvesteringen in het gezinsbeleid?; en 2) 
wat zijn hiervan de implicaties voor de doelstellingen van de 
overheidsinvesteringen in het gezinsbeleid? Met andere woorden, is er 
ook vandaag een Mattheuseffect werkzaam in het gezinsbeleid, hoe 
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manifesteert zich dat, en wat zijn daarvan de gevolgen? Ik focus daarbij 
op drie beleidsinstrumenten: kinderopvang, ouderschapsverlof en 
kinderbijslagen. 
Beleidskeuzes dragen inherent een doelstelling in zich mee, i.e. wat 
men met het beleid en dito overheidsuitgaven wil bereiken, maar dat 
impliceert niet noodzakelijk dat deze doelstelling ook echt wordt behaald. 
Meerdere beleidsdoelstellingen kunnen bovendien ook met elkaar 
conflicteren. We weten bijvoorbeeld dat de toename van 
arbeidsparticipatie door vrouwen tot op heden een ‘emancipatie in twee 
snelheden’ is geweest: het veralgemeend tweeverdienersschap is eerst en 
vooral een zaak van hoger geschoolde en niet van lager geschoolde 
vrouwen. De werkgelegenheidspatronen verschillen dus erg sterk tussen 
lage en hoge inkomensgezinnen. Als de verzoening van arbeid en gezin 
een doelstelling is van het kinderopvangbeleid, dan is de implicatie dat 
het gebruik van kinderopvang vooral bij de hogere inkomensgroepen 
geconcentreerd zou moeten zijn. Als beleidsmakers kinderopvang echter 
willen inzetten als instrument om de arbeidsmarktdeelname van 
moeders die nu nog niet actief zijn aan te moedigen, dan moet het 
gebruik van opvang geconcentreerd zijn bij de lagere inkomensgroepen 
(waarin werkloze en lager geschoolde kostwinnersgezinnen 
oververtegenwoordigd zijn). Kijken naar de gevolgen van het 
gezinsbeleid ‘door de bril van Mattheus’ is dan dienstig om deze 
doelstellingen te evalueren.  
De socioloog Robert Merton merkte reeds in de jaren dertig op dat 
beleidsdaden soms ook onbedoelde gevolgen hebben. Het gaat om 
gevolgen van bepaalde beleidskeuzes die niet zijn voorzien en dus geen 
beleidsdoelstelling zijn, maar die wel een negatief effect kunnen hebben. 
Als de overheid met haar kinderopvangbeleid de doelstelling nastreeft 
om arbeid en gezin met elkaar in overeenstemming te brengen, dan is de 
consequentie dat deze overheidsmiddelen vooral ten goede komen aan 
gezinnen die al tot de hogere inkomensgroepen behoren. Met andere 
woorden, de hogere inkomensgroepen hebben relatief gezien meer 
profijt van het overheidsbeleid dan de lage inkomensgroepen. Dat is 
niet noodzakelijk de bedoeling van een beleid om arbeid en gezin met 
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elkaar te verzoenen. Ook voor de onbedoelde gevolgen van het beleid is 
het Mattheuseffect dus een nuttig analysekader.  
Kinderbijslagen zijn een ‘oude’ vorm van gezinsbeleid; het is vooral 
de bedoeling om voor een aanvullend inkomen te zorgen voor gezinnen 
met kinderen om zo de kost van de kinderlast te helpen dragen. De 
institutionalisering van de kinderbijslagen verliep parallel met het 
ontstaan en de uitbreiding van de klassieke welvaart tijdens de trentes 
glorieuses na de Tweede Wereldoorlog. 
Sinds de jaren zeventig hebben zich structurele veranderingen 
voorgedaan op zowel de arbeidsmarkt als in de samenleving, en daarbij 
is de sociaaleconomische context waarin welvaartsstaten zijn verankerd 
grondig gewijzigd. De overgang naar een kenniseconomie, veranderende 
gezinsstructuren en de vrouwenemancipatie leidden tot een toename 
van de arbeidsdeelname door vrouwen en parallel hiermee het 
verdwijnen van het klassieke kostwinnersmodel ten voordele van een 
veralgemeend tweeverdienersschap. De instrumenten van de klassieke 
welvaartsstaat, die vooral waren gericht op het beschermen tegen de 
zogenoemde oude sociale risico’s (bijv. werkloosheid, pensioen, ziekte, 
kinderen) waren niet toereikend om de nieuwe behoeften, die 
samenhangen met de vergrote intreding van vrouwen op de 
arbeidsmarkt en de gewijzigde gezinspatronen, voldoende te 
ondervangen. Het afstemmen van betaalde arbeid op ouderlijke zorg 
voor de kinderen werd derhalve een belangrijk politiek thema voor 
beleidsmakers, met name in het licht van Europese ambities (i.e. de 
Lissabon-strategie en de daaropvolgende EU2020-strategie) om 
arbeidsparticipatie van vrouwen nog verder te verhogen. Kinderopvang 
en ouderschapsverlof, die de combinatie arbeid en gezin mogelijk 
maken, zijn dan ook relatieve ‘nieuwe’ instrumenten van het 
gezinsbeleid.  
In plaats van de klassieke welvaartsstaat spreken we nu over de 
‘sociale investeringsstaat’ waarin het sociaal beleid meer en meer wordt 
aangewend om mensen weerbaar te maken om zelf hun plaats in de 
arbeidsmarkt te kunnen veroveren, in plaats van mensen te beschermen 
door middel van cash uitkeringen voor het geval ze naast de 
arbeidsmarkt vallen. Dat gaat samen met een verscherpte focus op 
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investeren in jonge kinderen. Hoogkwalitatieve kinderopvang wordt 
daarbij gepromoot als het beleidsinstrument par excellence om de latere 
kansen in het onderwijs en op de arbeidsmarkt te verzekeren van 
kinderen die opgroeien in armoede. De vraag is of deze 
beleidsdoelstellingen realiseerbaar zijn, en aan wie de overheidsmiddelen 
voor het gezinsbeleid nu eigenlijk ten goede komen.  
In hoofdstuk 2 beantwoord ik twee vragen in vergelijkend 
perspectief: 1) zijn de overheidsmiddelen voor de nieuwe vormen van 
gezinsbeleid (kinderopvang en ouderschapsverlof) toegenomen, en ging 
dat ten koste van de uitgaven voor kinderbijslagen?; en 2) maken 
gezinnen met een verschillende sociale achtergrond in gelijke mate 
gebruik van deze beleidsmaatregelen? Ik focus daarbij op kinderen 
jonger dan zes jaar. De resultaten tonen ten eerste dat de uitgaven voor 
zowel kinderopvang als ouderschapsverlof gestegen zijn in bijna alle 
Europese landen, maar dat dit niet ten koste ging van de uitgaven voor 
kinderbijslagen die vaak ook stegen. De resultaten tonen ten tweede dat 
het gebruik van ouderschapsverlof en kinderopvang erg ongelijk is 
verdeeld: jonge kinderen die opgroeien in een gezin met een laag 
inkomen maken veel minder gebruik van kinderopvangvoorzieningen 
dan kinderen die opgroeien in een gezin met een hoger inkomen. De 
ongelijkheid is erg uitgesproken in de leeftijdsgroep van 0 tot 3 jaar. Met 
uitzondering van Denemarken en in mindere mate Zweden, slaagt geen 
enkel land er in om in een gelijk gebruik van opvang te voorzien voor 
alle kinderen ongeacht hun sociale achtergrond. In veel landen is het 
gemiddeld opvanggebruik ook erg laag. Voor de oudere kinderen is de 
ongelijkheid over het algemeen beperkter, onder meer omdat in een 
aantal landen universele kleuterschool bestaat. Wat ouderschapsverlof 
betreft krijgen we een gelijkaardig beeld: laaggeschoolde moeders van 
jonge kinderen maken veel minder gebruik van verlofregelingen dan 
hoger geschoolde moeders. De kinderbijslagen daarentegen zijn vandaag 
veel gelijker verdeeld over inkomensgroepen.  
In hoofdstuk 3 presenteer ik een casestudy van het 
kinderopvangbeleid in Zweden en Vlaanderen. In Vlaanderen wordt het 
kinderopvangbeleid duidelijk gekenmerkt door een Mattheuseffect. De 
overheidsinvesteringen komen in grotere mate terecht bij de hogere 
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inkomens dan bij de lagere inkomens. De reden hiervoor is de 
combinatie van een hogere mate van opvanggebruik en het systeem van 
fiscale korting (belastingaftrek), waardoor het effect van de 
inkomensgerelateerde tariefstructuur volledig ongedaan wordt gemaakt. 
In Zweden zien we het tegenovergestelde beeld: het gebruik van 
kinderopvang is niet alleen gelijkmatiger verdeeld over de verschillende 
inkomensgroepen, de laagste inkomens ontvangen er bijna dubbel 
zoveel aan de overheidssubsidies in vergelijking met de hoogste 
inkomens, omwille van het inkomensgerelateerde tariefstelsel en het 
ontbreken van een systeem van fiscale korting. Hoewel kinderopvang in 
beide landen de expliciete doelstelling heeft om de sociale integratie te 
bevorderen, slaagt enkel het Zweedse model erin om de kwetsbaarste 
groepen in de samenleving in het opvangsysteem te integreren. Hier 
wordt niet alleen het belang van het beleidsontwerp in het ontstaan van 
een Mattheuseffect duidelijk, het toont ook dat een Mattheuseffect 
vermijdbaar is. 
Hoofdstuk 4 gaat dieper in op het stelsel van de kinderbijslag in 
Europese landen. Focus hier is op de laagste inkomensgroepen: welk 
beleidsontwerp heeft de grootste impact op het kinderarmoederisico? 
De resultaten tonen dat kinderbijslagstelsels die meer selectief inzetten 
op lage inkomensgezinnen effectiever zijn in het reduceren van 
kinderarmoede. Landen die daarentegen hogere bedragen voorzien voor 
hogere inkomensgroepen, i.e. gekenmerkt worden door een 
Mattheuseffect, presteren erg zwak in het reduceren van kinderarmoede. 
De best presterende landen kennen een universele kinderbijslag 
waarbinnen hogere bedragen worden voorzien voor lage inkomens (het 
zogenaamde ‘progressief universalisme’ of ‘selectiviteit binnen 
universaliteit’).  
Hoofdstuk 5 evalueert de doelstelling van het kinderopvangbeleid. 
In dit hoofdstuk wordt een  eenvoudig argument ontwikkeld: als 
hoogwaardige kinderopvang goed is voor de cognitieve en niet-
cognitieve ontwikkeling van alle kinderen maar in het bijzonder voor 
kinderen die opgroeien in armoede, dan moeten vooral deze laatsten 
gebruik maken van hoogwaardige kinderopvang. De resultaten van 
hoofdstuk 2 en 3 toonden reeds dat ongelijkheid in 
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kinderopvanggebruik de norm is in Europese landen, en de resultaten in 
dit hoofdstuk bevestigen die trend voor een grotere groep van landen 
(waaronder Australië en de Verenigde Staten).  
Dit universele patroon van ongelijk gebruik suggereert dat de 
doelstelling van kinderopvang om de sociale ongelijkheid bij jonge 
kinderen te verkleinen op dit moment niet realistisch is. De uitbreiding 
van kinderopvangvoorzieningen, zoals gestuurd door het Europees 
beleid, kan de ongelijkheid zelfs vergroten; het omgekeerde van wat 
wordt beoogd. Verdere analyses in dit hoofdstuk tonen dat de 
ongelijkheid in gebruik niet verklaard kan worden door informele zorg 
door grootouders of familie: lager geschoolde moeder kunnen zelfs 
minder een beroep doen op grootouderlijke zorg dan hoger geschoolde 
moeders. Tewerkstelling daarentegen is wel een erg belangrijke 
verklarende factor: wanneer alleen het opvanggebruik van kinderen die 
leven in gezin met een werkende moeder in acht wordt genomen, dan 
blijkt de ongelijkheid in de meeste landen te verdwijnen. 
De analyses in dit hoofdstuk demonstreren ook het belang van een 
consistent beleid. Finland is een mooi voorbeeld van hoe verschillende 
beleidsinstrumenten elkaar kunnen tegenwerken. In Finland heeft elk 
kind recht op een plek in hoogkwalitatieve kinderopvang, maar 
gezinnen kunnen er ook voor kiezen om een uitkering te ontvangen als 
een van de ouders (vaak de moeder) thuisblijft om voor de kinderen te 
zorgen. Het gevolg is dat deze uitkering een incentive is voor moeders 
met weinig perspectieven op de arbeidsmarkt om thuis te blijven en zelf 
voor hun kinderen te zorgen. Dat zorgt, ondanks de voldoende 
beschikbaarheid van kinderopvang, voor een enorme kloof in het 
gebruik ervan.  
In hoofdstuk 6 ga ik dieper in op de oorzaken van dit ongelijk 
gebruik van kinderopvang. Door middel van een vergelijkende studie ga 
ik na welke institutionele elementen van de welvaartsstaat gerelateerd 
zijn aan ongelijkheid in kinderopvang. Ik vind onder meer bevestiging 
voor het belang van consistentie in het gevoerde beleid en voor 
tewerkstelling: landen die inzetten op erg lange periodes van betaald 
ouderschapsverlof kennen meer ongelijkheid in kinderopvanggebruik, 
landen waar laaggeschoolde moeders meer aan het werk zijn kennen 
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minder ongelijkheid in opvanggebruik. De resultaten van dit hoofdstuk 
suggereren ook dat meer overheidsuitgaven voor kinderopvang op zich 
niet voldoende zijn om lagere ongelijkheid in kinderopvang te 
bewerkstelligen, het doet er toe hoe de uitgaven worden gespendeerd. 
Meer specifiek moeten de uitgaven leiden tot de grotere beschikbaarheid 
van opvangplaatsen. 
In hoofdstuk 7, ten slotte, ga ik nog een stapje verder en bekijk ik 
deze kwestie over tijd. Op basis van vergelijkbare data over het gebruik 
van kinderopvang en de overheidsuitgaven voor kinderopvang over de 
periode 2006-2010 ga ik na of bijkomende overheidsuitgaven leiden tot 
1) meer kinderopvanggebruik; en 2) minder ongelijkheid in 
kinderopvanggebruik. De resultaten laten zien dat meer investeren in 
kinderopvang inderdaad leidt tot meer gebruik van kinderopvang door 
jonge kinderen, maar dat de ongelijkheid er niet noodzakelijk mee 
vermindert. Met andere woorden: het huidige investeringsbeleid moet 
worden bijgestuurd om meer gelijkheid in opvanggebruik te 
bewerkstelligen. De resultaten suggereren een complexe relatie tussen 
overheidsinvesteringen voor kinderopvang en ongelijkheid in gebruik 
van kinderopvang, maar de data laten vooralsnog niet toe om deze 
kwestie verder uit te diepen. 
Het Mattheuseffect als analysekader laat zien dat sociale klasse nog 
steeds relevant is om de uitkomsten van het sociaal beleid te begrijpen. 
Mijn conclusie is dan ook dat we niet kunnen verwachten dat mensen 
die tot verschillende sociale groepen behoren op een homogene manier 
zullen reageren op beleidsmaatregelen die vaak bedoeld zijn om 
bepaalde gedragsveranderingen te bewerkstelligen. Beleidsmakers 
moeten hier rekening mee houden. Meer specifiek eindig ik dit werk met 
een pleidooi voor een herijking van de sociale investeringsgedachte. Het 
Mattheuseffect in het ouderschapsverlof maar vooral in de 
kinderopvang leidt er toe dat we niet kunnen verwachten dat deze 
instrumenten op dit moment zullen bijdragen tot een vermindering van 
de sociale ongelijkheid noch tot het verminderen van kinderarmoede. 
Niet alleen moeten overheden streven naar het wegwerken van het 
Mattheuseffect (en mijn resultaten geven een aantal aanzetten hoe dat 
zou kunnen), ook inkomensbescherming moet terug prominent in beeld 
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komen. Daar spelen kinderbijslagen een erg belangrijke rol: zij hebben 
een onmiddellijke impact op het gezinsinkomen van gezinnen met 
kinderen, en dragen zo bij tot een significante en directe vermindering 
van de kinderarmoede. Kortom, zowel de nieuwe als de oude 
instrumenten van het gezinsbeleid zijn noodzakelijk om van sociale 
investeringen een echt succes te maken. 
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